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ABSTRACT

The value concept in sociology is traced from its beginnings
in phenomenological philosophy to its contemporary status as a
concept of many meanings and usages,
articles from five sociological
journals and books by sociologists expose the value concepts as one
which has been variously defined as the motive power for particular
behaviors, the goals towards which particular actions are directed,
and highly generalized abstractions of social preferences.
The
Vanfossen typology of values is used as the organizing principle
for discussing the various value concepts.
The intention of discovering the value concept of greatest
utility is thwarted by the realization that different conceptualizations
are able to encompass different ranges of meaning.
It is determined
that the concepts of greatest range are lacking in internal discrimin
ation.
It is also determined that highly discriminative concepts,
or concepts which are very precise about what does and what does not
constitute a value usually exclude a great area of meaning.
It is determined that "value" cannot logically function as an
independent variable or hold causal status.
It is argued that
"value” can serve as a "correlative" or complementary principle for
the development of causal explanations.
The sociological premise
that human ideas are related, in fact, to the physical and social
reality in which these ideas are found requires the maintenance of
a value concept of broad range and high discrimination.
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THE MEANING OF VALUE:

A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

* OF A*SOCIOLOGICAL “CONCEPT

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This thesis is concerned with a particular sociological concept—
value.

There are two major ways in which the subject may be approached.

The first approach is to apply the concept to social entities with
the intention of discovering the values of these social entities.
The first approach then, is to concentrate on the substance or
content of values.
The second major approach to the subject is to compare value
concepts with each other.

In this case the researcher examines

different value concepts in order to discover the range of meaning or
substance that a concept can encompass.

The result of such an

effort, if successful, would be an indication as to the most useful,
discriminating, or informing concept available.

If the results of

such an investigation cannot determine the most useful concept, then
the researcher must explain why this is the case and what implica
tions this has for the use of the concept.
This paper examines the concept of value with regard to its
conceptual meaning.

In other words, this thesis intends to explain

what value "means."

The term "value" means different things to

different researchers and these differences become evident when the
various definitions and usages are compared.

The second intention
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of this thesis is to discover which value concepts have the greatest
utility for the sociological discipline.

This involves recommendations

for the future conceptualization of "value."

There are in the

literature actually very few attempts to compare values in this way.
For the most part, sociologists who use a value concept either
make up a definition of their own or may adopt a usage from one
or another of the more "eminent" practitioners in the discipline.
In his efforts to discover the varieties of conceptualization the
researcher will find himself examining the literature in a variety
of substantive areas.

In other words, the researcher will read works

on criminology or delinquency, race relations, political sociology,
medical sociology, comparative sociology, social stratification, the
sociology of religion, social organization, rural sociology, and
virtually every other content area that can be named.

The curious

problem for the researcher of the value concept is to abstract -from
each study the value concept employed or, if an explicit definition
is lacking, extrapolate the concept’s meaning from a number of
studies on the same subject.

To undertake a conceptual investigation

the researcher needs a framework within which to work and a method for
accumulating "the literature" on the subject.

The Framework
This writer had adopted a typology of values developed by
Marion Vanfossen.

"Value" is understood as a generic term for "all

those belief and expressive idea forms to which some positive or
negative (valuational) meaning is attached (Vanfossen, page 5)."
such, value is not a quality of an object.

As

A value is a quality which
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is conceived by the actor.

Unlike some definitions which regard

value simply as an affective quality that implies the "good" and
distinguish it from the existential which implies the true and the
false, this writer’s understanding of value includes both.

Valuative

meaning may be based on a wide range of criteria from the actor’s
preference for a kind of food to the validity of a scientific theory.
This understanding of value is different from many others since
judgements of truth or fact are included with the more conventional
understanding which regards value as non-factual.
Values are of five basic types:
systems, and complexes.
values.

norms, beliefs, ideals,

Norms, beliefs, *and ideals are Specific.

These involve "particular separable standards, explanations,

and sentiments (Vanfossen, page 5)."

"Systems and complexes are

Diffuse; they are clusters or constellations of values focused around
some general referent

(Vanfossen, page 5).”

inclusive than Systems.

Complexes are more

While a complex includes all of a societies’

major values, a System may include very few.

Norms
Norms are situationally specific prescriptions or proscriptions
for behavior.

Norms are divided into three types.

customary, moral, and legal norms.

They are

Vanfossen attributes this

distinction to Sumner’s original distinction between folkways,
mores, and laws.

Customary norms are recognized as standards of

social appropriateness.
for behavior.
conformity.

They are highly visible standards or rules

Customary norms dictate the boundaries of surface
In the light of customary norms a behavior is judged
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as correct or incorrect.
Moral norms are customary norms that are considered so important
as to have a direct bearing on the social welfare.

The violation

of a moral norm is seen as morally wrong behavior as opposed to being
merely socially incorrect.

While the violation of a customary norm

may evoke anything from amusement, to curiosity, to ridicule, the
violation of a moral norm evokes a sense of evil and the violator
is thought to have some terrible flaw.

Because an actor considers

moral norms to be of greater importance than customary norms, moral
norms are violated less frequently than customary norms.

Ironically,

customary norms prove to be more important with regard to an
individual’s future since it is this kind of norm which is more
likely to be violated.

The distinction between moral norms and

customary norms, according to Vanfossen:
. . . often carries with it the inference that folkways are thus
somehow not very important norms.
This is unfortunate, since
both in terms of their pervasiveness and what they are likely
to mean regarding life's chances, folkways are exceedingly
important. Most things in life do not really hinge on moral
considerations, in part because the mores are in large measure
internalized as absolutes and are thus not as often matters for
decision.
To indicate only a few general examples, such things
as what cliques and groups a person may join; the sample from
which he may draw friends, a date, a spouse; his job or
profession, and advancement in it; his socio-economic position
and potential mobility; and indeed his overall style of life
can depend in large measure upon his familiarity with and
sensitivity to the proper performance of folkways.
(Vanfossen,
page 6)
In contrast with customary no r m s , moral norms change very
slowly.

A moral norm is one which an actor views as morally binding.

As a result, this actor is not going to view the norm in question
as one which should be changed.

It is frequently the case that moral

norms are incorporated into a societies' institutional structure.

Legal norms are "formalized, codified, and institutionalized
customary and moral norms . . . (Vanfossen, page 8)."
may be of two types; customary law and enacted law.

Legal norms
Customary law

reflects "at least some cultural consensus" while enacted law is
created "ordinarily for the purpose of regulation of large-scale
secondary interaction (Vanfossen, page 8)."
According to Vanfossen, enacted law is expected to be "reasonably
compatible" with other values but at the same time the great majority
of people are unaware of most of these laws and are not expected to
be aware of them.

Beliefs
Beliefs are propositional statements or "explanations of the way
phenomena are to be viewed and understood (Vanfossen, page 9)."
Beliefs are of three types; fictions, myths, and theories.

Fictions,

myths, and theories are all explanations but there are important
differences.

While myths and theories are explanations that are

expected to be believed, fictions are explanations that are known
to be untrue.
A fiction is a consensually agreed upon social lie which we all
tell each other because it supports an idea or justifies a
practice which we individually know to be untrue, but which as
a group we' find useful or convenient to employ.
(Vanfossen,
page 9)
Fictions are not lies in the usual sense of the word because everyone
involved in the fiction is aware of the falsehood.
may visit a sick friend and ask how he feels.
he is sick and he knows he is sick.
will say he feels fine.

For example, one

Of course, we know

Nevertheless,

the sick friend

In this case a fiction is employed as a
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simple courtesy.
Myths differ from fictions in two important respects.

First,

a fiction is known to be untrue while a myth, also being untrue,
is taken as fact.

For those people that accept a myth as a value

the myth is regarded as an accurate account of how things are.
Second, a fiction is usually a simple statement while a myth is
usually a long explanatory account.

In any event, neither myths

nor fictions have any empirical support.

That is, they fail to meet

the criteria for truth required of theories.
Theories are like myths in that both are taken to be accurate
explanatory accounts. * As Vanfossen pointfed out, the fact that myths
and theories are both beliefs makes for a confusion of the differences.
This confusion leads to the superficial conclusion that myths and
theories have equal validity since it is a case of what you believe
against what I believe.

As Vanfossen put it:

”1 believe this— you

believe that— all truth is relative anyway— and w h o ’s to say?”

The

primary difference between myths and theories is not "the inherent
validity of the explanation" but "the kinds of things which are
acceptable as evidence."
Myths are deductive, a priori explanations.

They rely on the

initial faith of the believer in the premises of the explanations.
To qualify as a theory an explanation must

(1) be able to handle

all of the relevant data which is available;■(2) it must be the only
logical explanation which is able to handle all the data (the
alternative could not logically exist); and (3) the explanation
must be congruent with what else is known.
Theories may exist in three conditions:

(1) A theory may have

been demonstrated true;

(2) it may not have been demonstrated true

as yet; or (3) it may have been demonstrated false.

If a theory has

been demonstrated false but is still believed, ^that theory is a myth.

Ideals
"An ideal is a generalized ’good.’

Ideals are values

representing widely agreed upon definitions of virtue or excellence
(Vanfossen, page 13)."

Ideals may appear in the form of idealized

norms or idealized beliefs.

Idealized norms are often thought of as

goals towards which men should strive.

In actuality there is

considerable deviance and operational norms may dictate that the
individual act contrary to the ideal.
"Idealized beliefs are those generally held definitions and
explanations which have become so traditional and time-honored as to
be raised to the level of hallowed verities, such as that crime
d oe s n ’t pay, that all men are equal before the law, or that mothers
instinctively love their babies (Vanfossen, page 13)."

Both

idealized norms and idealized beliefs provide a wide basis for
consensus and exceptions do little to challenge the virtue and
truth of ideals.
Whether ideals are presented in the form of norms or beliefs
or as a "named virtue (honesty)," all ideals are expressions.of
"abstract sentiments."
generalized sentiments.

Abstract sentiments are broad, vague,
They are frequently used as justifications

of other specific values, institutions, or social structure.

By

associating an abstract sentiment with some practice it is hoped
that the goodness inherent to the sentiment will be identified with
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the particular practice in question.
The same abstract sentiment may be used to justify quite different
norms, beliefs, or behaviors, as for example when several
political parties justify opposite positions by appealing to
identical sentiments; or different sentiments can be used to
justify logically inconsistent or contradictory values or
behavior engaged in by the same person or group, as for
example when we send aid to one country because of the "brother
hood of m a n ” and drop napalm on another (or perhaps the same
one) to "preserve freedom," "contain Communism," or "defend
our national security."
(Vanfossen, page 14)
The most important function of ideals is that they provide
the basis for consensus that could not possibly be attained on more
specific grounds such as behavior.

Systems
Value systems are. highly focused and highly visible constella
tions of values around some practice or idea.
interrelated n orms, beliefs, and ideals.

Systems include

Systems are of two kinds;

Institutions and Ideologies,
Institutions are generally thought of in structural terms.
Institutions are also interrelated systems of values.
All
institutions, the basic pivotal ones, as well as the secondary
or derived ones of a specific society, will have incorporated
within them many other types of values— folkways, mores,
fictions, myths, sentiments, models, and so forth.
(Vanfossen,
page 16)
•
Institutions have two major characteristics:
and serve as systems of social control.

They are pervasive

Institutions are pervasive

in that virtually every aspect of life is touched in. some way or
another by an institution.

Because institutions are values, their

pervasiveness serves a controlling function.

This control is not

the. uncomfortable, restraining kind of thing which is brought to
mind by the word "control."

A stable institution is one in which
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most people believe or approve.

For the most part, institutions are

pressed upon us from birth and the values or rules of the institutions
become our values.

Though institutions change, the change is hardly

ever radical or ’’revolutionary."
Even in revolutions,, people are more likely to be changed than
are value-structures. Whepu^institutions are challenged to some
degree, as has been happening in our society, many people are
left with a sense of r-dlsquietude. ambivalence, or even
a y ^ n at i o p . . .
Institutions are essentially conservative and they ordinarily
change->more by evolution than by revolution.
Some specific values
fade and some new ones emerge (they are seldom really new by
the time they have become institutionalized) but the bulk
provides a certain constancy and continuity both with the past
and in terms of the various interrelationships among institu
tions.
(Vanfossen, page 17)

.

Ideologies are also value systems.
Any ideology will include many particular norms, beliefs, and
ideals.
But whereas institutions are always made up of both
values and highly patterned interrelated behaviors (a structure),
ideologies may exist as systems of ideas and meaning more or
less independent
of anv «SDecific
social structure. . . .
; ■ . . . . . . . . . . iwmhi
0,1,iit—
■ *iiiimi'i n w i « i i M n f m ? i i i - - - - - - - - ,-r|1
Institutionalized ideologies constitute the value aspect of
institutions, and are used to justify or legitimize existing
social structures.
Christianity, Democracy, Capitalism, Racism,
Communism, Facism, and Monogamy are a few ideological systems
which have become highly institutionalized at one time or another
somewhere in the world.
(Vanfossen, page 18)
For an ideology to pose a great threat to an institution, that
is for it to bjecome a movement, an ideology requires a structure ,
organization,
and a hierarchy
of leadership.
^
^
.T
^
-H Irtl '-— — mum .l»

Without structure

("highly patterned interrelated behaviors"), organization (a
coordination of activities and policies), and a hierarchy of leader
ship, an ideology would necessarily remain a fragmented system of
ideas that cannot systematically attack the problems with which it
is concerned.

However, even an ideology which lacks organization,

structure, and a hierarchy of leadership can have some effect on or
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at least annoy the proponents of an institution.
While an ideology
contains all sorts of specific values, its
■ ...
'"

most important element is "myth." .,j„
Once the integral relation between myth and ideology is recognized,
the question arises as to whether ideologies can^srirvive without
their suppor.ting^mv tfcs. If they cannot, a full understanding
of the logical tie-up between these two types of values could be
most relevant for programs which attempt to change attitudes and
policies.
An ideology is a diffuse system of values, so broad
and generalized that it is almost impossible to attack directly;
however, myths are specific values, particularized explanations
which claim that certain things are so or not so, or exist in a
certain relationship.
A myth can be challens^ad^dA-rectlv on
efflpiricaT grounds. if indeed the empirical evidence with which
to disprove it is available.
(Vanfossen, page 19)

Complexes ‘
L ike systems. value complexes are diffu^e-hut they are more
encompassing or inclusive than systems.
That complex which incorporates all of the major values of a
society into an overall
"style" may be referred to as
that
societies1 Ethos; that complex which portrays the image or
range of alternative images of man himself may be termed an
Ethic and includes various major Personality Cynosures and.,-their
associaiad? Emulation Models.
(VanTdssen, page 20)
Each society has an ethos all its own.

An ethos may be

described by pointing out the central themes of a societies’
institutions.
Ethics may run across cultures and are not necessarily grounded
to a particular society.

Unlike ethos, ethics are not necessarily

grounded in a temporal or spatial context.

An Ethic is composed of

a definition of man ("the guide for living"), a personality cynosure
("the personality type most

characteristic of an ethic"),and emulation

models (examples of persons

representative of an ethic).

An image arises in the form of folk heroes, painted in broad
strokes or narrowly detailed, portraying the attitudes, motivations,
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goals, styles, interaction techniques, carriage, and even
physical characteristics that personify the ethic. . . .
. . . the ethic both directly..and „indirectly reflects the
broad-^rganizafj-pnal and structural forms of an-.era*, and
indicates something about what kind or kinds of personalities
are called for to be able^to^onerate most effectively within
these forms.
In that relatively free-wheeling era of Western
history when the concentration was an expansionism, conquest
and exploitation of the natural environment, and later, emerg
ing industrialism, the Protestant Ethic made a great deal of
sense.
However, neither the value complex of the Protestant
Ethic nor the personality cynosure of the individualized innerdirected man make quite as much sense in a highly urban and
bureaucratically structured world of collective authority
systems, which of necessity must begin to think of conserva t i o n ,
rather than exploitation, and the coordinated e£forts required
by the new industrial state, rather than^the.^..individualized
entrepreneurship of farm, ranch, or first Ford plant.
(Vanfossen,
pages 21-22)
— —
■» *

*

The Method
The sources of information which this writer has used in
researching the value concept consist of books and sociological
journals.

The journals examined are the American Sociological Review,

American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, Social Problems, and
Sociological Quarterly.
articles by topic.

The journals have indexes* which list

All articles were examined which were listed under

the heading of "values” or were listed under a heading in which the
term "value" appeared.

Not all of the articles that were listed

in this manner proved relevant.

Generally, only those articles in

*There are two exceptions.
Social Forces and Sociological
Quarterly did not have indexes available.
Instead, this writer
worked by examining titles.
These two journals represent the least
systematic and reliable sources in this research.
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which "value" served as a central concept were used in this examina
tion.*

The footnotes and citations which appeared in those articles

served as a secondary source of relevant information.

Of course,

not all of these citations and footnotes proved useful.
The books which were used in this examination were discovered
by three methods:

The first (1) involved the citations and footnotes

from- the journals listed above; the second (2) involved a search of
card catalogs in the libraries of the College of William and Mary
and Hamline University where the "subject" catalog had listings
under "Value" or "Values"; the third (3) involved whatever relevant
material this writer was able to pull together from his studies in
sociology.**
In general, all of the sources used are sociological.

With

some exceptions the fields of economics, psychology, philosophy, and
political science were excluded from this examination.

For example,

John Dewey is most frequently cited as an educator but is often
cited by sociologists as having been influential in their

*Regardless of the utility of "value" to an article, all those
articles which were examined are listed in the Bibliography.
For
example, "The Development and Transformation of Monetary Meanings
in the Child," by Anselm Strauss, was examined but did not directly
apply to the subject.
**Some of the materials which are included were discovered by
chance.
Specifically, the section of Fictions is very short and
exists by virtue of accident.
One of the three articles is included
because its subject matter may be interpreted as dealing with
fictions.
The other two writers are discussed because they explicitly
used the term "fiction." This writer happened to stumble across
the writings while searching for other information.
The articles
were not discovered as a result of the method used by this writer
for researching the value concept.
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conceptualizations of value.

Milton Rokeach is considered a

psychologist and does not receive great attention from sociologists.
He is, however, the most renowned student of "values" is^syehology,
and is Professor of Psychology and Sociology at Washington State
University.

The Organization
Chapters III through VII constitute the main body of the
paper.

Each of these five chapters is titled with one of the

five basic typological categories discussed in The Framework.
Chapter II is entitled "The Origins of Value in Sociology."
the only chapter which is organized chronologically.

This is

Chapter III is

entitled "Norms"; Chapter IV is entitled "Beliefs," and so on.
The literature discussed in each of the five chapters (IIIVII)

is the result of a rough categorization. In other words,

an

author might define or use the concept of "value" in a sense which
approximates the definition of "Ideals."

The categorization is

"rough" because the literature examined does not necessarily fall
into one single category.

In some cases a book or article is

discussed in several different chapters as it pertains to the subject
at hand.

It is very important that the reader understands that the

literature discussed in each chapter was discovered by researching
the subject of "values."

In other words, this writer did not

examine the literature dealing with "beliefs," or "norms," or
"ideals."

This writer is concerned with how sociologists use the

concept of "value."

How sociologists use the concept of "norm" and

"belief" and "ideal" is another project altogether and would
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constitute a far greater scope than intended in this context.
The sections and sub-sections in each chapter were determined
by the concerns or issues which recur in the literature as opposed
to some predetermined plan of this writer.

Of course, this writer

had to structure the discussions as he perceived them.
Chapter VIII is entitled "Conclusion."

The first section in

this chapter presents the only formal theory of value which was
discovered.

By "formal" this writer means that a set of hypotheses

and corrolaries were developed to explain the relationships between
valuers and values.

The theory is criticized.

The second section

involves a general account Of how values “have been categorized by
others and the criticisms which value concepts have received.

The

third and final section involves recommendations for the future
conceptualization of value.

These recommendations are intended to

allow the greatest possible utility for sociology.

CHAPTER II
THE ORIGINS OF VALUE IN SOCIOLOGY

European Origins
The use of "value" as a sociological concept arose from a
philosophical conflict.
essences.

The phenomenologists searched for man's

The positivists argued that things, including man, could

be understood only i n ’terms'of their external manifestations.
The phenomenological method, the method of pure sociology,
discovers the essences of society, social behavior, and social
relations.
It is not to be confused with the inductiveempirical approach to social materials, although the latter
may consist in the specialized research that applies the
principles and discoveries of the phenomenological method.
In fact, the inductive-empirical and phenomenological methods
are not simple alternatives, for the latter is more profound,
establishing results more basic than the former.
The
phenomenological method, in contrast to induction, may arrive
at judgements of absolute certainty and finality.
Through
use of this method, one discovers the ultimate, a priori facts
of social life, the inborn but plastic dispositions— to fondle,
to help, to fight, to sympathize, to imitate, to receive
suggestions, to be sociable, to trust, and so on— are the
a priori preconditions of human society, and social life is
reducible to the development of them.
Because they are inborn,
they are discoverable directly— if only one has the proper
method.
As original qualities of mental experience, they
are susceptible only to phenomenological analysis, which
discovers them and reduces all other qualities of experience
to them.
(Martindale, 1960: 272)
Phenomenology had its greatest impact on the course of
sociological thought through the work of two philosophers; Max
Scheler and perhaps of greater influence, Heinrich Rickert.
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Fundamental to all aspects of Scheler’s thought was the distinc
tion characteristic of the phenomenologists between the realm
of ideal value— essence— and the realm of existential fact.
While they partly parallel one another, they must not be identi
fied.
Real existence consists in factual relationships changing
in time; the realm of values is a sphere of timelessly valid,
intuited meanings.
This metaphysical distinction is essential
to the contrast between cultural sociology and the sociology
of real factors.
Cultural data are "ideal," existing in the
realm of ideas and values.
Real factors are part of changing
events in time.
Cultural data are defined by ideal goals or
intentions; real data form an impulse structure around such
things as sex, hunger and striving for power.
It is wrong to
assume that real factors such as race, political power, and
economic production exclusively determine meanings.
It is also
wrong to assume that external events of experience consist in
the unfolding of spiritualistic and perso'nalistic ideas.
Ideas do not become concrete and actualized unless bound up in
some fashion in collective tendencies and incorporated in
institutional structures.
The peculiar problem of historical
knowledge for Schelar is the explanation of how these two
realms are jointly effective.
(Martindale, 1960: 273)
Rickert accepts the doctrine of immediate experience, maintaining
that being does not exist except as the content of consciousness.
Immanent in consciousness is immediate reality as representation.
The immanence of being, as found in consciousness, is that of
the universal, the concept of formal logic in its representation.
However, the objective of knowledge cannot be obtained from
formal logic.
All that is given in consciousness is the play
of representations, and between representations there is no
universal and necessary validity.
To establish the objectivity
of knowledge it is necessary to get away from consciousness and
to devise a transcendant standard that has required validity.
The transcendant standard is not a content of consciousness.
It
is an "ought to be." This "ought" is the standard of logical
valuations.
The feeling of self-evidence is the only
indication of its presence.
Such self-evidence is the ultimate
criterion of truth.
In the further development of his ideas,
Rickert abandons the abstract doctrine of "ought" and replaces
it with "value," or the ideal, to which the doctrine of "ought"
is a stepping stone.
(Martindale, 1960:223)
According to Lewis Coser, Georg Simmel was a friend of Rickert
and continually enjoyed his support.
inspiration" from Simmel.
essentially economic.

Scheler derived "major

Simmel’s understanding of value is

Simmel’s description of value appeared in his
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book, The Philosophy of M oney.*

This writer discovered Simmel's

interpretation in "A Chapter in the Philosophy of Value" which
appeared in the new American Journal of Sociology (1900: 579-603).
An economic interpretation of value is important to Simmel as
the nature of human interaction is changed by the form taken by value.
When barter is replaced by money, transactions become more precise.
Money permits the determination of equivalents.

"It is impersonal

in a manner in which objects of barter, like crafted gongs and
collected shells can never be (Coser, 1971: 193)."
When money becomes the prevalent link between people, it replaces
personal ties anchored in diffuse feelings by impersonal relations
that are limited to a specific purpose.
Consequently, abstract
calculation invades areas of social life, such as kinship
relations or the realm of esthetic appreciation, which were
previously the domain of qualitative rather than quantitative
appraisals.** (Coser, 1971: 193)
Though Simmel's emphasis is upon economic value, some of his
formulations apply to conceptions of value which are not economic.
A strict economic view would dictate that a gain in value in one
sphere would be accompanied by a loss or sacrifice in another.
Simmel turned the matter around by noting that a sacrifice on one
hand may result in a valuation where none had previously existed.
"In fact, there is a series of cases in which the sacrifice not
merely raises the value of the aim, but even produces it (Simmel,
1900: 565)."

Though the economic conception of value is the most

precise or, if you will, empirical standard of value, and goes well

*As of 1971 this volume had not been translated to English.
**C. H. Cooley's formulations in this regard are similar.
aspect of Cooley is discussed in Chapter VI.

This
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with Simmel's "emphasis on the structural determinants of social
action," he did not neglect the importance of internal factors.
"Particular circumstances, however, are necessary in order to
attach to an object a valuation, for every such valuation is an
incident of the whole complex of our feelings, which is in constant
flux, adaptation, and reconstruction (Simmel, 1900: 585)."
According to Timasheff, Durkheim and Weber are the two most
important figures in the history of sociological thought that
emphasize the significance of subjective factors in social activity.
Durkheim defined a "social fact" as "every way of acting, fixed or
not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint
(Coser, 1971: 129).,"

Coser explains that Durkheim's emphasis on the

exteriority and constraining features of "social facts" is a
characteristic of his early work; particularly his work on legal
systems.

Coser says that Durkheim’s mechanical and organic

solidarity distinguish the features of "value consensus" from
"structural integration."
[Mechanical solidarity] prevails to the extent that "ideas and
tendencies common to all members of the society are greater
in number and intensity than those which pertain personally to
each member.
This solidarity can grow only in inverse ratio
to personality."
In other words, mechanical solidarity prevails
where individual differences are minimized and the members of
society are much alike in their devotion to the common weal.
"Solidarity which comes from likeness is at its maximum when the
collective conscience completely envelops our whole conscience
and coincides in all points with it." Organic solidarity, in
contrast, develops out of differences, rather than likenesses,
between individuals.
It is a product of the division of labor.
With increasing differentiation of functions in a society
comes increasing differentiation between its members.
(Coser,
1971: 131)
Timasheff's insistence on Durkheim's importance in stressing
subjective factors is derived from Durkheim's later work.

Coser
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agrees with the change in Durkheim’s emphasis.
The mature Durkheim stressed that social facts, and more
particularly moral rules, become effective guides and controls
of conduct only to the extent that they become internalized in
the consciousness of individuals, while continuing to exist
independently of individuals.
(Coser, 1971: 129)
Though members of mechanically solidaric societies have strong
systems of common belief and members of organic societies do not
require as many common beliefs, every society must have "common
assumptions about the world around them."

Durkheim refers to this

set of assumptions as the "conscience collective."

Timasheff

considered this concept as that which distinguishes Durkheim’s
recognition of subjective factors.

In Judgments of Reality and

Judgements of Value (1911) Durkheim .
. . . relates the collective conscience to social ideals, holding
that a reciprocal process relates the two— social ideals bring
into being the collective conscience and the latter in turn
generates social ideals.
Ideals arise from reality, to be sure,
but go far beyond it; m a n ’s conception of ideal society is
part of social reality and therefore requires sociological study.
Religion, law, morals, and economics— considered by Durkheim
as the major social systems— are at once systems of values and
ideals.
Social ideals constitute the collective conscience as
it exists independently of individual conceptions, while values
are manifestations of the common conscience in individuals
themselves.
(Timasheff, 1955: 111)
Rickert’s phenomenological philosophy had a major impact on
Max Weber.
The real distinctions to be made, Rickert and Windelband taught,
hinge on the differences between individualizing and generalizing
thought.
There exist two radically opposed scientific approaches:
The nomothetic sciences that aim at establishing universal laws
and uniformities, and the idiographic sciences, above all
history . . . , that only give descriptive accounts of particular
historical constellations or individual historical actors.
(Coser, 1971: 246)
W e b e r ’s emphasis on values was a reaction to materialist conceptions
that considered values and ideas as the product of structural
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characteristics.

Weber did not deny that structural characteristics

have an impact but rather, they are not the sole determinants of
future events.

"In contrast, Weber's primary focus was^on the

subjective meanings that human actors attach to their actions in
their mutual orientations within specific social-historical contexts
(Coser, 1971: 217)."

These subjective meanings are the differentia

of Weber's four types of social action.
Men may engage in purposeful or goal-oriented rational action
(zweckrational); their rational action may be value-oriented
(wertrational); they may act from emotional or affective
motivations; or, finally, they may engage in traditional action.
Purposeful rationality, in which both goal and means are
rationally chosen. . . . Value-oriented rationality is
characterized by striving for a substantive goal, which in
itself may not be rational. . . . Affective action is anchored
in the emotional state of the actor rather than in the rational
weighing of means and ends. . . . Finally, traditional action
is guided by customary habits of thought, by reliance on "the
eternal yesterday” ; . . . (Coser, 1971: 217)
Weber's types of action would later inform his types of authority
and permit him to argue the importance of subjective meanings in
determining the course of events for different societies.*

"Seen

in the light of W e b e r ’s methodology, the sociological emphasis on
key values in a social system is an effort to relate the operation
of the system to elements rooted in the past (Lipset, 1963: 531)."
Weber's sociology— "that science which aims at the interpretive
understanding (Verstehen) of social behavior in order to gain an
explanation of its causes, its course, and its effects (Coser, 1971:
220)"— has been attacked as an invalid method on the grounds that it
is not empirical.

In other words, "verstehen" sociology is not

*This aspect of Weber's work is discussed in Chapter VII.
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subject to systematic verification.

Weber did not see verstehen

as an end product but as a "correlative11 or complementary principle
in the development of causal explanations.

"Immediate intuitions

of meaning can be transformed into valid knowledge only if they
can be incorporated into theoretical structures that aim at causal
explanation (Coser, 1971: 221)."

The use of value or subjective

meaning in the interpretation of human action is attacked today
even as it was attacked by the positivists at the time of Durkheim
and Weber.*

Nevertheless, Weber "helped to make clear the significant

role of values in social life (Timasheff, 1955: 182)."
Celestin Bougie -was a'student of Durkheim and assumed the chair
vacated by Durkheim at the Sorbonne.
stature of his mentor.

Bougie never reached the

Bougie's The Evolution of Values (1926) is

an attempt to develop the values aspect of Durkheims mechanical
and organic solidarity.

Bougie calls a value "a permanent possibility

of satisfactions (Bougie, 1926: 19)."

Durkheim's influence is

unmistakable.
To speak of society is to speak not only of exchange of services,
or collaboration of forces, but also of communication of
sentiments.
Men are intimately associated only when they have
a number of things to respect in common.
A civilization is not
merely an assemblage of means of which humanity makes use in
its operations on nature; it is system of ends designed to
make individual activities converge.
The maintenance of a
sacred fire is a vital necessity for every society.
(Bougie,
1926: 38)
Bougie used Spencer's example of the multiple function of
priests (first judges, first doctors, first astronomers) to demonstrate

*These attacks on the value concept in general are discussed
in Chapter VIII.
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that a differentiation of function has occurred over time.

’’The

functions formerly pertaining to the priesthood are being made
specific.

So will be made specific the values primitively unified

by religion.

The differentiation of values keeps pace with the

division of labor (Bougie, 1926: 63)."
Bougie*s writing suggests that values are subsequent to
experience.

It is difficult to determine if Bougie attributes

any causal power to values.
comments as:

Throughout his book we find such

"All education is initiation" and "every occupation

marks its man, internally even more than externally."

Bougie takes

particular pleasure in annpuncing the decline of religion as the
determiner of values and the rise of individualism as a "superior
value."
. . . the differentiation of values in society, by taking social
complication into its service, would contribute its share
toward differentiation of individual souls.
Which amounts to
saying that it would, in its way, prepare us to consider the
autonomy of the human person as a superior value.
(Bougie,
1926: 67)
We can take as B o u g i e ’s major formulation that the differentiation
of values

follows the division of function and we can see that Bougie

considers

this a good thing as well as a fact.

The needs, the aspirations, the ideal of societies have other
means of making themselves understood and obeyed.
They have,
for a long time, been able to depend upon the values of which
worship, properly so called, is not the cement.
And, indeed,
they are obliged to do this systematically when, the principle
of social unity is placed elsewhere than in identity of
religious beliefs:
Where the dissident become fellow citizens,
religion loses its moral monopoly.
Then the authority of the
collective conscience drops the zaimphs, the prestigious veils,
strewn with stars, with it has so long been enveloped.
It
can no longer borrow the mouth of oracles to give orders.
In the vast and complex groupings, at once centralized and
heterogeneous, which modern nations are, religious beliefs tend,
more and more, to become "private affairs." We leave them free
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as all other opinions, but we can no longer confide to them
alone, the control of the rules which are the guardians of the
life of nations.
(Bougie, 1926: 145)
It is difficult to assess the impact which Bougie has had on
contemporary sociology.

Bougie is cited only infrequently by other

writers, and this writer discovered Bougie accidently while looking
for something else.

By the time this book appeared the work of

American sociologists had surpassed Bougie’s contribution.

As

will be discussed directly, Sumner had already delineated folkways
and mores and Thomas and Znaniecki had already completed an extensive
"empirical” study of values.
%

m

*

American Origins
The rational analysis .of social values in America as secular
data and as constructs was undertaken by economists and
philosophers earlier and with greater precision than by
sociologists.
The work of Cooley on "valuation," one of the
first theoretical analyses of social values by a sociologist
in this country, is said to have been shaped largely by his
training in both economics and philosophy.
Credit for the
first American sociological analysis of values is occasionally
given to Sumner whose "concept"* the central part of social
institutions, was allegedly but another name for social value.
Yet there is virtually no argument against the’position that
the real starting-point on social values among American sociolo
gists was in Thomas and Znaniecki’s work.
(Barron, 1951: 209)
Folkways (1906) is Sumner’s most widely known work.

The

v olume’s contents range from a description of how folkways and mores
develop, to the character of institutions and the means by which
these function.

Sumner says that folkways "are habits of the

individual and customs of the society which arise from efforts to
satisfy needs (Sumner, 1906: i i i ) ."

According to Sumner, early man

*Sumner's "concept" is discussed in Chapter VII.
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could only discriminate pleasure and pain.

By the time man becomes

aware of his established customs the origin of these customs is
far behind and lost in mystery.

Nevertheless, Sumner is able to

cite hunger, family, and ’’ghost fear” as the problems man had to
overcome in order to survive.

Holding an evolutionary perspective,

Sumner reasoned that only group life would permit man to survive.
It is through group life that folkways and mores develop.

Original

group life was characterized by ’’antagonistic cooperation.”*

Sumner’s

argument for the appearance of folkways might be paraphrased as
follows:

(1) Men struggle to survive;

chances of survival;

(2) cooperation increases the

(3) cooperation is enhanced by the predictability

of actions; and (4) actions are most predictable when they form
patterns which may be called folkways.
The members of a particular society would regard their mores
as being of greater importance than their folkways.
When the elements of truth and right are developed into
doctrines of welfare, the folkways are raised to another plane.
They then become capable of producing inferences, developing
into new forms, and extending their constructive influence
over men and society.
Then we call them the mores.
The mores
are the folkways, including the philosophical and ethical
generalizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by
them, and inherent in them as they grow.
(Sumner, 1906: 30)
The survivability of a particular folkway depends a great deal
on two factors:

(1) Is the folkway detrimental or beneficial to the

existence of the group, and (2) is the folkway buttressed by the mores.
According to Sumner, the mores influence the folkways through a
process called "suggestion.”

As the term indicates, suggestion is a

*Sumner did not mention that "antagonistic cooperation" was
originally discussed by Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651).
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rather vague process by which folkways are perceived as beneficial
or harmful.

This perception need not be a valid evaluation of a

folkway*s function.

Suggestion also works through institutions and

conceptions of ideal man.*
Mores and folkways change by a process called "syncretism.11
. . . syncretism, a selection of the folkways which is destructive
to some of them.
This is the process by which folkways are
rendered obsolete.
The notion of a gradual refinement of the
mores in time, which is assumed to go on of itself, or by
virtue of some inherent tendency in that direction, is entirely
unfounded.
(Sumner, 1906: 116)
The examples of syncretism given by Sumner were on the inter-societal
and inter-group level; e.g., the adoption of Roman law by conquered
peoples or the alteration of Christian symbols and ethnic mores by
proselytized peoples.

The notion of a gradual refinement of the

mores seems more likely than syncretism when the focus is upon modern
complex societies.

The mass media and the huge numbers of people

living in close proximity makes it difficult to determine the
boundaries of groups.

As a result the contact of different groups

is no longer a matter of completely distinct cultures and syncretism
becomes a difficult concept to use.

It is possible that the notion

of "gradual refinement" has substance.

The rapid increases in

information and the rapid means of disseminating that information,
as a stable characteristic of modern society, makes it difficult
to pinpoint the origin of particular folkways.

Changes in folkways

and mores do take place and it is not possible to attribute this
change solely to Sumner's syncretism without considering syncretism

*Sumner's formulations in this regard are discussed in
Chapter VII.
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on the interpersonal and person-media level of analysis.
Barron named Cooley as one of the three men who began "the
rational analysis of social values in America."

Timasheff would

take issue with Barron in at least one respect— Timasheff would add
Giddings to the list.

Timasheff said that "Giddings was one of the

first sociologists to bring out the significance of values in the
social life of man (Timasheff, 1955: 87)."

The best example of this,

as given by Timasheff, was "Giddings Law":
A community endeavors to perfect its type in compliance with
the prevailing conception of an ideal good.
(In modern
sociological language, this would mean that every large-scale
group is influenced by the social ideal that it accepts.)
Developing this law, Giddings stresses that the bases of
rational social choices are social values, which he defines as
social appraisals of certain satisfactions, relations, modes of
activity, and forms of social organization.
The supreme
object of social values is kind itself.
Giddings1 use of the
term social value is noteworthy:, it had not yet gained general
acceptance.
. . . the law of survival takes the following form:
Those
values will survive which fit into a total of values that is
becoming more and more complex and harmonious. This proposition
is a reformulation of the Spencerian conception of evolution,
with due regard to the volitional processes so important in
Giddings1 theory.
(Timasheff, 1955: 85)
Cooley* was perpetually intrigued by the idea of a transcendent
sense of value.**

*Cooley studied at Michigan where there was no formal instruc
tion in sociology.
Instead, Cooley was examined by Giddings through
the mail.
Cooley appreciated Giddings’ work to the extent that
he "emphasized the social psychological foundations of society
(Coser, 1971: 322)." Giddings had invited Cooley to teach at
Columbia.
Cooley never did.
**This transcendent sense of value, which Cooley called "Value,"
is economic.
The idea is examined in Chapter VI.
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Painters use the x^ord in connection with light and color,
moralists in questions of conduct, and so on. Any man or
group of men, in any
sphere of life, it appears, may be
presumed to act according to a scale of values.
This broad use of the term seems to rest on the feeling
that the judgement of worth is of much the same character,
whether you apply it to a choice between a dozen eggs and a
pound of beef in themarket-place, or between shades ofcolor
or lines of conduct:
it is a matter of ascertaining how much
the alternatives appeal to you.
(Cooley, 1918: 283)
Cooley’s conception of value is distinctly psychological in
that it is man who perceives value.

On the other hand, Cooley does

not claim that values are operative only when men are conscious of
them.
It would seem that the essential things in the conception of
value are three:
an organism, a situation, and an object.
The
organism is necessary to give meaning to the idea; there must
be worth to something.
It need not be a person; a group, an
institution, a doctrine, any organized form of life will do; and
that it be conscious of the values that motivate it is not at
all essential.
Anything which lives and grows gives rise to a
special system of values having reference to that growth, and
these values are real powers in life, whether persons are aware
of them or not; they are part of the character and tendency of
the organism. . . .
The situation is the immediate occasion for action, in view
of which the organism integrates the various values working
within it (as a man does when he "makes up his mind") and meets
the situation by an act of selection, which is a step in its own
growth, leading on to new values and new situations.
Valuation
is only another name for the tentative organic process.
. . . taking the point of view of the object, we speak of
grain-values, stock-values, the values of books, of pictures,
of doctrines, of men.
Evidently, however, these are indeter
minate unless we bring in the organism and the-situation to
define them.
(Cooley, 1918: 284-285)
Cooley’s organic conception of society in combination with his
emphasis on introspection makes for a rather blurry conception of
value.

Though structural analysis is not his forte, Cooley’s best

work on values deals with institutions.

The economy, he'argued, was

as much an institution as the state or the church.

However, "his

contributions to the subject matter consisted mainly of generalities.
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Cooley will probably rate only a footnote in future histories of
economics (Coser, 1971: 313)."
Barron claims that the work of W. I. Thomas and Florian
Znaniecki is the "real starting-point on social values among American
sociologists."

The "definition of the situation is the most famous

of Thomas’ formulations and had its roots in The Polish Peasant in
Europe and America (1927).*

Coser called their book "the first great

classic in American empirical sociology (Coser, 1971: 381)."

By

the time this book appeared, Thomas was convinced that sociology must
consist of the "subjective aspects of social reality" as well as the
forms of social organization in which thdse aspects operate.
Thomas and Znaniecki’s two volume work made use of letters and
autobiographies.

The concepts of greatest interest to us are found

in the opening section:

"Methodological Note."

aspects" were conceptualized in two forms:

The "subjective

social values and

attitudes.
By a social value we understand any datum having an empirical
content accessible to the members of some social group and a
meaning with regard to which it is or may be an object of
activity.
Thus a foodstuff, an instrument, a coin, a piece of
poetry, a university, a myth, a scientific theory, are social
values.
Each of them has a content that is sensual in the case
of the foodstuff, the instrument, the coin; partly sensual,
partly imaginary in the piece of poetry, whose content is
constituted not only by the images which they evoke, and in
the case of the university, whose content is the whole complex
of men, buildings, material accessories, and images representing
its activity; or, finally, only imaginary in the case of a
mythical personality or a scientific theory.
(Thomas and
Znaniecki, 1927: 21)

*This book was originally published in 1918-1920.
The volume
used by this writer was published by Alfred A. Knopf in 1927.
All references to The Polish Peasant will carry that date.
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By attitude we understand a process of individual conscious
ness which determines reactions or possible activity of the
individual in the social world.
Thus, hunger that compels the
consumption of the foodstuff: the workman's decision to use the
tool; the tendency of the spendthrift to spend the coin; the
poet's feelings and ideas expressed in the poem and the reader's
sympathy and admiration; the needs which the institution tries
to satisfy and the response it provokes; the fear and devotion
manifested in the cult of the divinity; the interest in creating,
understanding, or applying a scientific theory and the ways of
thinking implied in it— all these are attitudes.
The attitude
is thus the individual counterpart of the social value: activity,
in whatever form,*is the bond between them.
By its reference
to activity and thereby to individual consciousness the value
is distingiushed from the natural thing.
By reference to activity
and thereby to the social world the attitude is distinguished
from the psychical state.
(Thomas and Ananiecki, 1927: 22)
They distinguish "value" from the thing or object.

They

distinguish attitude from the "psychical state" (whatever that may
be).

It is "activity" which links attitude and value.

Thomas and

Znaniecki's use of social value and attitude would cause problems
in the future.
A conference was held from 1937-1938 to evaluate Thomas and
Znanieki's book.

Herbert Blumer's and Read Bain's summary of the

conference findings.illustrates the reaction of sociologists to
Thomas and Znanieki's mixture of value and attitude.
. . . Herbert Blumer, pointed out that, although Thomas and
Znaniecki had set out to establish laws, they had actually
proposed very few; that the concepts of value and attitude are
vague; that the two concepts overlap inasmuch as both include
meaning, and therefore no causal relationship can be established
between them; that the authors did not in fact use the
methodology they had worked out; and that their interpretation
of the personal documents employed in the study is subjective,
not really scientific. . . . Znaniecki, moreover acknowledged
that the authors had treated attitudes and values as constant
elements (which may be questioned) and that many years passed
before he recognized this methodological error.
(Timasheff,
1955: 154)
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. . . the conceptual scheme consisting of attitude, value,
wishes, personal types, and definition of the situation,
according to some, is incapable of producing laws of social
change.*
(Bain in Timasheff, 1955: 154)
It is uncommon to find attitude and value mixed in contemporary
sociology.

When the mixture does appear, the same attacks are

leveled at it that were suffered by Thomas and Znaniecki.

It is

perhaps the effort rather than the results which accounts for Thomas
and Znaniecki’s high standing in the history of the sociological
use of value.

As Coser put it, "despite the blemishes the work

surely remains an enduring monument to that creative merger of
empirical research and theoretical sophistication which even
contemporary sociology only attains at rare moments (Coser, 1971:
381).”**

*There appears to be some historical dispute as to when Thomas
developed the concept of "definition of the situation." B a i n ’s
criticism of The Polish Peasant includes remarks about this concept.
Coser, on the other hand, wrote that "definition of the situation"
was "elaborated after 1919."
**If some writers would dispute the high esteem in which Coser
holds Thomas and Znaniecki’s work in comparison with contemporary
work, it is certain that their work was a landmark in their time.
A mention of some of their contemporaries will throw Thomas and
Znaniecki into contrast.
Irving King (1909: 433-450) presented an argument denouncing
the theory of a "religious instinct" (apparently a current idea).
"The religious consciousness may be called a valuating attitude
toward something real or imagined.
By an attitude is meant an
organization of various mental capacities in a definite way about
certain situations or'problems of life (1909: 439)."
"We choose
to call it an attitude because it involves a‘ recognized emotional
appreciation of the conceived values and a tendency to act in some
way regarding them (1909: 440)." K i n g ’s rebuke of "instinct" is
marred by his replacing it with "attitude." While instinct implies
an inborn tendency, attitude implies an acquired tendency.
A later article by Boodin (1915: 65-103) slipped backwards a
bit by arguing that "instincts furnish the fundamental springs of
action and interest."
"We cannot, however, reduce values altogether
to social relations.
We must take into account the surd of our own
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Later American Developments
Ralph Linton is generally considered an anthropologist.

However,

his book The Study of Man (1936) contains ideas which are frequently
cited in sociological work on values.

"Universals," "Specialties,"

and "Alternatives" are Linton’s concepts for describing categories
of elements for a particular culture.
First, there are those ideas, habits, and conditioned emo
tional responses which are common to all sane, adult members of
the society.
We will call these Universals.
It must be under
stood that this terminology applies only to the context of a
particular culture.
An element classed as a universal in one
culture may be completely lacking in another.
To this category
belong such elements as the use of a particular language, the
tribal patterns of costume and housing, and the ideal patterns
f.or social relationships.
This category also includes the
associations and values which lie, for the most part, below
the level of consciousness but which are, at the same time,
an integral part of culture.
Second, we have those elements of culture which are shared
by the members, of certain socially recognized categories of
individuals but which are not shared by the total population.
We will call these Specialties.
Under this head come the
patterns for all these varied but mutually interdependent acti
vities which have been assigned to various section of the
society in the course of its division of labor.
In all societies
certain things are done by or known to only a designated part of
the population, although they contribute to the well being of
the whole.
Thus all the women within a tribe will be familiar
with certain occupations and techniques, while the men will be
familiar with a different series.
As a rule, the men will only
have a rather vague general knowledge of the things which belong
in the w o m e n ’s province and vice versa.
Under this head there
can also be classed the activities which the society has assigned
to special craftsmen or functionaries such as the smith,
carpenter, doctor, and priest. . . .
Third, there are in every culture a considerable number of
traits which are shared by certain individuals but which are not
common to all of the members of the society or even to all the

instinctive and temperamental endowment.
It is this which
furnishes the possibility, the raw material of social organization.
And it is this which in the last analysis, when raised to conscious
ness through social pressure, must give us the variations which
make new values and interpretations of value possible.
Only so
can we have progress in evaluation (Boodin, 1915: 78)."
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members of any of the socially recognized categories.
We will
call these Alternatives.
The elements of a culture which may be
included in this class have a very wide range, varying from the
special and often quite atypical ideas and habits of a particular
family to such things as different schools of painting or
sculpture.
Aside from the nature of the participation in them,
all these alternatives have this in common:
they represent
different reactions to the same situations or different techniques
for achieving the same end.
(Linton, 1936: 272-273)
Linton’s three categories blanket the range of topics that
could be studied by sociologists.

Richard Morris (1956: 610-613)

cited Linton’s categories as an example of previous work in norm
typologies.

Linton’s own requirement of discussing Universals with

reference to a particular culture illustrates a concern with ethos.
His use of the term "ideas” shows a concern which goes beyond an
interest in actions and artifacts.

His reference to "mutually inter

dependent activities" shows an interest in social structure.
Linton’s concept of "interest" is important because it recognizes
the possibility of neuter or negative values as opposed to the
generally accepted understanding of value with a positive valence.
The most complex and least explored field of cultural
phenomena is that of interests.
A culture interest may be
defined as anything which has meaning for two or more of a
societies’ component members.
It differs in certain respects
from a value as that term is commonly used.
Thus while it
falls within the broadest definition of a value as "anything
of interest," it at once limits the field to things in which
interest is shared.
No matter how numerous or how intense
any individual's associations with a particular thing are,
this does not make the thing an interest as long as these
associations are exclusively his own.
Interest also differs
from value in that it carries no implication of any relation to
good.
Although such implications do n o t ’necessarily attach
to value under the broad definition cited above, they have come
to it even in philosophic usage.
Thus no one would say that
murder was a value to any society, although it must be considered
an interest of all societies.
Lastly, it must be understood
that the thing of our definition is not necessarily an object
or natural phenomenon.
It may quite as well be an occupation,
such as carpentry or hunting, or an abstraction such as chastity,
generosity, or cowardice.
(Linton, 1936: 422)
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Lin t o n 1s use of interest in analyzing cultural phenomena was not as
insightful as his recognition that negative meaning is an important
"other side of the coin."

The following example illustrates the

trap into which Linton fell.
It can be seen that although the horse far outranked the dog
in economic importance, the dog far outranked the horse in
interest rating.
The Comanche made more use of the horse and
he was vastly more necessary to their survival, yet they
ascribed more meaning to the dog.
It may be urged that the
comparison of interest in a work animal with interest in a pet
is not a fair one, since the pet is really a member of society.
The group regards it as belonging, so to speak, on the human
side of the fence.
However, this only brings us to the problem
of why the Comanche did not make pets of their horses, as many
other societies did.
The answer is that they were not
sufficiently interested in them.
Thus we can close another
of those circles into which culture elements arrange themselves
whenever we study a culture continuum at a single point.
(Linton,
1936: 429)
The circularity of Linton's analysis is obvious.

He seems to

recognize circularity as a fact of cultures as if "single points"
were misleading.

Whatever Linton means in his last sentence it does

not diminish the fact that his explanation of differential interest
does not explain.
The sociology of Pitirim Sorokin is primarily directed at
discovering why a culture's elements seem to.be centered about some
particular concern.
Sorokin makes use of the fact that if we examine in a com
prehensive way the culture and society of any people at any time,
we begin to acquire a sense, however vague, of a relationship
between the disparate parts of the culture.
Mythology, art,
law, philosophy, morality, family structure, the conduct of
war, architecture, music, religion, economics, sense of time,
logic, science, mathematics, humor, and leisure pursuits seem
to be associated with each other.
For example, in a culture
such as ours, where affairs of the market place appear to be
dominant, a wide variety of cultural habits and practices are
related in their mutual support of the business ethic.
The
cultural practices of the Pueblo Indians, on the other hand,
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appear to be related to religious practices and concepts
associated with the problem of bringing rain to an arid land.
(Cuzzort, 1969: 237)
Why is a particular culture oriented towards a particular problem or
set of problems while another culture is oriented towards a different
set?

And why do these cultures, given their particular orientations,

move in one direction as opposed to another?

"Sorokin approaches

this problem by presuming that a culture will be profoundly affected
by the manner in which it defines the nature of reality.

Such

definitions are pervasive and may, as a consequence, influence a
great variety of behavior ranging from art and leisure to law and
science (Cuzzort, 1969: 237)."

.

According to Sorokin, reality may be approached in two ways.
The first approach Sorokin called the "Ideational mentality."

The

Ideational mentality locates reality within the spiritual or "supersensory" realm.

To one who views reality with an Ideational mentality

the experiences of the senses are misleading or illusory.

The second

approach to reality emphasizes the experiences of the senses to the
point that reality is limited, as much as possible, to what can be
sensed.

This type of culture or mentality is called "Sensate."

The nature of values in these two types of cultures varies as do
the definitions of reality.
absolute.

In Ideational cultures values are

The validity of values transcends time and situation.

Since reality is a question of the spirit, the situational differ
ences noted by the senses are of no validity in determining what is
of value.

The values of sensate culture are oriented toward change.

There is the belief that things are becoming better.
belief in objectivity.

There is the

In Sensate culture, rules of conduct and
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morality is based on its timeless truth.

Sorokin’s concern with

definitions of reality and its effects on the whole of culture is
translatable to a concern with Ethos.

Sorokin will be discussed in

greater detail in that context.
One of the most frequently cited individuals in the literature
on values is John Dewey.

Dewey has been called a philosopher, social

philosopher, reformer, and an educator.

Though Dewey had Cooley

and Mead among his colleagues, D e w e y ’s greatest influence on the
subject of values came through a volume entitled Theory of Valuation
(1939).

It is this volume to which writers refer when acknowledging

the distinction betwedn "the desired" and "the desirable."*

D e w e y ’s

book is also credited with demanding that values, or more precisely,
valuation exists only to the extent that actual behavior can be
observed.
The test of the existence of a valuation and the nature of
the latter ..is actual behavior as that is subject to observation.
Is the existing field of activities (including environing
conditions) accepted, where "acceptance" consists in effort to
maintain it against adverse conditions?
Or is it rejected,
where "rejection” consists of effort to get rid of it and to
produce another behavioral field? And in the latter case, what
is the actual field to which,.as an end, desire-efforts (or
the organization of desire-efforts constituting an interest)
are directed?
Determination of this field as an objective of
behavior determines what is valued.
Until there is actual or
threatened shock or disturbance of a situation, there is a green
light to go ahead in immediate act— overt action.
There is no
need, no desire, and no valuation, just as where there is no
doubt, there is no cause of inquiry.
(Dewey, 1939: 54)
Like Cooley, Dewey stressed that valuation should be understood
as a process (hence his preference for the term "valuation" as opposed

*Clyde Kluckhohn, another respected theorist in the field,
credits Dewey with this formulation.
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to "value") which changes "when menaced with disruption."

De w e y ’s

stress on the value process is best shown in his reference to the
building of a theory of valuation.
. . . the theory of valuation is itself an intellectual or
methodological means and as such can be developed and perfected
only in and by use.
Since that use does not now exist in any
adequate way, the theoretical consideration advanced and con
clusions reached outline a program to be undertaken, rather than
a complete theory.
The undertaking can be carried out only by
regulated guidance of the formation of interests and purposes
in the concrete.
The prime condition of this undertaking (in
contrast with the current theory of the relation of valuation
to desire and interest) is recognition that desire and interest
are not given ready made at the outset, and a fortiori are not,
as they may at first appear, starting-points, original data, or
premises of any theory of valuation, for desire always emerges
within a prior system of activities or interrelated energies.
It arises within a field when the field is disrupted or is
menaced with disruption, when conflict introduces the tension
of need or threatens to introduce it.
(Dewey, 1939: 54)
It would be difficult to argue that De w e y ’s "outline" has
been adopted.

A few of his ideas had their impact such as the

desire-desirable distinction, and the impermanence of means-ends
distinctions for particular values.
Howard Becker preferred the use of means and ends in his
conception of value.
or an end permanently.

Becker did not demand that a value be a means
Instead, Becker classified four types of

means and four types of ends.

Becker’s four types of means have

a distinct Weberian "ring" to them.

"(1) Expedient rationality is

that kind of conduct in which the actor seeks to attain values by
any means regarded as conforming to the principles of economy of
effort, efficiency, and absence of undesirable consequences (Becker,
1950: 24)."

Whether the ends the subject has in mind are a real

possibility and are consistent with one another and if the conduct
is in conformance with the above named principles is unimportant.
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It is the actor’s definition of them which is important.
(2) Sanctioned rationality is "a type in which the principles
of economy of effort and so on are followed as far as a certain
limit; this limit is set by the character of the end itself (Becker,
1950: 25)."

The notion of sportsmanlike conduct in warfare was given

as a case in point.

The discovery that the Japanese could be

suicidal in attaining their ends forced the naive American soldier
to suspend the sportsman’s code.

The prime objective— winning the

war— would not allow the means— "giving the guy a break"— if under
the circumstances the guy wo u l d n ’t give you one.
(3) Traditional ‘nonrationality "is 'marked by the dominance of
means over ends or, otherwise put, a state of affairs in which
actions formerly regarded as mere means become ends in themselves
(Becker, 1950: 26)."
(4) Affective nonrationality is "definitely a catchall,
including as it does everything from outburst of love or hatred to
the unquestioning acceptance of a leader . . . (Becker, 1950: 29)."
The "ends" listed by Becker are (1) security,
(3) recognition, and (4) new experience.*
sound like "needs" is not accidental.

(2) response,

The fact that these "ends"

Becker gave "needs" a central

place in his formulation of value.
There are no human needs without values; there are no human values
without needs.
Needs and values are reciprocally defined in and
through sociation.
(Becker, 1950: 252) •

*Becker recognized these as the "four wishes" of W, I. Thomas.
Becker noted that they have variously been referred to as "wishes,"
"attitudes," and "tendencies."
(Becker, 1950: 35)
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One of the most influential, if not the most influential,
sociologists of the past 25 years is Talcott Parsons.

Parson’s

peculiar style of grand theory led C. Wright Mills to say:

"The

fact is that it is not readily understandable; the suspicion is that
it may not be altogether intelligible (Mills, 1959: 26)."*

So as to

avoid a misinterpretation of Parson's complex work, Martindale’s
interpretation is accepted.

Martindale summarized Parsons’ "argu

ment" as follows:
I.

Parsons breaks with the social-action branch of social
behaviorism, reducing social action to the status of a
dependent unit of one of three kinds of system.

II.

The fundamental elements of action are conceived to be
ideas, desires, and values (cognitive, cathectic, and
evaluation orientation).

III.

IV.

Action as a system is differentiated into three subsystems:
personality, social system, and culture.
A social system is, if total rather than partial, a society.
A.
It is a large scale, persistent, independent system of
social action.
B. The primary units into which it is analyzed are rolestatus:
positions plus the activities appropriate to
them.

*Mills mentioned four kinds of reactions to Parsons’ theory:
To at least some of those who claim to understand i t , and who
like it, it is one of the greatest advances in the enture history
of social science.
To many of those who claim to understand it, but who do not
like it, it is a clumsy piece of irrelevant ponderosity.
(These
are rare, if only because dislike and impatience prevent many from
trying to puzzle it out.)
To those who do not claim to understand it, but who like it
very much— and there are many of these— it is a wondrous maze,
fascinating precisely because of its often splendid lack of
intelligibility.
Those who do not claim to understand it and who do not like
it— if they retain the courage of their convictions— will feel
that indeed the emperor has no clothes.
(Mills, 1959: 26)
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C.

D.
E.

V.

The functional prerequisites of a society are those
minimum requirements with respect to individuals,
social systems, and culture without which society
could not exist.
Institutions are large-order units formed out of the
status-roles when they are integrated and standardized.
A collectivity is formed around a core of central
institutions.

Social norms form the central element in status-roles and
institutions.

VI.

Institutions are of three types:
relational (defining
reciprocal role expectations); regulative (defining legiti
mate means to values); and cultural (defining cultural
requirements).
A. Of these, relational institutions are most critical for
establishing the character of a society.

VII.

Pattern alternatives of value orientation define relational
role-expectation.patterns. There are five of these pairs:
A. Affectivity vs. Affective neutrality.
"The polarity of affectivity-neutrality formulates the
patterning out of action with respect to this basic
alternative.M
B. Self-Orientation vs. Collectivity-Orientation.
(The individual faces a choice of pursuing interests
private to himself or shared with others.)
C. Universalism vs. Particularism.
"The primacy of cognitive values may be said to imply
a universalistic standard of role-expectation, while
that of appreciative' values implies a particularistic
standard."
D. Achievement vs. Ascription.
E. Specificity vs. Diffuseness.
The scope of e g o ’s interest in the object.

Whatever merit there may be in the totality of Parsons' theory,
it is certain that his "pattern alternatives" hit at the basic
questions that all societies confront.

This is not to say that

societies consciously consider each of the five pairs above but
rather, every social system has some position on each of the five
pairs.

Martindale said that:

Parsons' most unique contribution to sociological functional
ism appears at this point in his conception of what he calls
"pattern-alternatives of value-orientations." These represent
the possibilities in which the normative elements of relational
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institutions are defined.
As he states the case:
"It should
again be emphasized that we are here dealing with the foci for
the patterning of relational institutions."
(Martindale, 1960:
487)
The reader will find an example of how this framework has been
used in Chapter VIII along with another five-point conception of value
orientation by Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Stodtbeck.
A chapter by Clyde Kluckhohn in Parsons’ Toward a General Theory
of Action (1951) aptly summarizes the condition of the value concept.
Reading the voluminous, and often vague and diffuse, literature
on the subject in the various fields of learning, one finds
values considered as attitudes, motivations, objects, measurable
quantities, substantive areas of behavior, affect-laden customs
or traditions, and relationships such as those between individuals,
groups, objects, events:
The only general agreement is that
values somehow have to do with normative as opposed to existential
propositions.
(Kluckhohn in Parsons, 1951: 390)
Kluckhohn follows Dewey’s suggestion by insisting that
"verbalizability is a necessary test of value (Kluckhohn in Parsons,
1951: 397)."

Likewise, Kluckhohn raises value above the level of

the desired and insists that a value is a conception of the desirable.
A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an
individual or characteristic of a group, of the desireable
which influences the selection from available modes, means and
ends of action.
(Kluckhohn in Parson, 1951: 395)
Kluckhohn spends considerable time explaining the terms of his
definition.

He says that "explicit and implicit" are important

qualifiers because many values are only occasionally verbalized.
"An implicit value is, however, almost always potentially
expressible in rational language by actor as well as observer (1951:
397)."

His use of "conception" with "desirable" is a recognition

that "value" is comprised of "reason" and "feeling."
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Value and Social Value
By this time the reader may sense that there are many ways in
which value may be understood.

An important distinction, and one

that is by no means clear in sociological writings on value, is
between "value" and "social value."

Robin Williams makes the dis

tinction.
What are experienced by individuals as values have these qualities:
(1) They have a conceptual element— they are more than pure
sensations, emotions, reflexes, or so-called needs.
Values are
abstractions drawn from the flux of the individual's immediate
experience.
(2) They are affectively charged:
They represent
actual or potential emotional mobilization.
(3) Values are not
the concrete goals of action, but rather the criteria by which
goals are chosen.
(4) Values are important, not "trivial" or
of slight concern.
(Williams, 1951: 440)
Of social values Williams wrote:
. . . we may follow Linton in treating all shared values as
cultural values by definition.
Social values, however, not only
are shared by a number of individuals but are regarded as matters
of collective welfare by an effective consensus of the group.
(Williams, 1951: 400)
Williams' definition implies that a social value is attached
to a power base.

The most powerful values are "institutions."

The

church, the state, the family, the economy are all institutions.
Each is comprised of many specific values but it is the rationale,
ideology, or to use Sumner's term, the "concept" which serves as
the "socia.1 value."

Conclusion
Within sociology, "value" and "fact" have the same origin.
That origin is the pheomenological method.

As Martindale wrote:

"The phenomenological method, in contrast to induction, may arrive
at judgements of absolute certainty and finality.

Through use of
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this method, one discovers the ultimate, a priori facts of social
life, the inborn but plastic dispositions . . . (Martindale, 1960:
272).”
For Scheler there was a metaphysical distinction between fact
and value.

Value is timelessly valid and fact consists of relation

ships changing in time.
identified.

Scheler warned that the two must not be

Nevertheless, Rickert connected the two by arguing that

the "Ought" is the "standard of logical valuations."

The "Ought,"

later called "value," is a transcendent standard necessary for
establishing the objectivity of knowledge.
Max Scheler and Georg Simmel brought values and ideas out of
philosophy.

Scheler believed that ideas do not have social effects

unless they are bound up in "collective tendencies" and "incorporated
in institutional structures."

Simmel severly limited his use of value

by conceptualizing value in economic terms.

But since Simmel was also

trying to relate values to institutions it is not surprising to find
him using money as the symbol or representation of value— money is
relatively concrete.
Cooley was to follow this pattern in essence.

He managed to

minimize the importance of phenomenological discoveries— "the inborn
but plastic dispositions."

These basic dispositions, which Cooley

called "human nature values," are so transformed by the social
forms in which they are found that it is no longer correct to attribute
these values to human nature.

Instead Cooley claims that most values

are "institutional values."
Giddings emphasized the institutional character of social
values.

Actually, Giddings equated the two ideas of "institutions"
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and "social values" when he defined the latter as "social appraisals
of certain satisfactions, relations, modes of activity, and forms
of social organization (Timasheff, 1955: 85)."
this regard are not unlike Durkheim*s.

Giddings* ideas in

Durkheim, however, may be

credited with developing an idea more diffuse than Gidding’s "social
value."
ideals."

This more diffuse idea of Durkheim*s is that of "social
"Social ideals constitute the collective conscience as it

exists independently of individual conceptions, while values are
manifestations of the common consciences in individuals themselves
(Timasheff, 1955: 111)."

It appears that Durkheim has laid the ground-

o

’*

4

work for the concept of "Ethos" with his concept of "conscience
collective."

Values are manifestations of the collective conscience

but are not equal to it.

According to Timasheff, Durkheim*s "major

social systems" of religion, law, morals, and economics are "at once
systems of values and ideals."
Max Weber defined actions in terms of the meanings attached to
the actions by the actor.
behavior.

In doing this, Weber related "meaning" and

Sumner was to make a similar recognition by differentiating

between folkways and mores.

The primary difference between folkways

and mores is the way in which actors define the importance of the
action, custom, or behavior in question.
diffuse values.
values.

Sumner also addressed

Like Giddings, Sumner saw institutions as social

Sumner argued that each institution'embodied some social

value which he called a "concept."
In the late 1930*s Sorokin was to argue that a society's
institutions, activities, and artifacts were arranged about some
central idea or "mentality."

This mentality defines a culture’s
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orientation.

In this respect Sorokin defined types of ethos.

Other sociologists contributed their ideas to the developing
value concept.

Linton expanded the meaning of value beyond its

conventional attachment to "the good" by defining "interest" as a
concept which encompasses "the bad" as well as "the good."

John

Dewey argued against the idea that values exist in a necessary meansends relationship with one another.

Talcott Parsons managed, in

effect, to argue that cultures can be defined by their reciprocal
role expectations.

These reciprocal role expectations are best

defined in institutions.

This line of reasoning links norms,

institutions, and ethos.
The information presented in this chapter on the origins of
value in sociology tells us that value can be broken down most simply
into the categories of "value" and "social value."

Value pertains

to the individual and social value pertains to the society.

W e b e r ’s

four types of action, Durkheim’s "values" and Sumner’s folkways and
mores all pertain to "value."

Durkheim's "social ideals," Giddings

"social values," Cooley’s "institutional values," Sorokin’s
Ideational and Sensate cultures, and Weber's ethics all relate to
"social values."
With regard to the Vanfossen typology of values it is apparent
that the distinction between "value" and "social value" is virtually
equivalent to Vanfossen's distinction between values which are
Specific and values which are Diffuse.

The precedent for such a

breakdown is explicit in Sumner's, Durkheim’s, Linton’s, and W e b e r ’s
work and implicit in the focus of the work of Sorokin, Giddings,
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Cooley, Dewey, and Parsons.

The following chapters will focus on

particular kinds of specific and diffuse values.

CHAPTER III
NORMS

Norms and Values:

A Common Distinction

In the Handbook of Modern Sociology (Faris, 1964) the reader
will find an article entitled "Norms, Values and Sanctions" by Blake
and Davis (1964: 456-484).

This article was intended to summarize

and clarify the accumulated-knowledge of-norms, values and sanctions.
The article as a whole is confusing although "norms" and "values” are
distinguished from one another.

A norm is defined as "any standard or

rule that states what human beings should or should not think, say
or do under given circumstances."

Values are defined as "the goals

or principles in terms of which specific norms are claimed to be
desirable."

The norm-values distinction made by Blake and Davis

accurately reflects the most common usage of the terms in sociological
literature.
At least two introductory sociology texts also separate norm
and value.*

Vernon says that "value definitions specify the relative

worth that man attributes to or imposes upon various aspects of his

*Introductory texts are not generally considered primary
sources.
They are cited here because this writers intention is to
show the conventional usage.
It is unlikely that an introductory
volume would be the place to find a novel or unaccepted idea.
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universe.

. . .

Statements that specify plans of action, directly or

indirectly, reflect value definitions.
norm definitions or just norms

Such statements are called

. . . (Vernon, 1965: 98)."

Lenski says that norms are "behavioral prescriptions and
proscriptions for the incumbents of specific roles in specific
situations (Lenski, 1970: 496)."

Values are "the generalized moral

beliefs to which the members of a group subscribe (Lenski, 1970: 498)."
Blake and Davis, Vernon, and Lenski all distinguish norms
from values yet relate the two with varying explicitness.
and Davis, values justify norms.

For Blake

For Vernon, norms reflect values.

For Lenski, norms and ’values differ according to situational
specificity.

This similarity in definition has posed a serious problem

for those who used the two concepts in the same context.

This is

especially true where causal connections are stated.*
Blake and Davis also discuss the "fallacy of normative deter
minism."

This simply means that it is erroneous to assume that the

presence of a norm is the cause of behavior which is consistent with
that norm.

This contention may be approached in two ways.

If

behavior in a specific situation is patterned an observer may assume
that the behavior is normal.

The observation of a pattern only

permits the observer to state a statistical norm, e.g., such and
such usually occurs in such and such a situation.

The assumption that

*Causal connections between values and other concepts, are
treated in Chapter VIII.
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a "standard or rule" is behind the pattern may be fallacious.*
If a norm is understood as a prescription or proscription the
"fallacy of normative determinism" may not really be a fallacy.

If

"determinism" is equated with "cause" then normative determinism
is fallacious since no deviance would be possible.

If "determinism"

is understood as a contingent or a statement of probability then
normative determinism may not be fallacious.

The presence of "a

standard or rule that states what human beings should or should not
think, say, or do under given circumstances" is a good indication of
what people will or will not say or do.
#

*

Of course, norms are violated,
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Evidence for Relationships Between
Norms of Different Types
The distinction between "folkways" and "mores" that was
formalized by Sumner continues to receive empirical support even
though the specific terms have declined in use.

As discussed in the

introduction, "customary norms” and "moral norms" are the terms used
to refer to this distinction.

Though specific research efforts are

phrased in terms of "morals," "attitudes," "values," or "norms," a real
difference betwTeen customary and moral norms is repeatedly evident.
In a study by Turner (1952: 70-77), open-ended questionnaires

*Robin Williams is not necessarily willing to agree that a
standard or rule is present even if one has been verbalized.
Williams likes a more rigid test:
"The social character of a norm,
on the other hand, can be observed only in interaction; and its
first sign is the appearance of approval or disapproval. . . . And
the final sign of a genuinely social norm is that the sanctioning
is approved (accepted as legitimate by relatively disinterested
parties)."
(Williams, 1951: 413)
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were used to discover the differences in response to two hypothetical
situations.

Respondents were asked "What would you do if . . .

type questions.

?"

The situations presented to the respondents were:

(1) a friend had stolen $500 and confided in you, and (2) a friend
had a pre-marital affair and confided in you.
types:

Responses were of six

relective— a break or limitation of the friendship; responsible—

to assume responsibility for the action and urge rectification and
future avoidance; moral passive— make a judgement such as disapproval
or have less trust but make no relational change; amoral assisting—
protect the friend or help to reduce guilt; responsible assisting— a
personal attempt to rectify'the situation.
Response combinations were numerous but the course of action
chosen by the respondent depended most frequently on whether or not
the friend’s behavior had a victim other than the friend himself.*
The most interesting finding involved the rejective response.

Persons

rejective toward the sex situation were always rejective of the theft
situation.

Persons rejective of the theft situation, however,

demonstrated no clear pattern of response to the sex situation.
There was considerable variation among the five other response types.
/

The pattern of response for the rejective choice and the two
situations may be clarified by referring to different types of norms.
Theft is a behavior which is far more specific with regard to the
sanctions attached to it.

Theft is a specific situation defined by

*Turners interest in this study centered on primary groups and
roles.
His conclusions were directed at this area and made use
of psychological inferences.
The discussion of norms has been
abstracted from Turner’s data.
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codified proscription— law.

Pre-marital sex, on the other hand, is

a situation of greater latitude in terms of law, regardless of the
importance attached to it in an individuals upbringing.

Turner’s

findings indicate that sanction of greater severity are more probable
in situations where customary, moral, and legal norms coincide.

By

comparison, sanctions will be less severe where customary, moral, and
legal norms do not coincide.
The same conclusion may be drawn from a study by Smigel (1953:
59-67).

This article dealt with unemployment compensation.

Smigel

found that his respondents disapproved of persons who received
compensation to which *they were not entifled under law ("chiseling").
The degree of disapproval varied depending on the circumstances in
which the chiseling occurred.

When the violation was unintended or

accidental the disapproval was least consistent.

Disapproval

increased greatly when the chiseling was not only intentional but
involved the assistance of other persons.
Disapproval of chiseling is more consistent when social norms
and the law are congruent.
When the social norms and the law
agree, as they do in the situations involving collusion, the
illegal behavior is often sharply disapproved.
(Smigel, 1953:
64)
In a study of three Sinhalese villages (Tambiah and Ryan,
1957: 292-299) it was hypothesized that traditional family values
would be weaker, or less often supported in communities having the
greatest contact with secular forces, i.e., newspapers, radio,
cinema, and education.
Life is considered sacred in this Buddhist culture and all
three communities rejected birth control with about equal vehemence.
Large families are traditional.

In Elaga, the most remote village

library
to *

*

Ma

Cof/eoe

which has the least secular influence, the authors found the least
support for large families— the smallest expressed ideal number.
This finding contradicted the author’s hypothesis.

The village

scoring the highest in secular influence (Colony) also expressed the
highest ideal number of .family members.
In an effort to account for their findings the authors noted
that Elaga had very sparse rainfall and techniques of cultivation
not conducive to the support of a large population.

The Colony on

the other hand, did not have problems with rainfall.
was illegal to rent land in Colony.

However, it

To obtain.a profit from the land

it had to be sold or worked by the owner and his family.
noted this as a situation conducive to large families.

The authors
While the

authors suggested the importance of "ecological realities" in
"contravening the effects of secular influence" they hypothesized
"unique moral vitality in family mores."

It is sensible to consider

environmental conditions but it is apparent once again that custom
is stronger when its alternatives are not reinforced by law.
Rettig and Pasamanick (1959: 856-863) performed a time study
on "moral values" using questionnaire data from 1958 and data
collected by Crissman in 1929, 1939, and 1949.

College student

respondents were asked to mark on a scale of from 1-10, better to
worse respectively, how they felt abotit certain behaviors.
were 50 items in all.

There

Graphing the mean scores of a moral rating

on each item the authors were able to conclude that there was a
general trend towards harshness of judgement.

That is, from 1929

to 1958 the same items or behaviors have been judged with increasing
conservatism.
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A factor analysis revealed several clusters the most interesting
of which was Factor "B."

This is a "group factor" the highest loadings

of which fall oil "seeking amusement on Sunday instead of going to
church," "disbelieving in God,” "seeking divorce because of
incompatability," and "not giving to support religion when able."
Though other items fell with the above group, e.g., "suicide,"
"profane language,” "not giving to charity," "birth control,"
"premarital sex," "girls smoking," and "not marrying below a m a n ’s
status," the former set of items formed their own "inner group."
According to the authors this suggests that an empirical differen
tiation should be made between judgements relating to "sinful" and
"wrong" behavior (Rettig and Pasamanick, 1959: 862).

The authors’

rationale for this distinction is that "sinful" originates in
teachings derived from a superimposed authority while "wrong" has
its origins in daily learning experiences, e.g., "the rules of
the game."

The distinction between "wrong" and "sinful" behavior

is consistent with Sumner’s distinction of folkways and mores.
Another study (Rettig and Pasamanick, 1960: 550-555) revealed
that the general trend towards harshness did not include "economic
moral standards."

In other words, these standards do not become

more severe with increased age.

Unlike religious morality or

morality pertaining to the family, economic affairs are largely
covered by enacted law.

The propriety of economic norms (enacted

law) is less visible than are those norms derived from religious
conviction or personal family experience.

Therefore,

"moral values"

pertaining to economic matters would tend to remain as they are
unless there is a change in their perceived effects.

Rettig and
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Pasamanick offered no explanation as to why economic moral standards
have not become more severe.

The "visibility argument" may be

inferred from their conclusion:
On the basis of these findings, it may be predicted that, unless
a major historical event such as deep depression, uncontrolled
inflation, or another World War is to interfere, approval of
economic exploitation may increase.
(Rettig and Pasamanick,
1960: 555)
Historical events such as Watergate, Vietnam, current inflation,
unemployment, and recession have probably had just such an impact.
A follow-up study would be interesting.
The information presented supports the distinction between
customary norms, moral norms, and legal rforms.

The articles by

Turner and Smigel indicate that the severity of sanctions will vary
depending upon the legal standing of the behavior in question.

The

article by Tambiah and Ryan illustrates that ecological and legal
conditions will maintain traditional norms despite secular influence.
One of the questions not asked by Tambiah and Ryan concerns the
affective influence of secular forces:

Even though behavior has

not changed because of secular forces, perhaps the local norms are
shifting from a moral to a customary standing.

Norms are Situationally Specific
but Conformity is Variable
A norm is conventionally understood as a situationally specific
prescription or proscription for behavior.

The concept is useful

but presents problems because all behavior which is considered
conforming behavior is not the same.

According to Williams "there

is usually a 'permissive1 zone of variation around even the most
specific and strongly supported norms; certain kinds and degrees of
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overconformity and of underconformity are expected and tolerated
(Williams, 1951: 413)."
Stouffer (1949: 707-717) posed a set of hypothetical situations
i

to college student respondents.

In each situation the student was

told to imagine that he was a proctor (student) who witnesses another
student cheating on an examination.

The proctor had five choices

from turning in the offender directly to entirely ignoring the
cheating.

The contingents involved whether or not the other students,

authorities, both, or neither would find out about the proctors
decision.

The range of acceptable responses to the cheating varied

according to who did or did not know about it.

Each respondent was

asked to define the range of acceptable responses.

This range could

consist of just one action or all five possibilities.

Respondents

rarely placed their own action (what they would do) at the midpoint
of their range.

Stouffer concluded that these results lend credence

to the idea that there is a range of behaviors which can be considered
consistent with any particular norm.

This idea opposes that which

believes each norm to be accompanied by one acceptable behavior.
The fact that Stouffer found a range of acceptable behaviors
may, in part, be attributed to the nature of the situations he
posed.

The respondents had to consider two sources of sanction,

students and authorities.

Students may expect that the proctor

fellow student) find his allegances with them.

(their

To turn in a fellow

student might be considered a violation of trust or a going over to
the opposition.

The authorities on the other hand, would expect

that the proctor fulfill the obligations attached to the position.
After all, the proctor knows the responsibilities.

With two sources
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of sanction the proctor literally finds himself in a conflict
situation; a situation in which more than one norm applies.

It

would seem that a situation in which more than one norm applies
would have more acceptable courses of action than a situation in
which a single norm is present.

The question may be presented:

Does a situation where norms conflict have a greater or fewer
number of acceptable alternatives than a situation where only a
single norm applies?
Williams’ "permissive zone of variation" may be applied to a
larger theoretical issue.

This issue is the controversy between the

"common value system" .perspective of Parsons and the "classdifferentiated value system" perspective espoused by Allison Davis
and Hyman Rodman.

With regard to this controversy Celia Heller w r o t e :

As a matter of fact, the major exponents of each do not deny the
other but rather give less importance to the other position.
Those who stress the common value system, foremost among whom
is Parsons, also recognize the existence of "secondary or
subsidiary or variant value patterns." On the other hand,
those who stress that different values are held by different
classes do not deny that a common core of values also exists.
Thus, the disagreement is mainly over the relative importance
of common values or different class values in a society.
Nevertheless, attempts have been made to reconcile these
views as if they were inherently contradictory.
(Heller,
1969: 251)
As a solution to the contradiction Rodman proposed a "lowerclass value stretch."

The concept recognizes that there is a common

value system but that lower class persons "stretch" the content of
these values so as to make them workable for their situation.

Instead

of valuing marriage and legitimate childbirth, "non-legal union and
legally illegitimate children are also desirable."
What is this content which is "stretched"?

Evidently, the
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value in question is family life.
means can family life be achieved.

The question involved is by what
In other words, what are the

norms for whom with regard to family life.
a situation of conflicting norms.

Stouffer's study involved

Hyman's subject involves a

situation where particular norms may be in conflict with the
realities of life.

As with the students in StoufferTs study,

lower-class persons recognize a permissive zone of variation by
which they may think of themselves as conforming to the appropriate
values (or n orms).

As Heller put i t , "all strata seem to accept

certain deviations but those deviations accepted in one may not
be accepted in another (Heller, 1969: 251)."*

Norms and Groups
Sociologists have put considerable effort into the study of
groups and it is not surprising to find the concept of "norm" in
extensive use.

One of the most interesting by-products of this

interest in groups, whether we speak of primary groups or societies,
surrounds the perception of changing norms.

Becker (1960: 803-810)

wrote that the sociologist may regard all conduct as being of a
normative orientation.

In other words, the sociologist may study

behavior from the perspective of the prevailing norms in which the
behavior is taking place.

Because of this, Becker argued, absolute

normlessness as seen by a subject, is to the sociologist only a lack
(or change) of norms appropriate to some situation.

To the extent

that the subject attributes worthiness to some norms, their deterioration

*There are other ways of viewing the common values versus
class differentiated value perspectives.
These will be discussed
in Chapter V.

*
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may be regarded as the absolute deterioration of all norms.
may, then, tentatively define normative

"We

'reactions’ as efforts to

adhere to worthy norms in the face of what is viewed as actual or
potential normlessness (Becker, 1960: 806)."

Worthy norms are norms

regarded for their own sake (moral norms) as opposed to simple
expediency to some end as would be the case with conventions.
Becker listed four "reactions" and conditions under which they
might occur.
(1) Cultural lapse— the imperfect transmission of culture whereby
zealots note a "going to the dogs."
(2) A norm has an impact such that the attainment of some mundane
end is thwarted with the result that the value of the end is
"officially" devalued.
(3) Innovations— where new practices must be instituted simply
to provide a basis by which other older values may be
maintained.
(4) Non-zealots but relevant others adopt innovations in which
case a tightening or reaffirming of the worthy norms is
. experienced.
While Becker addressed himself to "worthy" norms when he
discussed the above reactions, Mizruchi (1962: 391-399) thought that
a norm's prescriptiveness or proscriptiveness was the important
factor to be considered with regard to "reactions."

Mizruchi

thought that violations of proscriptive norms were more likely to
be extreme ("pathological") than prescriptive norms because once a
proscription has been broken there is no norm which dictates the limit
or the degree to which the behavior may extend.

Mizruchi also listed

four reactions which groups may have to deviancy.
(1) Retrenchment:

A casting out of the deviants with a core of
advocates remaining.

(2) Regeneration:

An attempt to revitalize the norm.
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(3) Rational-Scientific Innovation:

(4) Permissiveness:

Efforts to adapt new normative
patterns to the pre-existing
cultural system.

A decision to let the individual determine
the limits of his behavior.

Precisely how these reactions to deviancy are related to the nature
of the norm was never discussed.

It is important to note that the

norms discussed dealt with drinking behavior and that hypotheses were
derived concerning a n o r m ’s nature (prescriptive or proscriptive)
and the degree of deviance.

Mizruchi suggested the following

hypotheses:
H^:

Given a situation in which there is proscription on the
normative leVel and deviation on the factual level,
pathology will be high.
Given a situation in which there is prescription on the
normative level and deviation on the factual level, pathology
will be low.
Given a situation in which there is either prescription or
proscription on the normative level and conformity on the
factual level, pathology will be low.

With due regard for the fact that Mizruchi considered his
article "an exploratory analysis," there are several criticisms to
which his hypotheses are open.

First, if pathology is high does

Mizruchi mean that one individual is deviating frequently or that
many people are deviating?
cal.

Second, the third hypothesis is tautologi

Third, it is difficult in many cases to determine if a norm is

prescriptive or proscriptive.

For example, a norm which says "go

to class" (prescriptive) can be stated "don’t miss class"
(proscriptive).

Fourth, is there a likelihood of being caught— is

the violation going to be visible?
expected for violating the norm?

Fifth, what sanctions are to be
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It makes

sense to combine variables such as "degree of deviance"

and norms in the same hypothesis.

However, it is important to know

if the norm is customary, moral or legal.

It is also important to

know the conditions under which a norm is found, i.e., are there
institutions which justify the norm.
The reactions to deviancy (Mizruchi) and the reactions to the
perception of deteriorating norms (Becker) are of greater insight.
It is interesting that the lists given by Becker and Mizruchi should
parallel each other so closely.

As Becker mentioned, the apparent

deterioration of worthy norms may be perceived as the deterioration
of all norms.

It miglit also be true that if one group finds that

another group does not conform to their norms they may assume that
the other group has no norms.

This is the idea which stimulated an

article entitled "A Slum Sex Code" (Whyte, 1943: 24-31).

Whyte

offered this article in response to the belief among respectable
middle class people with "definite sex standards" that people who do
not conform to these standards have none.
Whyte referred

The Italian group to which

restricted pre-marital sex with local Italian but made

little or no proscription as to non-Italian non-local girls.
Virgin Italian girls were prized for marriage but were respected
and avoided for sexual purposes because of the community sentiments
towards courting and marriage.

A man who caused an Italian girl to

become pregnant was held responsible and marriage was expected on
the penalty of loss of respect.
to the known promiscuous,
resort.

Sexual activity was thus restricted

"one-man-lays," and prostitutes as a last

If we can accept Whyte's account of beliefs among respectable

middle class people, then these people have reacted as the "zealots"
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in Becker’s first item— a "going to the dogs."
The sociologist may not be afflicted with the "tunnel vision"
which allows his middle class subjects to see others as valueless or
immoral.

Instead the sociologist may go to the other extreme and

see deviation as the representation of subcultures.
is not so much incorrect as it is imprecise.

This conclusion

In other words, it

is difficult

to determine if a group is sub-cultural

or not.If it

is judged to

be sub-cultural then we may ask what is

the culture of

which the group in question is a sub-form.

Certainly, deviation is

not the sole domain of the sub-culture.
Lerman

(1968: 219-235) found that youthful peer groups considered

delinquent in slum areas did

not necessarily disdain

work orschool,

nor were they necessarily alienated by the dominant value system.
With increasing age, the job world tends to replace the school world
as the most stable value orientation.

Though some groups have been

found which specify illegal behavior as a requirement for membership,
most groups float through periods of legal and illegal behavior in
the pursuit of fun.

Legality as such is quite irrelevant.

In the same vein, Matza and Sykes (1961: 712-719) attacked
the notion that delinquents hold deviant values which are responsible
for their deviant or delinquent behavior.

"Values behind much

juvenile delinquency are far less deviant than they are commonly
portrayed; and the faulty picture is due to a gross over-simplification
of the middle class value system (Matza and Sykes, 1961: 713)."
In reviewing past research on delinquents, the authors noted three
recurring "themes."

First, delinquents exhibit a restless search

for excitement, "thrills,” or "kicks."

Second they show a disdain
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for "getting on" in the work-a-day world of the middle class.

Third,

there is a preoccupation and readiness to engage in aggression.
It is on these points that the authors attacked the alternative
value system hypothesis.

The middle class also exhibits an interest

in excitement, whether it be in the sanctioned amusements of night
clubs or sports.

Also, aggression is among the top drawing themes

of mass media entertainment; delinquents of the lower class, however,
seem to act it out more.

Again, though the methods of the two groups

are different, both seek a life of leisure; the middle class through
a life of hard work; the delinquents through quick schemes as though
the hard work technique would come to nailght for them.
It would be presumptuous and incorrect to try to pigeon-hole
different sociological perspectives as endorsing either the common
values viewpoint or the subculture explanation of different norms and
values.

The sociologist realizes that some values and norms are

present throughout a society.

The curious problem at hand is this:

Matza and Sykes and Lerman both attack the alternative value system
hypothesis, but they do so in radically different ways.

Lerman

argues that lower class delinquents are less deviant than portrayed
and that they did not necessarily disdain work.

Matza and Sykes

argue that past research has shown that delinquents disdain the
work-a-day world, and there is more middle class delinquency than
often portrayed.
must ask:

Given these two approaches- to the same task we

Who is deviating from whose values and what is the value

system implicated in the "alternative" value system hypothesis?
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Values, Norms, and Integration
Aberle (1950: 495-502) believes that a society’s members must
share values in order to function.

However, complex societies are

not represented by one absolute set of values as might be characteristic
of simple primitive societies.

He noted that it is a widely accepted

fact that complex societies are comprised of "sub-cultures" with
differing value constellations.

That complex societies are

functioning is a priori evidence that these value constellations
are not mutually exclusive.*

Aberle insists:

. . . a core of common values is an integrational principle of
any viable social system, the approach asks for future analysis
of the value systems or sub-systems of the society, in close
connection with the recognition that these sub-systems them
selves must be integrated with one another, and that every
individual participates in a number of sub-systems.
(Aberle,
1950: 502)
Bidwell (1966: 119-136) wrote that the integration of complex
social systems via values is not understood and comprises "one of the
most vexing" problems of social theory.

Although some deny that values

serve as an "integrative force" (as classically demonstrated by
Sumner), the most popular position is still derived from Durkheim:

*Sorokin required that there be some consistency between the
values of a group if that group is to be considered organized:
A social group, as a totality of interacting individuals, is
organized when its central set of meanings and values, as the
reason for their interaction, is somewhat consistent within
itself and assumes the form of the law-norms precisely defining
all the relevant actions-reactions of the interacting indivi
duals in their relationships toward one another, the outsiders,
and the world at large; and when these norms are effective,
obligatory, and, if need be, enforced, in the conduct of the
interacting persons.
(Sorokin in Timasheff, 1955: 237)
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"shared values are empirically prior to social order (1966: 120)."
Arguments to the effect that values are divisive or that they are
cohesive are not sufficient in and of themselves.

Bidwell noted that

a variety of norms may endorse the same value and that the same norm
may be existent "among persons with highly varied values."

"The

value-based integration of differentiated social systems need not
presuppose any particular pattern of value commitments (Bidwell,
1966: 135)."
One study illustrated that more than a few common values or
moral norms are necessary to guarantee integration and stability
(Dahlke, 1945: 22-33)..

To accommodate the federal requirement of

"alternative service" by conscientious objectors during World War II,
the American Friends Service Committee set up work camps.

The camps

were formed under the assumption that conscientious objectors were
a homogeneous group and that the work performed would be secondary
but instrumental to the Friend's religious observances.

The

expectations of the latter assumption were thwarted for the most part
because of the fallaciousness of the former.

Some conscientious

objectors are secular pacifists, some are religious pacifists (of a
variety of denominations), and others are opposed only to the particu
lar war.

The A.F.S.C. camps, which were set up in the expectation

that its own adherents would be in the majority, saw its "programs"
crumble with the onset of a majority of non-Eriends.

"Social

integration depends not only upon a unity of values internal to a
social structure but also upon harmonious relations between the
structure and the general culture pattern.

In the two camps studied,

no such relation obtained (Dahlke, 1945: 33)."
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"The Accommodation and Integration of Conflicting Cultures in a
Newly Established Community" (Danhof, 1943: 14-23) describes the
development of Boulder City in 1931; the community involved in the
Boulder Dam Project.

By viewing patterns of sexual relations, housing

preferences and realities, and community activities, Danhof was able
to conclude that groups with pre-existing cultural elements* on an
"equal footing" (meaning the number of people) will not only exper
ience some degree of integration but will also function as "contrasts"
for each other.
. . . the data presented demonstrates that conflicting cultures
are made functional parts of a single community organization not
only through the development of common values and common patterns
of behavior (integration) but also through the emergence of common
conflicting patterns which permit each culture to function and
transmit itself by opposing other cultures.
(Danhof, 1943: 23)
Danhof's conclusion that opposition permits each culture "to
function and transmit itself" implies that the opposition is instru
mental to a particular kind of functioning and transmission.

Obviously,

cultures function and transmit themselves without intercultural
conflict.

Perhaps he means that opposition facilitates the

ossification of certain norms.

Norms that were customary attain the

standing of moral norms as a result of conflict and become more
difficult to change.**

Perhaps he means that contact with a group

characterized by different norms facilitates the development of

*By "cultural elements" Danhof is referring to norms.
**This interpretation would be consistent with Becker's
"Innovation" reaction and Mizruchi's "Rational-Scientific Innovation"
reaction.
Mizruchi's "Retrenchment" reaction may also be applicable.
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previously non-existent beliefs and prejudices.

If any or all of

these possible interpretations is valid it may be said that sub
cultural conflict facilitates sub-cultural enrichment.
The research by Dahlke and Danhof lends credibility to Bidwell's
analysis.

Arguments to the effect that values are divisive or that

they are cohesive are not sufficient in and of themselves.
The information presented in this section does not consistently
support either the common values perspective or the alternative value
systems perspective.

Dahlke's study revealed that different values

prevented the integration of a social group.

Danhof's study revealed

that different values .did not prevent and* in fact aided in the
integration of Boulder City.

The conflict between Boulder City's

different groups formed patterns.

Certain places became the sites

for verbal and occasional physical conflict.
the normal basis for conflict.

Certain topics became

In short, Boulder City was growing

with definitions that included conflict between social groups.
Bidwell is virtually understating the situation when he says
that the integration of complex social systems via values comprises
"one of the most vexing" problems of social theory.

Common values

are evident in contexts which lack conflict.

Common values are
t
evident in contexts where there is a great deal of conflict.
On
the other hand, people may have quite different values and yet there

may be no conflict.

The theoretical problem .presented by values may

be partially clarified by investigating the relationship between
different kinds of values.

Does conflict usually revolve around

norms— the most concrete type of value?

Does conflict usually

revolve about the abstract values— ideals such as brotherhood, peace,
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equality, freedom?

Does conflict usually occur in the areas

dominated by institutions or in areas where institutions have failed
to establish patterns or precedents?

Answers to these questions may

aid us in understanding the relationships between values, conflict,
and social stability (integration).

Norms:

Reciprocity and Typology

Observing that the use of "reciprocity” is implicit in much
of functional theory as well as in many of the early works concerning
solidarity, Gouldner (1960: 161-178) sought to provide an explicit
definition.

His discussion involved an analysis of the meanings of

reciprocity (Durkheim:

equivalent exchange; Marx:

exploitation) as

well as the functioning of the "norm of reciprocity" under different
conditions:
Both Durkheim and Marx use a concept of "exploitation" for
analyzing social instabilities.
Durkheim, however, adds an
important element that was systematically neglected by Marx,
namely, that unequal exchanges of goods and services are
socially disruptive because they violate certain pervasive
values.
But the specific nature of this value element is never
fully explored by Durkheim; we must take as problematic what
Durkheim took as given.
(Gouldner, 1960: 167)
Reciprocity and complementarity were consistently confused.

Gouldner

made a distinction:
Complementarity:

Reciprocity:

An obligation of alter implies a right of ego
or a duty of alter to ego implies a right of
ego against alter.

A duty of alter to ego implies a duty of ego to
alter.
Each party has both rights and duties.

Reciprocity is of two k i n d s :
Heteromorphic:

The content of reciprocation is different as
food is different from protection.
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Homeomorphic:

The content of reciprocation is the same as "an
eye for an eye" or "you scratch my back and I'll
scratch y o u r s ."

Gouldner’s definition of reciprocity clarifies the important
difference between Marx and Durkheim in their use of "exploitation."
M a r x ’s basic principle is that the economic realm dictates or
determines what form, structure, and qualities will be manifested
by the social order.

This includes values and ideas.

Durkheim

reversed this principle in part as he thought that "shared values are
empirically prior to social order (Bidwell, 1966: 120)."

Durkheim’s

"certain pervasive values," to use Gouldner’s terms, refers to the
norm of reciprocity.

Durkheim would consider exploitation socially

disruptive since it violates the norm of reciprocity.
Gouldner speaks of reciprocity as a norm; usage which implies
that reciprocity is one norm in addition to many others.

Gouldner

considered reciprocity as a norm on an equal footing with other norms.
But rather than think of reciprocity as "a norm," we can think of
reciprocity as a quality of all norms.

Behavior which is in concert

with the norms of the group meets with reciprocation on the part of
the group in the form for which the group is recognized, i.e.,
friendship, acceptance, employment, etc.

Conversely, a member’s

failure to perform his duties results in the group’s withdrawal of
the member's rights.

Reciprocity then, may be considered the principle

which binds norms and sanctions.
Reciprocation, as delineated by Gouldner, is a relational term.
Reciprocation requires that one recognize the actor and the person
or persons to whom the actor's behavior refers.
and "ego" to emphasize this necessity.

Gouldner used "alter"

The only effort to formulate
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a typology of norms, of which this writer is aware, recognized this
alter-ego distinction by referring to "subjects" and "objects"
(Morris, 1956: 610-613).
According to Morris, "values are individual or commonly shared
conceptions of the desirable."
individual; norms cannot."

"Values can be held by a single

Morris said that his classification is

based upon the problem of establishing and predicting the "salience"
of norms.

M orris’ typology is as follows:
I.

Distribution of Norm

Extent of knowledge of norm
(1) By subjects (those who set the norm)
very f ew...................... almost everyone
(2)

By objects (those to whom the norm applies)
very few
almost everyone

Extent of acceptance, agreement with norm
(3)

By subjects
very f e w ..........almost everyone

(4)

By objects
very f ew..........almost everyone

Extent of application of norm to objects
(5)

To groups or categories
very few.
............ almost everyone

(6)

To conditions
in specified f e w ..........in almost all

II.
(7)

Mode of Enforcement
Reward— Punishment
more reward
than punishment

more punishment
than reward

(8)

Severity of sanction
light, unimportant....heavy, important

(9)

Enforcing agency
specialized,
general
designated responsibility..universal responsibility
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(10)

Extent of enforcement
lax, intermittent.....rigorous, uniform

(11)

Source of authority
rational,
divine, inherent
expedient,
absolute,
instrumental....... autonomous

(12)

Degree of internalization by objects
little,
great,
external enforcement
self-enforcement
required.................. .. .sufficient

III.

Transmission of the Norm

(13)

Socialization process
late learning from
early learning from
secondary relations...... primary relations

(14)

Degree of reinforcement by subjects
very little.
high, persistent

IV.

Conformity to the Norm

(15)

Amount of conformity attempted by objects
attempted by
attempted by almost
very few...... ............everyone

(16)

Amount of deviance by objects
very great...............very little

(17)

Kind of deviance
formation of patterned
idiosyncratic
sub-norms......evasion.......deviation

Morris did not intend this to be a typology of norm content and as
the reader can see, all elements are conceived as continuia.

Even

though norms require that reference be made to the group holding or
maintaining the norm, the alter-ego or subject-object dichotomy is
problematic.

The articles by Turner, Stouffer, Becker, Mizruchi,

Whyte, Lerman, Matza and Sykes, Dahlke, and Danhof demonstrate the
usefulness of including reference groups in discussions of norms.
Because reference groups are so important to the analysis of norms,
reification is a special danger to alter-ego, subject-object

distinctions.
time.

Individuals may be subjects and objects at the same

An individual may be viewed as part of the group (subject)

which dispenses rewards and punishments or the target (object) of
these same sanctions.

This does not deny the usefulness of alter-ego

distinctions for the purposes of explanation or analysis but serves
as a warning that norms are not simply imposed by some people upon
other people.

The subject-object distinction which Morris favors in

his typology would appear more useful if it were applied to legal
norms or those derived from institutions.

In this case a person

(object) may feel that the "social pressure" to conform which he
senses is legitimate. ‘ In this case the ’^subject" is self evident.
A few of M o rris’ items appear to be redundant.

Items #3 and

#4 ("Extent of acceptance, agreement with norm") seem barely
distinguishable from Item #12 ("Degree of internalization by
objects") and Item #15 ("Amount of conformity attempted by objects").
Nine years after Morris’ typology appeared, another article
was published entitled "A Proposal for the Empirical Study of
Values" (Fallding, 1965: 223-233).
value concepts.

Fallding was critical of several

He criticized hierarchical constructs* because they

fail to account for shifts in value and imply a static quality in
terms of both time and place (situation).
He said that a measure of "objective" value cannot be worked
out because the economic conception understands value in terms of
"limited resources."

"Such tests assume that a person values more

what he forgoes more time, money or pleasure for (Fallding, 1965: 224).

^Hierarchical constructs are discussed in Chapter V.
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Third, a value holds a self-sufficient status.

Though pleasures

and interests "are capable of becoming values if they attain self
sufficient status," some studies do not discriminate between those
interests that have and those that have not.

"The great defect of

the Allport-Vernon-Lindsey Study of Values, in my opinion, is that it
does not recognize this, and what it yields is a profile of interests
(Fallding, 1965: 226)."*
Fourth, it is incorrect to assume from all behavior that a value
is behind it.

For example, "compulsions are not capable of

exaltation into values:

they compete with them rather, and so far

as a person is in the ‘grip of compulsions his capacity to pursue values
is drained away (Fallding, 1965: 226)."
Fallding distinguished norms from values.

"Norms are ends

desired because they make a segmental contribution to the attainment
of values (Fallding, 1965: 227)."

"Value" was defined indirectly:

a valued "object" is "a satisfaction envisaged (Fallding, 1965:
224)."

In discussing the conventional variety of norms characteristic

of Gesellschaft type societies Fallding wrote:

"The segment of

their living taken up with instrumental concerns increases, and there
is even the risk that they will become so absorbed in these that
they will lose sight of their values and come to question,
it all for?'
be true.

(Fallding, 1965: 227)."

’what is

This analysis may or may not

However, the analysis is inconsistent with Fallding’s

*This study is not treated in this paper as it is considered
a psychological tool and does not receive much attention from
sociologists.
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understanding of ’’norm.”

If norms are "ends desired because they make

a segmental* contribution to the attainment of values," how is it
possible to "lose sight" of values and still have norms?
limits of Falldingfs definition, it is not possible.

Within the

It is reasonable

to conclude that Fallding implies that norms are adopted willingly
and after thought.

On the other hand, norms may be adopted unwillingly

or may be devoid of consideration.
Fallding thought of values as being of two types; spiritual and
egoistic.

The spiritual are those values which take note of a wider

system or entail a devotion

to

a wider system.

Such values may be

patriotic, familial, religious, etc., and denote a transcendance of
pure self interest.

Egoistic values, in contrast, denote a heightened

self awareness where things are valued to the extent that they pertain
to the self.

These types are each divided along the dimensions of

"comprehensiveness" and "intensity."

This yields the following

four types:
Membership

(spiritual):

An aim to stand in relation with as many
things and people as possible.

Partisanship

(spiritual):

An exclusive devotion to a set or
system.
It may be a cause.

Ownership (egoistic):

Interest

(egoistic):

An expansion of the ego by the attach
ment of things to it.
These are values of a passion; a
deliberate subjugation of all other
things to it. It may be a sport,
hobby, profession, etc.

Fallding added a fifth type of value which is removed from the

*"Segmental" is understood as a synonym for "instrumental."

others.

This fifth type he called ’’face value" and is comparable

to Veblen’s "ostentation."

This value is found where the person

assumes the conventions of the other four.

The manner in which the

concept of face value is to be used is not explicit.
the utility of this typology was not demonstrated.

Likewise,
Furthermore, and

contrary to the implications of the title, Fallding does not explain
how these values are to be used in empirical study.
His four basic types would appear to be more useful in
categorizing ethics.

It may be simpler to categorize a diffuse set

of values than any specific component.
difficult to identify a specific norm,

In other words, it is
belief, or ideal as belonging

to the "membership,” "partisanship,” "ownership," or "interest"
category.

As Bidwell pointed out, a variety of norms may endorse the

same value and the same norm may be existent among persons with highly
varied values (Bidwell, 1966: 135).
Why Fallding considered his typology of values an addition to
M o r r i s ’ typology of norms is not clear.

It must be inferred from

Fallding’s effort to distinguish norm from value, his delineation
of value types, and Morris' admission that his typology did not deal
with norm content, that Fallding considered values to be the content
of norms.

As ‘quoted earlier, "norms are ends desired because they

make a segmental contribution to the attainment of values (Fallding,
1965: 227)."

Fallding has fallen into a trap which is created when

norms and values are separated and then related as though there was
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some logic inherent in a norm-value relationship.*

Norms do not

necessarily make "a segmental contribution" to the attainment of "a
satisfaction envisaged" unless Fallding's definitions are accepted.**
To accept Fallding’s definition is to negate the considerable amount
of information derived from research where norm is understood as a
situationally specific prescription or proscription for behavior.

Conclusion
The Vanfossen values typology, in contrast to conventional
usage, subsumes "norms" under a general value concept.
a norm is a type of value.
o

In other words,

Conventional conceptualization differ’*

entiates between norms and values.

*

Values have been called "moral

beliefs," "estimations of worth,” or goals.

Norms have been called

"plans of action," standards or rules that dictate acceptable
behavior, etc.

The difficulty in distinguishing norms from values

is found in the invariable effort to relate norms and values to
each other.

When this is done we find such propositions as "norms

reflect values," "values justify norms," and "values are behind
norms."

This inclination to separate norms from values followed by

efforts to relate the concepts demonstrates two theoretical
situations: ‘ (1) The sociologist realizes that norms have some kind
of positive or negative meaning attached to them and (2) the
sociologist realizes that not all positive or negative meanings can

*This trap can be avoided by understanding "norm" as a type
of value rather than something altogether different.
**In which case the norm-value relationship is true by
definition.

be called norms.

The result of these theoretical situations is that

the concept of "norm" is used to cover behavioral elements attached
to positive or negative meaning, and the concept of "value" is used
to cover everything else.
cover a wide area.

This "everything else" is vague and can

For example, a person may say that he values

family life and that a person should be scientific.
"family life" and "science" the same?

As values, are

The person could be saying

that family life is important to producing good members of society.
The person could be saying that he values the fruits of discovered
scientific principles.

This person may have no real idea what

science is even though he is expressing ar valuation.

As described,

"family life" and "science" may both be values but they are con
siderably different.
The Vanfossen typology has adopted Sumner's distinction between
folkways, mores, and laws.

The typological categories are customary

norms, moral norms, and legal norms.

The information presented in

this chapter clearly supports this distinction.

Where customary

norms and legal norms, or moral norms and legal norms coincide we
may expect greater severity in the attached sanctions.

It is to be

expected that law be consistent with customary norms.

An interesting

hypothetical question might be concerned with the conditions under
which legal norms attain the affective significance of moral norms.
In other words, when do laws become the objects of moral concern
simply because they are laws?
The evidence indicates that it is a generally accepted principle
that a particular norm will have a range of behaviors which are

appropriate.

The obvious question concerns the extent of variation

that could be considered acceptable for each type of norm.

In

other words, is there greater variation accepted for customary
norms or for moral norms?

CHAPTER IV
BELIEFS

Value is often thought of as a subjective quality; validity
and rationality is a question of belief.

One writer defined value as:

. . . the believed capacity of any object to satisfy a human
desire.
The quality of any object which causes it to be of
interest to an individual or a group.
Value is strictly a
psychological reality, and is not measurable by any means yet
devised.
It. is to be sharply distinguished from utility
(q.v.), because its reality is in the human mind, not in the
external object itself.
Value is strictly a matter of belief;
an object, the utility of which is strictly spurious, will
have the same value as if it were genuine until the deception
is discovered.
Ultimate values are axiomatic and are inherent
in human nature (q.v.) itself.
Their existence may be dis
covered by social or psychological research, but neither their
validity nor their justifiability can be demonstrated.
They
are at the same time, the final sources of the motivation of
all conscious rational telic behavior.
(Fairchild, 1944: 331)
This quotation was taken from Fairchild’s Dictionary of Sociology.
Though a volume of this sort is not what one might regard as a
primary reference, its standing as a dictionary serves to illustrate
the conventional understanding of value.

Because values are thought

of as having the qualities of belief, it is rather strange to find
that little attention is paid to the concept of belief within the
context of value research.

In fact, there are only five research

efforts discussed in the next section.

Three of these are included

because specific reference is made to beliefs.

The other two

articles may be thought of as dealing with belief because a beliefs
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explanatory quality may be abstracted from the terminology used.
All five articles speak of belief in a general way.
The section on Myths and Theories is much different from the
chapter on norms.

Just as this writer found little work which

dealt with beliefs-as-values, there was little work which dealt
with myths-as-values or theories-as-values.

The sociological work

discussed in this section surrounds the concepts of value, valuejudgements, and the controversy connected with them.*

Ironically,

this controversy illustrates the common ground of myths and theories
as being matters of belief— ’’explanations of the way phenomena are to
be viewed and understood (Vanfossen, page 9)-.”

The Use of Belief in Value Research
In

a recent article addressed to the topic of subculture there

is an attempt to distinguish a subculture through the value concept
(Ball-Rokeach, 1973: 736-749).

In this test of the "subculture of

violence

thesis" value was defined as "a belief about a desired end-

state of

existence" or "a belief about a preferred mode

of conduct."

An attitude is "an ongoing organization of beliefs about a specific
object . . .
1973: 737)."

or about an ongoing activity or situation (Ball-Rokeach,
The following presumptions with regard to the above

*The chapter on norms was not compiled by researching norms
but by examining the literature which explicitly claimed to deal
with values.
The Myths and Theories section was compiled the same
way but resulted from epistemological arguments about value.
The
scope of this thesis would have been far too vast had this writer
searched for material which explicitly claimed to deal with norms,
beliefs, ideologies, and so on.
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definitions were listed:
(1)

A person may have thousands of attitudes towards specific
objects but relatively few values.

(2)

Values are generalized internal standards that transcend
specific objects or situations.

(3)

Values determine attitudes and action.

(4)

Values are hierarchically organized by their relative
importance to one another. . . .

(5)

A persons values system, and the variations in value
priorities account, in large part, for variations in
attitudes and action.
(Ball-Rokeach, 1973: 737)

. . .

The author supposed that questionnaire data containing "value"
items and "attitude" items would distinguish a subculture if there
was no one to be found.

Data was collected from 363 men in a

Michigan prison who were convicted of violent crimes, and from a
probability sample of 1,429 adult Americans over the age of twenty
one.
There was only a weak association between "attitudes" and
violent behavior and little or no evidence of association between
"values" and violent behavior.

In the opinion of Ball-Rokeach, the

"subculture of violence thesis" has been invalidated(1973: 748).
Even though this writer considers a "subculture of violence"
to be an unlikely prospect in the first place, it is not surprising
that Ball-RokeachTs method did not find one.

Why would one expect

that men convicted of violent crimes be the constituents of a
subculture?

The only difference between the prison sample and the

probability sample is that the former were all convicts.

The idea

that a single variable such as conviction would serve to differ
entiate groups of such a complex character as a subculture is
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simplistic indeed.

All that could be concluded from this study is

that no subculture has been found; not that one does not exist.
The combination of values and attitudes is all but dead in
sociological research.

The most renowned use of the two concepts in

combination appeared over fifty years ago in Thomas and Znaniecki’s
The Polish Peasant.*

Why the use of these two concepts in the same

context should be resurrected is a curiosity.

The assumption that

there are "thousands of attitudes . . . but relatively few values"
and that "values determine attitudes and action" is plagued by
circularity and conceptual problems when defined and used in the
manner of Ball-Rokeach.
"The positive emphasis on self application, consistency, and
achievement, are the principal holiness themes that directly converge
with dominant American values
conclusion of Johnson’s study:
Dominant Values?"

(Johnson, 1961: 309-316) .H This was a
"Do Holiness Sects Socialize in

The content of these values is not so important

as is their type and their justification.

The above named values are

stated in the form of ideals which means that the conduct implied by
them is not very specific.**

These values, however, are justified

in terms of a wider explanatory account— religious beliefs in this
case.

Religion is only one kind of belief and Johnson’s article

illustrates that beliefs may serve a s ’the justification for other
specific values.

*See Chapter II.
**Ideals are treated in Chapter V.
in the Introduction.

A definition may be found

In an article entitled "The Deferred Gratification Pattern"
(Schneider and Lysgaard, 1953: 142-149) is evidence which supports
the above contention.

The authors sought to test the hypothesis

that "deferred gratification” constitutes a pattern which is
distinctly based on socio-economic differences.
It is supposed to be a middle class "belief" that greater
rewards are to be had by deferring gratifications of the present in
return for preparations for the future.

Elements in the pattern

include the deferment of sexual gratification through intercourse,
and a tendency to save money.
these elements were normative.

Schneider and Lysgaard thought that
They gave as an example the street

c o m e r gangs in W h y t e ’s study whose members could not save money for
future uses because peer group norms required a sharing by those of
good fortune.

Hoarding resulted in a loss of status.

The authors used "self evaluation of class" and "father’s
occupation" as independent variables.

Dependent variables involved

plans for education, occupational aspirations,

sexual practices (which

the authors discounted because of problems in acquiring this infor
mation from high school students), manners(specifically table), and
finishing high school.

Most of the results were statistically

significant but "father’s occupation" was a better predictor of the
deferment elements than was "self evaluation of class level."

It

is unfortunate that sexual practices could not be used as a variable.
It is curious, however, that the use of money was not used as a
variable.

The authors named this as one of the important elements

in the pattern.

Despite the significance levels, the vast majority

had expectations of upward mobility.
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One can conclude from this study that the belief in upward
mobility need not have anything to do with the set of norms whose
rationale is upward mobility.*

Stated otherwise, the presence or

absence of any particular belief does not necessarily determine the
presence or absence of any other specific value.
With regard to upward mobility, the data used by Schneider
and Lysgaard tells us more about what the respondents would like to
happen than about what is happening.

If the phrase ’’would like” is

thought of as "wished would" and the phrase "what is" is regarded
as an explanation, we have the basis for studying the relationship
between class and existential (reality) beliefs.
In an attempt to eliminate the common values versus class
differential values controversy, Han proposed that a distinction be
made between "wishes" and "expectations” (Han, 1969: 679-690).

In

an empirical test, Han expected that socio-economic levels would be
related to the "perception of limitations" (the perception of
restricted opportunities and limited self-ability in the pursuit of
success goals).

The socio-economic level expected (SELE) was

defined by the expected occupation, expected education, and
expected material comfort.

The socio-economic level wished for

(SELW) was defined by the same items wished for.

Han hypothesized:

(1)

SELW would not be related to the perception of limitations.

(2)

SELE is inversely related to the perception of limitations.

*The authors tried to demonstrate the normative character of
deferred gratification but neither intended to nor succeeded in
demonstrating that deferred gratification was based on any set of
beliefs.
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(3)

Socio-economic level of aspiration (SELW minus SELE) is
positively associated with the perception of limitations.

For the sample of white, protestant 9
- seniors in high school,
all three hypotheses were supported.

Han suggested that the varied

findings with regard to differential class values and common values
can be alleviated by distinguishing between "wishes" (common values)
and "expectations" (class values) as well as "aspirations."

Wishes,

like ideals, need not have anything to do with the actual conditions
under which a person is operating.

Expectations, as Han demonstrated,

are grounded in the facts of the situation.
(a la

"perception of

,

limitations").
•

The facts are perceived

It is not surprising that the
s

socio-economic level expected would be inversely related to the
perception of limitations.

It may be hypothesized that o n e ’s

expectations of the future (belief) are more closely related to o n e ’s
explanation of the present

(belief) than ones hopes for the future

(ideal).

A Typology of Beliefs
This writer
of beliefs.

This

is

aware of only one effort to formulate a typology

typology, aimed at

explaining a belief’sresistance

to change, was proposed in Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values (Rokeach,
%

1968).*
Rokeach argued that beliefs exist along a "central-peripheral"
dimension.

Those beliefs that are more central are more resistant

to change than the more peripheral beliefs.

The property which relates

*Rokeach’s work usually appears under the heading of psychology.
He is the foremost student of values in psychology however and
much of his work tends to be sociological.
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one belief to another was called "connectedness."

Those beliefs

which are peripheral have fewer "connections" than do central beliefs.
In consequence, the greater the number of connections which a belief
has, the more resistant to change it will be.

Changing a belief

of high centrality will involve changing a greater number of other
beliefs than if it were a peripheral belief with few connections.
Rokeach defined five types of belief.
they are:

In order of centrality

"Type A — Primitive, 100% Consensus," "Type B— Primitive—

Zero Consensus," "Type C— Authority Beliefs," "Type D — Derived
Beliefs," "Type E— Inconsequential Beliefs."

Type "A" refers to

those beliefs learned »by direct encounter with the object of belief
and reinforced by the consensus of ones reference groups.

Beliefs

learned by experience in which no relevant others believe are Type
"B".

Since these beliefs are not shared by others nor acquired via

social pressure they are not amenable to persuasion since "no one
else knows."
authority.

Type "C" refers to those beliefs in persons of
For example, a belief in Billy Graham over Billy James

Hargis would be a Type "C" belief.
from Type "C".

Type "D" beliefs are derived

A persons belief in the theory that it is impossible

to travel faster than the speed of light because a physicist says
so is a Type "D" belief.

Type "E" beliefs are arbitrary and involve

matters of taste.
Unfortunately, Rokeach did not provide.a demonstration of the
"central-peripheral" construct.

At first glance the five types of

belief appear quite meaningful.

Everyone can think of beliefs which

fit each type.

However, when we recall that these types are ordered

by centrality, and that "connectedness" is the property which determines
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centrality, the types present a problem.

Type "B" beliefs (primi

tive, zero consensus) are supposed to be difficult to change because
they are not shared by others nor acquired via social pressure;
they are not amenable to persuasion because "no one else knows."
The central-peripheral construct explains this resistance to change
as the result of "connections."

If we assume from a beliefs resistance

to change that it has many connections we are engaging in a post
facto exercise.

How are Type "E" beliefs to be distinguished from

Type "B" except after the fact?

It is one thing to formulate a

typology and list the types of beliefs.

It is quite another to base

a typology on a theory without establishing the relationship between
the typological elements and the property upon which the theory is
based.

Rokeachfs listing of belief types in order of centrality is

teleological because the "connectedness" of each type has not been
demonstrated.

Connectedness is supposed to be the factor which deter

mines centrality.
In a later work, The Nature of Human Values (1973), Rokeach
did not speak of the above five types of belief.

The beliefs which

he discussed were mentioned in his 1968 book and are important
because of an explicit link with values.
belief are:

Rokeach's three kinds of

descriptive or existential ("those capable of being

true or false"), evaluative ("wherein the object of belief is judged
to be good or ba d " ) , and prescriptive or proscriptive beliefs
("wherein some means or end of action is judged to be desirable or
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undesirable")

(Rokeach, 1973: 7).*

Rokeach said that values were of

the third kind.
A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct
or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable
to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of
existence.
A value system is an enduring organization of
beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states
of existence along a continuum of relative importance.
(Rokeach,
1973: 5)
Rokeach1s use of this definition will be elaborated more fully in
the chapter on Complexes.

The bulk of Rokeach*s work deals with

what he calls a "value system."

Despite the differences in

terminology, it is appropriate to continue the discussion of Rokeach
in the context of Complexes.

Myth and Theory
Ralph Linton wrote:
One school of anthropologists have devoted much time and erudition
to proving that uncivilized peoples do not think logically.
This
is essentially correct, the only error being that neither do
civilized ones.
(Linton, 1936: 362)
The sociology of knowledge seeks to understand the relationship
between m e n ’s ideas and the societies in which these men live.

This

specialized area specifically rejects the idea that "truth" consists
of one solid, immutable body of facts.

The scientist realizes that

conceptions of reality are subject to changes and modifications.

Just

as Newtonian physics gave way to Einsteinian physics, explanations

*Robin Williams defined beliefs in a manner similar to
R okeach’s first kind:
Beliefs have primarily an existential reference:
They concern
what the believer takes as reality— the properties of and
relationships among entities and processes.
Beliefs are true or
false, valid or invalid, or not testable.
(Williams, 1951: 443)
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become myths when they fail to meet the criteria of theory.

Because

conceptions of truth are in a state of flux we must recognize that
myths and theories have a common property; in explaining reality
they evaluate.

In paraphrasing Max Weber, one writer said:

The concept of culture itself is a value concept.
Empirical
reality becomes culture to us because, and in so far as, we
relate it to values.
The validity of values is a matter of
faith, not of knowledge, according to Weber: therefore the
social sciences must investigate values but cannot provide
binding norms and ideals from which directives controlling
practical activity can be derived.
(Timasheff, 1955: 169)
Celestin Bougie thought enough of the evaluative nature of
theories to quote Fossey’s description of how the magician is
similar to the scientist.
"The magician makes no appeal to the supernatural:
The destruc
tion of an image brings about the destruction of the original
as fire causes water to boil.
There is not the least mystery
in it."
(Bougie, 1926: 157)
If however, the paths of science are so well opened up at so
many points by magic, it is because this latter, in separating
itself from religion, enters effectively into more direct
contact with things.
Treating the gods more freely, it
handles matter more freely.
It delights in all sorts of
experiments, it acquires a skill, the knowledge of which
cannot fail to be beneficient.
"It leans toward the concrete
as religion leans toward the abstract." It mixes more and more
in practical activities.
And thus it comes to pass that it
shelters, with its mystic authority, the budding positive
technique.
(Bougie, 1926: 159)
For an explanation to qualify as a theory it must conform to
rules far more strict than mythical explanations.

Since the great

majority of people d o n ’t know a myth from a theory it is not
surprising to find them in competition.
The best excuse ever made for astrology was that offered by the
great astronomer, Kepler, himself an unwilling practiser of the
art.
He had many applications from his friends to cast
nativities for them, and generally gave a positive refusal to
such as he was not afraid of offending by his frankness.
In
other cases he accommodated himself to the prevailing delusion.
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In sending a copy of his Ephemerides to Professor Gerlach, he
wrote, that they were nothing but worthless conjectures but
he was obliged to devote himself to them, or he would have
starved.
"Ye otherwise philosophers," he exclaimed, in his
Tertius Interveniens; "ye censure this daughter of astronomy
beyond her deserts!
Know ye not that she must support her
mother by her charms? The scanty reward of an astronomer would
not provide him with bread, if men did not entertain hopes of
reading the future in the heavens."
(Mackay, 1841: 290)
These passages by Bougie and Mackay demonstrate rather well known
splits between mythical and theoretical explanations.

There are only

I

a few, relatively speaking, who endorse magic or astrology as
practices which produce their intended results.*

If magic and

astrology are based upon unproven or discredited theories, it is
reasonable to assume that the same process is occurring with regard
to contemporary explanations.**

Controversy seems ubiquitous with

regard to sociological concepts and "value" concepts are embroiled
as any.
One of the most pronounced demands of positivist though
is the demand for "objective" data.

For value to function as an

*There are numerous contemporary works devoted to astrology
and many newspapers carry daily horoscopes.
Evidently, there are
many who still believe in it.
**John Dewey said that rules of appraisal or evaluation can
be based upon scientific principles.
It is commonly believed that such devices as radios and
automobiles have been greatly improved (bettered) since they were
first invented, and that the betterment in the relation of means to
consequences is due to more adequate scientific knowledge of under
lying physical principles.
The argument does not demand the belief
that the influence of custom and convention is entirely eliminated.
It is enough that such cases show that it is possible for rules of
appraisal or evaluation to rest upon scientifically warranted
physical generalizations and that the ratio of rules of this type
to those expressing mere customary habits is on the increase.
(Dewey, 1939: 21)
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active concept depends upon the possibility that values may actually
be studied as empirical datum.

Znaniecki noted that many have

derided the use of values on "subjective-objective" grounds.

This

reasoning is erroneous, he says, because the terms are "meaningless
unless applied to the experiences of data which are already the
objects of scientific study (Znaniecki, 1939: 801)."*

For values

to be proved unable to be such objects, "it would be necessary" to
show that "no experiences of values and activities can be
scientifically standardized."

The only experiences not amenable to

standardization, says Znaniecki, are "original" experiences, which
are gone as soon as they happen.

"Reconstructive" experiences—

those recalled, related to others, etc.— can be standardized.

In

the true sense of the word, all original experiences are subjective
(Znaniecki, 1939: 802).
Znaniecki is not without support in this argument.

That value

measurement is not yet sophisticated is not any real cause for
doubting the possibility of its development.

One writer was not

particularly concerned about a present lack of sophistication:
What is fruitful depends on the level of development achieved.
At one historical stage, measurements that are crude,
imperfect, and deficient as compared to what will be achieved
in a later stage of development may still mark a considerable
advance in m a n ’s ability to describe and predict.
To insist
a priori that all mensurational techniques be judged in terms
of their logical structure seems irrelevant and foolish.
(Handy, 1970: 198)
With regard to those who think values trivial or impossible to get at,

*Fairchild (1944: 332) defines "objective value" as a "standard
or judgment of persons, groups or institutions constructed and
proven by the consensus of competence.”
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this same author says "the success of value measurement depends on
how well it aids us in describing and predicting human behavior
that is taken as value behavior.

Those who refuse to call 'valuef

anything that can be measured are welcome to their terminological
decisions . . . (Handy, 1970: 202)."*

Values in Science
Values are evident in science as science is a method of
evaluation.

One author listed the following as the values of

science:
(1)

Openness before knowledge irrespective of source, and
inquisitive probing into its meaning.

(2)

Belief that change characterizes all matter, thus that
knowledge is never complete.

(3)

Belief in the superiority of the inductive method over
the deductive method, with a built-in dedication to
expose deductive falsity wherever found.

(4)

Explanation of nature’s phenomena in terms of defensible
theories and established laws.

(5)

Thus, rejection of animism, superstition, magic, and
religious fanaticism.

(6)

In the area- of basic science, operational autonomy in a
personal-social context; in the area of applied science .
(or technology), social and political accountability.

*Handy is making a picque at those who will not consider
matters which do not fit into their preconceived plans.
Likewise,
Mackay relayed the following anecdote:
An enthusiastic philosopher, of whose name we are not informed,
had constructed a very satisfactory theory on some subject or other,
and was not a little, proud of it.
"But the facts, my dear fellow,"
said his friend, "the facts do not agree with your theory."
"Don’t
they?" replied the philosopher, shrugging his shoulders, "then,
tant pis pour le faits;"— so much the worse for the facts!
(Mackay, 1841: 323)
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(7)

Disavowal of any need to implement divine purpose,
deductively conceived.

(8)

Knowledge conceived as neither good nor bad apart from
social implementation.

(9)

Justification of a broad base of professional and
financial support for basic science inasmuch as the
latter*s purview is the universe and all mankind, the
ultimate goal being an international brotherhood of
scientists.

(10)

Espousal of the scientific method of openness. careful
hypothesi s , data gathering, and final asp.es.sinent. (Inlow,
1972: 105)

Howard Becker, in an article entitled,

"Supreme Values and

the Sociologist," discussed the closely related goals of science,
"prediction" and "control."’ To the extent that scientists have these
goals,
the slogan "No value-judgements in science" must . . . be
expanded to read as follows:
"No value-judgements in science
which derive from sources other than the supreme value-judgement
that control is ultimately desireable is ethically permissible
by the scientist in his specifically scientific capacity.
(Becker, 1941: 167)
But control, Becker pointed out, is subject to a paradox:
in some spheres gives rise to a lack of it in others.

Control

For example,

controlling the ecological balance was no problem until the devices
of technology became widespread; control over heart disease was no
problem until the control over other diseases extended the normal
lifespan.

Even the supreme scientific value-judgment is not without

its irrationality.

"Value-polytheism," Becker argues, is necessarily

the practice of everyone; the scientist is not a scientist in all
spheres.

A "value-monotheist," even a scientific one, is not going

to escape what is eventually going to appear as the irrational.
Inlow does not mention "prediction" or "control" explicitly.
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The value "prediction" is implicit in the term "explanation."

The

value "control" is implicit in her reference to "applied science"
in item six.

Myths and theories are both explanations.

Both are

evaluative and, as such, each contains implicit or explicit values.
Myths as they are defined, are irrational.

If Becker’s argument is

recognized, theories are also irrational in the long run if prediction
and control are characteristics of theory.
One writer came to this conclusion in an article entitled
"Values, Positivism, and the Functional Theory of Religion:
Growth of a Moral Dilemma" (Kolb, 1953: 301-311).

The

Kolb argues:

When the sociologist holds a positivist view of values and a
functional theory of religion the theory presented is moral
because (1) it is difficult if not impossible to determine the
right and proper behavior under the circumstances described;
(2) principles of right and wrong (ethical principles) are
involved; (3) the problem of conformity to a standard of moral
right and wrong is presented; (4) and, finally, the dilemma is
a dilemma of conscience.
. . . A sociologist who believes that people must believe
in the validity of values (functional theory of religion) but
that such values actually have no validity (moral and ethical
positivism) must either deceive his public or help in
dissolving the forces which hold a society together.
(Kolb,
1953: 305)
The dilemma which Kolb presents is a false one given the circum
stances he describes.

The choices which Kolb presents,

"deception"

or "dissolving the forces which hold a society together," present
a dilemma only if you value truth and a society which is together.
It is a contradiction to believe that values have no validity and
then be trapped in a dilemma of values.

If a sociologist really

accepts a "positivist view of values" there is no dilemma.

If a

sociologist does not accept the positivist view of values there is
still no dilemma.

The irrationality lies with positivism itself
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(as Kolb relates it to values).

A positivist perspective would

deny validity to theory as well as myth since both are inextricably
tied to valuation.
positivism?

What would one expect from a positivist view of

Positivism is truly paradoxical since it would ultimately

deny its own validity.

Becker seems correct:.

"A "value-monotheist,M

even a scientific one, is not going to escape what is eventually
going to appear as the irrational.
Science, of course, is a method despite the inclincation of
some persons to treat science as an object.

This small section on

the values in science serves to illustrate the valuative nature of
science or, more specifically, theory.

Kolb does this by suggesting

that the premises of science (positivism) present moral problems.
Becker illustrates the valuative nature of science by showing that
the pursuit of the values of prediction and control may result in
their antithesis.
Few scientists would argue with these ideas.

It is surprising,

however, to discover how many non-academic people believe that the
terms "rational," and "objective" mean free from the influence of
values.

It may be an important function of the sociology of

knowledge to determine how values^ function within the context of
science and theory.

Fictions
A fiction is an explanatory account in which the participants
express belief but in which there is no real belief.
must be privy to the deception.
if" behavior.

All participants

Tom Burns described fictions as "as

When people act "as if" a definition of the situation

95
is correct when they think otherwise their behavior is fictional.
B u m s writes that:
occasions arise when the memberships involved in two separate,
although proximate, situations overlap.
There is then presented
a dilemma situation of two possible ranges of norms of differing
coverage, each with its appropriate level of consensus. . . .
Embarrassment arises through the failure to establish or maintain
consensus about the range of social norms affecting behavior as
an interaction.
(Burns, 1953: 662)
When the participants recognize and allow for this overlap in the
range of norms they are engaging in "polite fiction."

Burns

discussed a method of maintaining two roles at once which he called
"banter."
To use banter is to play at being hostile, distant, unfriendly,
while intimating friendliness.
It is a style of interaction
used when two roles are presented to an individual and he
decides to retain the status appropriate to both while, as he
must, acting out the role of only one.
(Burns, 1953: 655)
"Irony" is the opposite of "banter."

Irony is "the convention which

disguises hostility in a style overtly connoting goodwill, helpfulness,
friendliness (Burns, 1953: 657)."
Robin Williams defined fiction in a fashion very similar to
Burns.

"Stereotyped behavior

(including statements of sentiment,

feeling, value) become f i c t i o n a l 1 only when the culturally ascribed
meaning of the behavior is in opposition to the privately held
meanings actually operative in the situation (Williams, 1951: 433)."
Williams’ discussion of fictions encompassed a larger range
of conditions than Burns' situational descriptions.

Williams applied

the term "fiction" to whole sets or orderings of values.
Perhaps the phrase "culture fictions" seems to imply too harsh
a judgement on the validity of many social beliefs to which it
might be applied.
Perhaps "ideology" would fit better as a
label for sets of ideas and beliefs that purport to explain
and justify existing social and cultural conditions.
Ideologies
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flourish at points of actual or potential conflict of interests,
of inconsistencies of beliefs and values, or discrepancies
between norms and practice.
The elaboration of an ideology is
a sign that tells us to expect some underlying strain or tension.
(Williams, 1951: 434)
Williams seems to be saying that the term "fiction” does not
apply to those situations of such grandiose importance as described
above.

He suggests the "ideology be used in reference to large

scale, organized, norms, beliefs and values that are fictional.
Williams does not, however, reduce fiction to a specific situation.
He maintains the use of "fiction" on a cultural level.
. . . cultural patterns are especially likely to be perceived
as fictional— -both by participants and by analytical observers —
when (1) beliefs or value orientatioifs conflict, or (2) "creeds"
enjoin beliefs without modeling the conduct required for their
effective operation ("lip service"), or (3) certain practices
and beliefs have ceased to command personal commitment or
involvement from large numbers of people.
(Williams, 1951:
435)
Burns speaks of fictions as they function in situations where
demands are in conflict.
of cultural falsehoods.

Williams speaks of fictions as perceptions
The failure to perceive a fiction which is

prevalent in a group may have undesirable consequences for the
uninitiated.

We can infer the mechanics of such a failure from an

article entitled "Upward Mobility and Class Values"
359-371).

(Turner, 1964:

Turner noted that a person may often accept the values

of the strata he is moving into before he gets there (anticipatory
socialization).

The values which he accepts are often distorted

however, and constitute the individual’s "image" of the strata.
Turner used the terms "ceremonial" and "working" to describe the
values which the uninitiated falsely perceives and the values which
are actually there.

The ceremonial values are those which the
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newcomer is adopting while the working values are the actual values.
To those acquainted with the working values, the newcomer is readily
recognized (not necessarily as an upwardly mobile person) as being
a bit different.

The newcomer then finds himself in the marginal

position which he hoped to avoid.
values— fictions.

Ceremonial values are pretend

If ceremonial values may be equated with fictions*

than fictions may be used as a tool, intentionally or otherwise,
for distingiushing an individual’s status relative to the rest of
the group, as well as a method of maintaining order in situations
uncomfortable to the participants.
,

»

A

Conclusion
According to Fairchild, the validity of values is a matter of
belief.

As he put it, "neither their validity nor their justifiability

can be demonstrated."
from beliefs.

According to Johnson, values may be derived

According to Ball-Rokeach a value is "a belief about

a desired end-state of existence" or "a belief about a preferred mode
of conduct."

Of course, Myths and Theories have the common element

of "original acceptance."

That is, whether a myth or theory is

believed it is necessary that the individual accept the basic
premises behind the explanation.

The only danger presented by this

relationship between myth and theory is that the unwary may quickly
conclude that all explanations are equally true or false since the
basic premises cannot be "proved."
however.

There are considerable differences

Theories are systematic explanations— myths are not.

*This is the meaning which may be construed from Williams
reference to "lip service."
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Theories must fulfill criteria with regard

to the relevant data and

the explanation’s logical structure— myths

do not.

In this respect, Rokeach’s Central-Peripheral construct is of
considerable utility.

According to this explanation, beliefs were

related to one another by the property of "connectedness."

A belief

with many connections is more difficult to change than a belief with
few connections.

By comparison we may see the difference between

theological explanations and scientific or theoretical explanations.
Compare, for example, competing explanations about the formation
of the world.

A theological explanation might claim that the world

was created in six or 'seven “days by an oufnipotent, omnicient,
omnipresent entity.

A person who accepted this explanation as a

factual account would not be able to demonstrate empirically the
existence of this entity, nor the starting

and ending of this

creation period.

might show

As evidence, this person

us

abook from

antiquity which makes these claims but which does not follow the
conventional norms of substantiation and documentation.

A theoretical

explanation would incorporate physical evidence, substantiated
information on geology, astronomy, and what have you.

As a result,

the theory may suggest that the world was formed so many billions
of years ago under some conditions.

Unlike the theological

explanation, the theoretical explanation will say that we simply
don't have enough evidence to know for sure.-

In terms of Rokeach's

Central-Peripheral construct we would expect that the belief in the
theological explanation would be difficult to change since the
conventional criteria for "evidence" do not apply.

Belief in the

theological explanation does not appeal to the intellect.

Belief
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in the theoretical explanation, on the other hand, is dependent upon
the available evidence.

Given that sufficient evidence is available,

an individual could not reject the conclusions of the theoretical
explanation without rejecting the validity of everything else reached
via this system of explanation.

For most people, theological

explanations and theoretical explanations have the status of "derived
Beliefs."

This speculation is based on the expectation that most

people do not really know the differences between myth and theory.
As a result, most people probably float back and forth between myth
and theory.

Are the differences between myth and theory simple

abstractions or are their effects quite real?

According to Dewey,

"it is enough that such cases show that it is possible for rules
of appraisal or evaluation to rest upon scientifically warranted
physical generalizations and that the ratio of rules of this type to
those expressing mere customary habits is on the increase (Dewey,
1939: 21)."

The differences between myth and theory are not simple

o
abstractions; the differences are evident in human behavior.
Like the conventional relationship between norms and values
the relationship between beliefs and values is confusing since both
include positive and negative meaning.

As with norms, the habit of

differentiating beliefs and values followed by an effort to re-relate
them results in a system of definitions like the one used by BallRokeach.

Part of her definition says that a value is "a belief

about a preferred mode of conduct."

Here we'find value, belief, and

part of a definition of norms in the same sentence.
comments that "values determine attitudes and action.
Rokeach has over-conceptualized.

Later on she
..."

Ball-
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The Vanfossen typology subsumes "belief" under value.

Since

"norms" are also subsumed under value the reader may wonder if the
old problem which besets the conventional norm-value distinction
will appear between the belief-norm distinction.

Such a possibility

exists but only if one begins to impute cause to one or another, or
define one in terms of the other.
in terms of some belief.

Certain norms may be justified

For example, most religious systems make

claims as to proper and improper behavior.

There is no imperative

in the Vanfossen typology, however, which states that beliefs justify
norms.
What functions may be-performed by-the belief concept?

First,

we may ask if there is a significant difference between cultures in
which mythical explanations predominate and cultures in which
theoretical explanations predominate.

Second, under what conditions

will mythologizing flourish in contrast to the conditions favorable
to theorizing.
of myths

Third, Kolb raised the question of the possibility

(religion specifically) being necessary to the maintenance

of society.

This writer asks a more basic question.

possible to be rid of myths?
in Chapters VI and VII.

Is it ever

Some of these questions will reappear

CHAPTER V
IDEALS

Ideals and Values
It is unusual to find values defined as ideals.

The literature

which is discussed in this chapter makes use of ideals or the usage
and definition of value conform to this writer’s understanding of
ideals.

"An ideal is -a generalized ’good.’

Ideals are values

representing widely agreed upon definitions of virtue or excellence
(Vanfossen, page 13).”

Ideals may be stated in the form of norms or

beliefs, e.g., "idealized norms" and "idealized beliefs."

Whether

ideals appear in the form of norms, beliefs, or simply as a "named
virtue," they are expressions of "abstract sentiments."

"Abstract

sentiments are what the term implies— “broad, vague, generalized
sentiments that are idealistic-— loyalty, humanity, equality, love,
liberty, the American Way, and so on (Vanfossen, page 14)."
Clyde Kluckhohn tried to make a distinction between values
and ideals.

Ideals, though co-extensive with values, does not imply

"the property of choice" which "is a differentia of value."

An

ideal "carries the connotation of the unattainable as opposed to
the desirable and possible (Kluckhohn in Parsons, 1951: 432)."
Kluckhohn recognizes that values and ideals overlap when he agrees
with Thomas O ’D e a ’s suggestion that ideals be defined as "a constructed
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embodiment of values in a hypothetically concrete situation (Kluckhohn
in Parsons, 1951: 432)."

This is essentially a definition of

idealized norms.
Robin Williams said that "ideal norms are typically plastic
and vague; they state a very general principle without specifying
its detailed application (Williams, 1951: 40)."
Dewey describes a similar kind of value:
Generalized ideas of ends and values undoubtedly exist.
They
exist not only as expressions of habit and as uncritical and
probably invalid ideas but also in the same way as valid general
ideas arise in any subject.
Similar situations recur; desires
and interests are carried over from one situation to another
and progressively consolidated.
A schedule of general ends
results, the involved yalues being "abstract" in the sense of
not being directly connected with any particular existing case
but not in the sense of independence of all empirically
existent cases.
(Dewey, 1939: 44)
Using different terminology, Blake and Davis say:

"Disembodied

values— i.e., values without any norms through which they can be
collectively achieved— are like purely private norms, sociologically
irrelevant
challenged.

(Blake and Davis, 1964: 456)."

This statement must be

"Values without any norms through which they can be

collectively achieved" derive their sociological relevance precisely
from this fact.
Abstract sentiments emerge as central to the value system of a
more complex society precisely because they provide a basis
for value consensus where such consensus could not possibly
be gained on the basis of actual behavior.
What must be
recognized here is that the only real consistency to be found
may be in the shared disposition or value orientation reflected
in the ideals, not' in the actual norms, beliefs, or behaviors,
which (though more or less consistent and patterned within
themselves may be widely diversified from group to group,
region to region, etc. (Vanfossen, page 15)
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Ideals as Values in Research
An article entitled ’’National and Regional Cultural Values in
the United States” (Gillin, 1955: 107-113) is an effort to characterize
V

various regions according to their prevalent values.
is "tentative and suggestive.”

Gillins listing

Though Gillin does not use the term

"ideal," his definition of value and the list of values which he
provides readily demonstrates how "disembodied values" may be used
to characterize massive groups of people.

"A value, for present

purposes, can be thought of as a conception, culturally held,
concerning what is regarded as desirable with respect to human
beings and their behavior in their relations with each other and
with the non-human universe (Gillin, 1955: 107)."

The order of

the following items has no reference to preference or relative
importance.

The reader can see that each item represents some type

of ideal and that each of the items can be stated as any kind of ideal
by a simple change of style.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Personal output of energy
Pragmatic ingenuity
Mechanistic world view
Mobility of the person
Change and novelty
Optimism
Individualism
Competitiveness
"Fair play"

(10) Cooperation
(11) Honesty
(12) Prestige
(13) Power
(14) Recreation
(15) Efficiency
(16) Love
(17) Inner-regulated morality

In his characterizations, Gillin notes that different regions
may emphasize some of these values more than, others.

Given these

values, it would be virtually impossible to infer particular norms,
religions, political preferences, socio-economic status, etc.,
without additional information.

Of course, Gillin had no intention

of making such inferences solely on the basis of these values.
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If the reader

will recall, the lastchapter contained a

discussion of H a n ’s suggested solution to the common values versus
class differential values controversy.

Han (1969: 679-690)

suggested that "wishes” be thought of as common values and that
"expectations" be thought of as class values.

A wish may be as free

from the conditions

of reality as ideals.

in ideal terms they

are referring to abstract ideas which are

evaluated as "good."

In fact, when people speak

An ideal becomes a wish when (using Parsonian

terms) the positively evaluated cognition is cathected.*

H a n ’s

recognition that "wishes" could serve as the basis of common values
is readily understandable when (1) it is understood that people
generally, want (hope for, wish for, etc.) what they think is good
and that (2) people d o n ’t begin disagreeing about the value of "good"
things until the specific content of the good is discussed.

H a n ’s

usage virtually identifies wishes and ideals.
Another article from the last chapter (Turner, 1964: 359-371)
may also be considered with respect to ideals.

Turner’s "ceremonial"

values were discussed as though they were fictions to the strata
maintaining them.

The newcomer, not recognizing their ficticious

character, acts as though they are real, operative, or "working"
values.

As a result, the newcomer is not recognized as a member of

the in-group.
with ideals.

On the other hand, "ceremonial" values may be equated
People may be quite sincere about their "ceremonial"

values, but since the values lack a specific behavioral component

*This means nothing more or less than that an individual
"understands" an idea, considers it good, and desires it.
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(as would be the case of ceremonial and ideal are equated), the
"working" values would be a necessary element.

The newcomer assigns

some specific content to the ideals which conflicts with the "working"
values or fails to agree with the groups image of what is good.*
Whether Turner’s "ceremonial" values are best thought of as fictions
or ideals depends upon how one wishes to relate fictions and ideals.
Robin Williams spoke of fictions on a cultural level.

He thought

that "cultural patterns are likely to be perceived as fictional . . .
when . . . ’creeds’ enjoin beliefs without modeling the conduct
required for their effective operation (’lip service’) . » .
(Williams, 1951: 435).*"

Ideals also lack the specific behavioral

element required for their effective** operation.

However, an ideal

is fictional only when it is overtly endorsed and covertly unaccepted.
Whether "ceremonial" values are regarded as ficticious or ideal
depends upon the regard given them by the constituents of the
"ceremonial" values.
Idealized norms are prescriptions or proscriptions which
purportedly apply everywhere and in all cases.

Williams and Vanfossen

agree that the detailed applications or the actual behavior expected
is not very specific.

Operational norms may, "specifically prescribe

*This is not to say that a group has an image of ideal behavior
which is good.
Rather, the group has an image of behavior which is
not good.
It is much easier to see the "bad" in a non-conformist
than the "good" in a. conformist.
**What constitutes "effective operation" depends upon the
intention of the actor who invokes the ideal.
If a specific task is
in question, the ideal is ineffective.
Politicians may use ideals
effectively so as to avoid making specific commitments.
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behavior which is inconsistent with the ideal (Vanfossen, page 13)."
In "Group Norms and the Active Minority" (March, 1954: 733-741) it
is hypothesized that the more radically oriented toward the group a
member is, the more valued he would be.

March found that "radicalism"

was an inadequate concept of explaining the high value attached to
members because the adherence to norms, in many cases, could reach
only a maximally functional level beyond which no good was done.
Others, which March called "preferred-value norms," could reach only
a maximal adherence beyond which the adherence was dysfunctional.

It

is evident that idealized norms, which "represent perfection," have
a ficticious quality. • By definition, things which are good or
perfect should be strived for.

In actuality, such an effort proves

irrational or dysfunctional to other values.

To this extent, Turner’s

"ceremonial" values may be fictional and ideal at the same time.

Scaling and the Problem of Establishing
Value Priorities
When ideas such as scaling and priority are applied to values
the result is frequently an estimation of relative worth.

Means-ends

dichotomies, ultimate-instrumental, self-sufficient-derived, etc.,
are examples of efforts to determine relative worth.

Folsom said:

. . . we shall regard "value" as any general pattern, situation
or aspect of human behavior, society, culture, or of the physi
cal environment, or their interrelationships, which is treated
by one or more human beings as if it were an end in itself;
it is something which people try to protect, increase, or
attain, and apparently gain satisfaction when they succeed.
This conception of value differs from economic value in that
it implies utility only and not necessarily scarcity;
furthermore, it emphasizes final utility rather than instru
mental or derived utility.
(Folsom, 1937: 717)
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. . . a value is always regarded as desirable for other persons
as well as for the self.
Anything which people want exclusively
for themselves is not a value.
(Folsom, 1937: 719)
Folsom’s definition is rather curious in that he combines
"final" and "utility" in the same phrase.

There are no other works

of which this writer is aware that regards utility as meaning anything
other than usefulness, usability, functional, etc., when discussing
values.
else.

As such, utility means that something is used for something
"Final" refers to the ultimate, absolute, etc.

If "satisi

faction” is what people "apparently gain" when they attain an "end
in itself" the question arises:

Final utility for what?

If "any

thing which people want exclusively for themselves is not a value,"
then values must be very general and applicable— they must be ideals.
Folsom's confusing and cumbersome definition is an example of what
usually occurs when value is treated like a means-ends relationship.
A "means-value" is supposed to be a tool for achieving the ultimate,
final, self-sufficient,

"end-value."

it is a "good" in the purest form.

An end is necessarily absolute;
Efforts to establish means-ends

relationships are frequently intended to aid in decision-making.
Unfortunately, the tool is either simplistic enough for it to be
unnecessary, or it shows that some absolute ends are more absolute
than others.
Testing the assertion that qualitatively unlike values are
not quantitatively commensurable was the purpose of an article
entitled "Exploring Techniques for Measuring Human Values" (Catton,
1954: 49-55).

Catton acquired the opinions of 20,000 soldiers on

the order of preference which should be given for demobilization on
the basis of four characteristics:

length of time in the service,
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age, overseas service, and dependents.

Each respondent was asked

to pick the most important item for each pair of items (six pairs).
The data for each respondent would form some hierarchy.

A perfect

hierarchy would result if one item was selected as more important
than the other three, one item more important than the other two, one
item more important than one other, and one item less important than
all the others.

According to Catton, if these values were

incommensurable the response hierarchies would be random.

However,

90% of the respondents produced perfect hierarchies, i.e., "3, 2, 1,

0.M
In another test which Catton performed, the sample consisted
\

of ministers.

They were asked to evaluate pairs of "infinite values”

in terms of importance.

The pairs were made up from a list of five

items:*
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Human life itself,
Man's creative achievements (such as art, democracy, and
philosophy),
Worship of God and acceptance of God's will,
Fullest development of the moral character of mankind,
Fullest development of human intelligence and human
abilities.

If these were "infinite values" in the mathematical sense of
the word, then "even clergymen" should be unable to arrive at anything
but a random ordering of items.
was .989.

However, the mean index of hierarchy

Chance would yield an index of .429.

Catton concluded that:

From such evidence it seems reasonable to infer one of two
things:
(1) that "infinite" values can be measured according
to established scaling techniques, or else (2) that clergymen
are a bit unrigorous in their use of the term "infinite" (that

*The items were acquired from the ministers themselves via a
questionnaire which asked them to name infinite values.
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is, they do not use it in a sense comparable to its mathematical
m eaning). In a way these are merely two phrasings of the same
inference. . . . certain values, even if they are alleged by
generally accepted authorities to be of infinite worth to human
beings, are nevertheless measurable by standard scaling procedures
applied to the responses of those very authorities.
(Catton,
1954: 54)*
In 1956, Catton replicated this test of the incommensurability
hypothesis.

The hypothesis was retested using three samples of

ministers (N=99/sample).

For all three samples, the incommensurability

hypothesis was rejected.

It is curious that of 47 questionnaires

returned for sample #1 only 39 were usable; for sample #2, only 62
of 70 returns were usable; and for sample #3, only 58 of 64 returns
were usable.

It would be interesting to -know what proportion of the

non-respondents did not respond because they felt they could not rank
infinite values.
Catton1s named values were supposed to be of the highest kind.
His sample of ministers were not officially treating them as means— a
method of attaining higher values.
the direction.

A study by Hornell Hart reverses

Hart thought that decision-making, whether personal or

organizational, would be more effective not only if the results of
choices could be known, but if one knew which choice was preferable
in a purely valuative sense.
at stake in his study.

Hart selected happiness as the value

Of 114 descriptions, students were asked to

divide into two groups, the happy and the unhappy, and rank order
each group in terms of the degree of happiness or unhappiness such
experiences would cause.

The scale range was from 100 to -100,

*Some ministers, in fact, refused to rank the items because
they felt they could not make the decisions.
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happy to unhappy respectively.

From these, the 18 most "universal"

experiences having the smallest standard deviation were chosen.
scale had very high reliability.

The

It appeared to Hart that scales of

value-judgments could be created to aid in decision making.
Even though the scale was reliable in that others would rank
the universal experiences in the same order, its usefulness as an
aid to decision-making is questionable.

It seems that the high

reliability and universality is partly a result of the choices
themselves being rather clear-cut.

The author himself states that

he included experiences "which seemed to evoke a clear-cut and fairly
consistent valuation reaction on the part of the students (Hart,
1945: 474)."

If the choices are easy to make, of what use would

such a scale be?

It is reasonable to assume that assistance in

decision-making would be necessary only when valuation reactions are
not clear-cut or consistent.
It is true that the study of values by sociologists is pursued
with the sincere intent to create explanations which quality as theory,
but it is just as true that there are efforts to explain phenomena
in terms of values which lack even the minimal requirements of theory.
A simple statement of Myrdal's An American Dilemma might read:

There

is a contradiction between American values and American life with
regard to race relations.

Cornelius Golightly agrees that there is

a contradiction between values and action but argued that guilt was
not the primary product of this conflict.

Golightly hypothesized

that a lower order of values is maintained which mitigates what
would otherwise be experienced as guilt.

This lower order of values

is the belief in "caste" (in practice if not in n ame).

As a value
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however, it is not as satisfying as the higher (more inclusive)
ideal of total equality.
The fatal weakness of caste as a socially approved form is that
it provides only artificial and second order satisfactions.
Derived hostile or aggressive impulses are satisfied but the
primary psychological and social motivations remain thwarted.
[When perceived, the white American] repudiates the false
gratifications for the, genuine values because the latter are
more satisfying.
(Golightly, 1947: 139)
As is evident, this analysis is fraught with theoretical problems.
First, what are "the primary psychological and social motivations"
which remain thwarted?*

Second, on what basis are we to determine the

"false gratifications" from those which are true?

Third, how does

Golightly know what values Are "genuine"'because they are more
satisfying?**
Despite the purpose, method, or quality of their efforts,
Catton, Hart, and Golightly all agree that values may be arranged
in a hierarchy or exist on

levels of importance.

Svend Riemer

recognized this as a basic problem which is inherent to research on

*If these "motivations" are those which might be called brother
hood, cooperativeness, understanding, etc., there is considerable
evidence which suggests that these "motivations" may go only so
far.
Recall Danhof's study of Boulder City where it was hypothesized
that social groups strengthen and perpetuate themselves through
conflict.
Recall Fallding’s category of "partisanship." Would
Golightly call this a "lower order" type of value than the "member
ship" category?
The human ability to compartmentalize seems
sufficient to permit men a life of externally illogical and irrele
vant satisfactions.
Ridicule seems a more likely stimulus for values
of greater inclusiveness than does some inherent satisfaction in
them.
**While this writer probably shares many of the same "ideals"
with Golightly, his analysis, apparently being based on them, is a
theoretical embarrassment.
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values.

Riemer agrees that values may be arranged in a hierarchy:

The "lower level” values serve as means to the attainment of the
"summon bonum" or supreme values (Riemer, 1949: 131-136).

Research

on values that attempts to determine the appropriate means to ends
is difficult because of disagreements surrounding the lower level
values.

Supreme values, on the other hand, are readily agreed upon.

Riemer *s argument is as follows:
(1)

Ideologies are set off against one another according to
disparate means for the achievement of the "summon bonum."

(2)

Lower level values stand in a relationship as means to the
higher level values.

(3)

Ideological conflict involves lower level values.

(4)

Acceptability is reached by climbing out of the range of
the concrete into the "lofty" heights of supreme values.
"Consensus can never be reached if the true issue of
concrete value specifications is avoided."

(5)

Lower level values " . . . will be justified in terms of
their efficacy in achieving results on a higher level of
value abstraction."

(6)

Social research is challenged by the "cause-and-effeet
relationship by which the different levels of abstraction
are connected."

(7)

The demands of research require that values be broken
down and "commitments made to definite means of attain
ment." This will of course be arbitrary and the focus
selective.

(8)

"For this reason the very bulk of empirical research will
be arrested at the very threshold of the value discussion.
(Riemer, 1949: 133)

RiemerTs understanding of the relationship between "lower level"
and "supreme" values is problematic.

Point #3 is questionable.

All

so-called "lower level" values need not stand in any means-ends
relationship unless by "lower level" Riemer is referring to some
pre-defined means.

In terms of abstraction, moral norms are lower
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level values acknowledged for their own "rightness."

Many Confucian

dictates of prescriptive form are recognized as "good" while making
no claim to results such as wealth, salvation, etc.

They are low

level in terms of abstraction and they are also self-sufficient.
Point #5 is also questionable.
values is contradictory.

Once such a goal has been attained, its

position as an ideal is dissolved.
more difficult matter:

The idea of attaining supreme

That problem is consequent to a

All must agree that the goal has been reached.

A Note on Sumner
Ideals are abstract sentiments.
generalizable.

As such, they are highly

An interesting by-product of these characteristics

is that new terms, having a relatively specific meaning can become
vague or lose some of their former intensity.

When this occurs,

individuals may believe they know what an ideal means when, in fact,
they are at a loss to explain the precise content or action which
the. ideal is supposed to represent.

Sumner was well aware of this

and gave two names to the forms of ideals which function in this
misleading fashion:

"watchwords" and "phrases."

A watchword sums up one policy, doctrine, view, or phase
of a subject.
It may be legitimate and useful, but a watchword
easily changes in meaning and takes up foreign connotations or
fallacious suggestions.
(Sumner, 1906: 177)
The educated classes are victims of the phrase.
Phrases
are the rhetorical flourishes adapted to the pet notions of
the time.
They are artifices of suggestion. . . . Instead of
a rattle or a drum the operator talks about "destiny" and
"duty" or molds into easy phrases the sentiments which are
popular.
(Sumner, 1906: 179)
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Conclusion
The most general statement which could be made about the
writings discussed in this chapter is that ideal values are broad,
vague, lacking in specific instructions for practice, and are highly
generalizable.

The second most general statement is that ideal

values provide the basis of widespread consensus.
topic is the means-value-ends-value construct.

The most problematic

It has not been

demonstrated that values exist on a necessary "higher-lower"
relationship with regard to satisfaction derived, nor is there a
demonstration of a method for distinguishing higher and lower values—
the exception being that th£re are different levels of abstraction
and specificity.
In this regard, higher and lower values can be distinguished.
In the sense of abstraction we may say that the more abstract a
value is the "higher" it is.

In another sense we may say that a

value is higher than another when there is greater consensus in its
regard.

For example, members of the 19th century Prussian military

system probably placed "honor" above "freedom" in their order of
values.

In the second sense then, "honor" is a higher value.

In

the first sense, we no more know what constitutes "honor" than we
know what constitutes "freedom."

These values are equally abstract.

In the contemporary United States "freedom" probably has a
high place in some value scale.

Virtually everybody would think

that "freedom" is a good thing.

However, if we say that "freedom"

means that a man has the right to build a monopoly and thereby
control prices to the public detriment, most people would not value
"freedom."

The higher-lower, means-ends constructs must be confined

115
to very small realms.
to some ends.

Some values are specifically defined as means

It is incorrect, however, to pigeon-hole every value

as a means or as an end as though it were necessarily one or another.

CHAPTER VI
SYSTEMS

Institutions and Ideologies
Value systems are highly focused and highly visible constella
tions of specific values which concern themselves with certain
practices and ideas.
ideologies.

Systems are of two types, institutions and

Both types will include norms, beliefs, and ideals,

but an institution always has a structure; "highly patterned
interrelated behaviors (Vanfossen, page 18)."

"Ideologies may exist

as systems of ideas and meanings more or less independent of any
specific social structure.

Thus ideologies may or may not be

institutionalized, or may be institutionalized to different degrees
(Vanfossen, page 18)."

To put the matter in different terms we may

say that institutions are ideologies which have been incorporated into
the social structure.
Sumner’s understanding of institutions is quite similar.
Institutions and laws are produced out of mores.
An institution
consists of a concept (idea, notion, doctrine, interest) and a
structure.
The structure is a framework, or apparatus, or
perhaps only a number of functionaries set up to cooperate in
prescribed ways at a certain conjuncture'.
The structure holds
the concept and furnishes instrumentalities for bringing it
into the world of facts and action in a way to serve the interests
of men in society.
Institutions are either crescive or enacted.
(Sumner, 1906: 53)
Robin Williams writes that "institutions are organized sets of widely
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accepted and strongly supported obligatory norms (Williams, 1951:
447).”
. . . institutional norms are:
(1) widely known, accepted, and
applied; (2) widely enforced by strong sanctions continuously
applied; (3) based on revered sources of authority; (4) inter
nalized in individual personalities; (5) inculcated and strongly
enforced early in life; and (6) objects of consistent and
prevalent conformity.
(Williams, 1951: 40)
Another recent work also recognizes institutions as a combination
of structure and values.
An institution is simply a social process whereby individual
people or groups of people interact with one another in a
commonly understood, typical, and patterned way.
An institution,
then, must consist of two parts.
First there must be commonly
understood guidelines (like rules in a game) which point out
what is considered acceptable behavior, and on which people
base their expectations of how other people will act.
For
example, consider as an institution the free market in labor:
The "rules of the game" declare that workers must compete
against each other for jobs and employers must compete against
each other for workers.
Any other behavior (for example, using
violence to force an employer to hire you) is contrary to the
rules of the free market.
. Second, such institutional rules must be accompanied by
people actually acting according to those rules; that is, there
must be normal and patterned behavior consistent with "the
rules of the game." A set of institutional "rules" does not
constitute an institution unless people behave according to
those rules.*
(Edwards, 1972: 89)
It is stressed repeatedly that values pertaining to institu
tions are pervasive and constitute much of an individual’s under
standing of how things are or should be.

As related by Martindale

Parsonian social theory makes considerable use of the concept of
institution.

For Parsons, "institutions are large-order units formed

*Recall Rettig and Pasamanick’s research on norms where a
factor analysis revealed clusters that the authors suggest is an
indication of an empirical distinction between "sinful" and "wrong"
behavior.
The cluster of behaviors viewed as "wrong" represent
violations of what the authors called "rules of the game"— learned
in everyday life.
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out of status-roles when they are integrated and standardized
(Martindale, 1951: 488)."

"Social norms form the central element

in status-roles and institutions (Martindale, 1951: 488)."
Institutions are of three types: Relational (defining reciprocal
role expectations); regulative (defining legitimate means to
values); and cultural (defining cultural requirements). Of
these, relational institutions are most critical for establishing
the character of a society.
(Martindale, 1951: 488)
Like Parsons, Williams emphasizes the orientational function of
institutions:
Institutionalized rules at any given time in a particular culture
implicitly say:
"These and these are the things that are
expected, these and these are the probable consequences of con
formity and noncomformity." . . .
In addition to this function
of orientation, institutions represent internalized values that
are felt as binding for the personality . . . .
Institutions
get inside us.
(Williams, 1951: 439)
Sumner, Parsons, Williams, and Edwards all recognize the
predominance of norms as the quality which is essential for institu
tions to be present.

Conformity to these norms is requisite for an

institution according to Parsons and Edwards.

Internalization of

these norms is not only probable but, according to Sumner and
Williams, necessary.

When institutional norms are not internalized

(covertly accepted as right) there is the danger that the institution
will be challenged.

The most serious challenge to an institution is

an alternative ideology.

Though Williams uses "ideology" in a fashion

which is more inclusive than one which regards institutions as the
target,* he implies that ideologies may function in this capacity.

*"When such beliefs (evaluative) fall together into relatively
coherent and stable clusterings, such organized aggregates of
beliefs and values may be termed ideologies."
(Williams, 1951:
443)
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Perhaps "ideology" would fit better as a label for sets of
ideas and beliefs that purport to explain and justify existing
social and cultural conditions.
Ideologies flourish at
points of actual or potential conflict of interests, of
inconsistencies of beliefs and values, of discrepancies between
norms and practice.
The elaboration of an ideology is a sign
that tells us to expect some underlying strain or tension.
(Williams, 1951:
434)*
An institutional ideology serves to argue the legitimacy,
effectiveness, or purpose of the existing institutional structure.
An ideology, as previously defined, does just the reverse.

An

ideology argues that an institution is not legitimate, effective
in substantiating its claims, or beneficial in carrying out its
purpose.
By definition, institutions are the stronger of the two types
of systems.

It is not common for an ideology to make a complete and

successful challenge to an institution.

Usually, an institution

adopts some of the ideology's demands and alters its structure to
accommodate them.

When an ideology is represented by a small group

or one lacking a power base, the ideology may be entirely ignored.
Institutional change is usually slow.
Cooley thought that enduring institutions have been able to
retain some essential idea even though its structure has changed:
Where institutions, like Christianity, have survived for a
millenium or two, it is commonly not their organization that
has endured, but a very general idea or sentiment which as
vitalized successive systems, each of which has had its cycle
of prosperity and decay.
(Cooley, 1918: 31)

*This quotation appears in the discussion of "fictions" in
the previous chapter.
It may be surmised that Williams thinks
ideologies appear when sets of values are regarded as fictional by
the ideologues.
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Change as a Problem in Identifying Systems
Cooley’s analysis raises difficult questions.

He argues, in

the case of Christianity, that an institution has survived in some
aspect of its values but that its structure has changed.

It is

certain that the institutional structure of Christianity has changed
but a good case can be built demonstrating that the values have also
changed.

In particular, the Reformation exemplifies *an ideological

conflict culminating in a schism— the old institution remains but is
in competition with new ones.

Does the variety of churches or

theologies demonstrate several institutions with some values in
common or does the fact th^t some values are held in common demonstrate
a single institution?

Probably the former is correct since each

church has its own administration.
Value systems are dynamic.

Viewing a system as a closed unit

allows a superficial examination of an institution but Cripples
efforts to study ideologies.

As a closed system, an ideology would

necessarily remain an impotent set of ideas.

Value systems, after

all, are diffuse; ideologies vary in their degree of organization;
and institutions overlap.
An article by Stuart Dodd describes a method for deriving
predictors of human valuing.

D o d d ’s concepts were "values, valuing,

valuers, time, space, complementary conditions, and the symbols for
these and other combinations.

(Dodd, 1951: 645)."

values into twelve "institutional" categories:
(2)

scholastic,

(6)

philanthropic,

(10) scientific,

(3) economic,

(4) political,

(7) hygienic,

Dodd breaks up

(1) domestic,

(5) religious,

(8) recreational,

(11) linguistic, and (12) military.

(9) artistic,
Unlike

Williams, Dodd expects to predict human valuing by subjecting the
values of each "institution" and his previously listed concepts to
a correlation exercise.

The actual cause of valuing is irrelevant,

Dodd argues, any high correlation with "valuing" may serve as a
predictor.

Dodd's understanding of value ("what a person says he

wants") is sufficient to wreck the whole plan.

Dodd does not recognize

that institutions serve as orientational elements with regard to
more specific values.

A specific value may run across several

institutional spheres— ideals in particular as Williams demonstrated.
It seems unlikely that an inherently dynamic idea such as valuing
can be predicted when a dynamic and diffuse idea such as institution
is treated statically.

Future sociological work failed to reveal

the utility of Dodd's plan.
The most violent, massive, and thorough restructuring of a
society in modern history must be credited to The Peoples Republic
of China.

Mao Tse-Tung's version of Marxist-Leninism is credited

with providing the impetus for a successful ideological challenge.
It is plausible that China would provide the best subject matter
for studying institutional change because ideological debate became
a revolution with the incumbent institution losing out.

In an article

entitled "The Marxist Remolding of Chinese Society" (Chen, 1953:
340-346), the author discussed some of the efforts of the new regime
to supplant the previous institutions and ideals.
the communists have advocated the " ’five loves’:

Chen says that
love of the

fatherland, love of the people, love of labor, love of science, and
care of public property."

These are considered as the "highest

virtues of citizenship (Chen, 1953:

340)."

As for the institutions
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of marriage and the family:

"emotions are not important,

...

political and ideological compatibility is far more important
(Chen, 1953: 324)."

"Filial piety is condemned as a feudal survival

(Chen, 1953, 343)."
While not in sympathy with the politics of Communist China,
Chen insisted that one cannot help but be impressed at the social
progress which has taken place, especially in a country whose culture
and traditions have been rooted for so long.

He added, however, that

the immense power needed to uproot China from these positions, or
rather, the inertia gained by the revolution may present problems
should the communist leaders wish to establish some kind of orthodoxy.
The purges of the sixties seem to indicate this very problem.
The fanaticism of the Red Guard was finally halted only as a result
of its being disbanded.

As for the ideals and institutions which

Chen discussed, remnants of the old culture may be abstracted from
the present Chinese value system.
mistaken for Confucian ideas.*

The "five loves" could easily be

Of course, the five loves are ideals

and do not describe actual behavior very well.

That "emotions are

not important" for a marriage is not new idea to the Chinese.

Child

marriages, contract marriages, and the outright sale of children were
common practices though they are different from marriage based upon
"political and ideological compatibility."

Filial piety, where an

individual’s devotion and responsibility are-directed at the adults,
ancestors, and members of the family, is only a step different from

*This would be ironic since Mao Tse-Tung is quite vocal about
his hate for Confucius.
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devotion and responsibility to the state.

In all of these cases,

under the old regime as well as the new, concerns are directed away
from the self.

To use Fallding’s terminology, both regimes emphasize

"spiritual values."

In any event, the recent history of China

demonstrates that institutions and ideologies are not black and
white issues.
A less successful and more familiar example of ideological
conflict may be found in the American contra-culture.
target for the contra-culture was Vietnam.
symbolized the errors of the status quo.

The primary

It was this situation which
Vietnam lacked, despite the

official rhetoric, a clear And justifiable purpose.

In Vietnam

people were dying as the result of a special kind of war— an undeclared
Executive action.

For the contra-culture the war was an act of

imperialism.
Vietnam was only one of the events, albeit the biggest one, to
which the contra-culture was responding.

The perpetrator of this

and other acts came to be known as "The Establishment."

"The

Establishment" is a term which represents the institutional forms
challenged by the contra-culture.

The contra-culture attacked a

variety of specifiable institutions.

University education was

attacked for being the servant of the military-industrial complex.
The role of the university was thought to be instrumental— it
prepared students to fill the slots open in "The Establishment."
The contra-culture demanded education of intrinsic worth.
Marriage and family life was attacked by the contra-culture.
The young viewed the ideal of a wife, two kids, two cars, and a house
in the suburbs as a constraining and "plastic" pattern.

In response,
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the contra-culture tried communes and group marriages.
At root, perhaps, we find the religious institutions as the
greatest targets of disdain.

The persons who professed "Christian"

values waged war in Vietnam, practiced racial and sexual discrimina
tion, and supported capitalistic enterprises that appeared strictly
inegalitarian.

In short, it seemed that the Judeo-Christian

tradition had been invaded by hypocrisy.

In response, the contra-

culture looked at eastern thought systems.

There can be no doubt

that some individuals profited by these novel ways of thinking but
for the most part the new student of eastern thought was more
pleased by the dissassociafion with Western ideas than with the
substance of the eastern ways.*
What happened to the contra-culture?
culture failed:

Some argue that the contra-

We have the same political-economic system; students

do not control the universities; people still get married and live
in the suburbs, etc.

To some degree it can be argued that the

contra-culture got only as far as it did because it lacked con
sistent leadership.

Instead there was a variety of spokesmen for

a variety of contra-cultural issues.

Bobby Seale, Stokely Carmichael,

H. Rap Brown, and Eldridge Cleaver served as contra-cultural
proponents on racial issues.

The Students for a Democratic Society

represented a radical position against the established political and

*One possible indication of this idea is the new forms of mystic
Christianity.
Some among the young who particularly needed or wanted
the earthy, basic., unadorned ideal of eastern thought but who could
not grasp it mentally have returned to the western religious style.
The result, this writer suggests, is the "Jesus freak."
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economic systems.

Abbie Hoffman was against everything.

Leary argued for personal psychological freedom.
course, many others.

Timothy

There are, of

In addition to the lack of consistent leadership

the contra-culture lacked organization.

What coordination there was

consisted of a variety of protests, sit-ins, violent and non-violent
obstruction of a variety of events, etc.
It is safe to say that American institutions were not over
thrown by contra-cultural ideologies.

However, it would be incorrect

to say that the contra-culture "failed."

It is on this point that

we may learn something about changing value systems.

"The Establish

ment" has adopted or incorporated some of the demands of the contraculture.

Universities now have students sitting on the Boards of

Regents, Black Studies programs, W o m e n ’s Studies programs, etc.
Contra-cultural attacks on the limits of conventional lifestyle
have brought a greater acceptance of career women, pre-marital
cohabitation, gay liberation, non-antagonistic divorce, and so on.
The military supplies its manpower needs not by the draft but by
attracting recruits with a variety of training programs.

Marijuana

is being decriminalized.
What has occurred is not a displacement of one value system
by another but' the adoption of some ideological components by the
existing institutions.
revolutionary.

Institutional' change in China has been

Institutional change in America has been evolutionary.

Systems and Delinquents
Efforts to explain delinquency as a phenomenon of "sub
culture" and

"alternative

value systems" imply that there are
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institutions or ideologies under which delinquents operate.

Matza

and Sykes' "Juvenile Delinquency and Subterranean Values" (1961:
712-719) sought to arrest the notion that deviant values can serve
as an explanation for delinquency.

They pointed out that "excite

ment," "aggression," and "leisure" are themes as prevalent among the
middle class as they are among lower class delinquents.

The middle

class however, satisfies these interests through "sanctioned”
amusements such as sports, nightclubs, and mass media entertainment.
That middle class outlets are "sanctioned" serves as an indication
that the recreation activities of the middle class are within the
boundaries of the lega’l system of the larger society.
activities have been legitimized.

That is, their

This suggests, in contrast, that

the value systems of delinquents lack the organization or structure
necessary for institutions.

On the societal level, they lack the

power base necessary to achieve legitimacy.

If the ideas and values of

delinquents have an organization or consistency* then they have an
ideology.

If delinquents believe that middle class methods for a

successful life would not work for them they might say that these
institutions are exclusive, i.e., discriminatory.

Williams wrote

that "the elaboration of an ideology is a sign that tells us to
expect some underlying strain or tension (Williams, 1951: 434)."
Ideologies appear with differing degrees of sophistication.

It

could not be expected that a gang of delinquents be able to present
a full-blown ideology in the sense that we think of Maoism.

A weak

*The concept of "vocabulary of motives" implies such a system
however weak and transient the expressed "motives" may be.
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ideology might consist of a few beliefs, ideals, and a set of norms
which characterize a delinquent group.

Such an ideology might have

no plan to displace dominant institutions but simply to circumvent
them.
Kobrin suggested that high delinquency areas may be characterized
by social forces or value systems which are at odds with the dominant
institutions.

He wrote that these areas are characterized by a

"duality of conduct norms rather than by the dominance of either a
conventional or criminal culture."

Lerman came to a similar conclusion.

Delinquents act in the pursuit of fun; legality is quite irrelevant.
Given that an ideology of some sort is to be found among lower
class delinquents, a new problem arises.

Matza and Sykes noted that

the incidence of middle class delinquency is increasing.

They

suggest that this may be the result of better research methods,
actual increases, or both.

It would be hard to argue that middle

class youths think that institutional avenues to success are closed
to them.

However, many of the outlets for recreation available to

middle class adults are as closed to middle class youths as they are
to lower class youths.

Some youths no doubt rejected the "accept

able" outlets for recreation.

This gives indirect support to

Lerman's "pursuit of fun" theory.

Laws— the most powerful of

institutional norms— are breached in the delinquents pursuit of
fun.

If there is a youthful ideology of fun it is certainly a

weak one.

It is quickly dropped when the individual discovers

that institutions are willing to accommodate him.

This happens

because he suddenly meets an institutional criterion— age.
Chen's article demonstrated the difficulty of clearly
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identifying new and old institutions under rapid change.

The

literature on delinquent values demonstrates the difficulty in
identifying the ideologies of delinquents, not because the
ideology is changing but because the

adherents

are changing the context of their lives.

of those ideologies

If there was no change of

context we might see the development of ideologies which meet
conventional definitions.
such a development.

Organized crime may be an example of

The case of the American contra-culture

demonstrates what is probably the typical relationship between
institutions and ideological challenges.

Those elements which

can work within the institution and have popular backing will be
incorporated into the institutional structure.

Economy as the Dominant Institution
It would be correct to paraphrase Marxian social theory as one
which sees a society’s economic system as the primary determinant
of other characteristics of the society.

Karl Marx wrote:

In the social productions which men carry on they enter into
definite relations that are indispensable and independent of
their will; these relations of production correspond to a
definite stage of development of their material powers of
production.
The sum total of these relations of production
constitutes the economic structure of society— the real
foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures
and to whbch correspond definite forms of social consciousness.
(Feuer, 1959: 43)
Cooley divided values into two types:
"institutional" values.

"human nature" and

In criticizing the value-making process

as explained by "political economy" Cooley said:

It is assumed

"that these wants spring from the inscrutable depths of the private
mind.

At any rate it has not been customary to recognize that they

129
are the

expressions of an institutional development (Cooley, 1913:

546)."

To believe that wants spring from the private mind is to

place values in the category of "human nature."

In 'and of itself,

Cooley considered this unacceptable.
The simple formula, "the people want it, and the law of supply
and demand does the rest," will explain anything.
But if we
allow ourselves to ask why the people want it, or just who the
people are that want it, or why they can make wants effective,
we discover that we have everything to learn.
(Cooley, 1913:
547)
Cooley limited human nature values.

They are:

. . . those which may be traced without great difficulty to
phases of universal human nature.
The organism for which
they have weight is simply man in those comparatively permanent
aspects which we dre accustomed to speak of as human nature,
and to contrast the shifting institutions that are built upon
it.
(Cooley, 1918: 285)
There are some (human nature values) in which particular
senses are the conspicuous factors, as auditory and gustatory
values.
Others spring from the social sentiments, like the
values of social self-feeling which underlie conformity, and
those of love, fear, ambition, honor, and loyalty.
(Cooley,
1918: 286)
Institutional values are:
. . . those which must be ascribed to an institutional system
of some sort.
Human nature enters into them but is so transformed
in its operation by the system that we regard the latter as their
source, and are justified in doing so by the fact that social
organisms have a growth and values that cannot, practically,
be explained from the standpoint of general human nature.
(Cooley, 1918: 286)
Unlike Marx, Cooley did not explicitly claim that the
"economic structure of society" was "the real foundation . . . ."
In a similar vein, however, Cooley argued that economies which rely
on "money" have a way of bringing all other institutions under
its influence.
valuation."

Cooley called this kind of institution "pecuniary
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We have then, to do with a value institution or process, far
transcending in reach any special sort of value, and
participating in the most diverse phases of our life. . . . this
mobilization of values through the pecuniary measure tends to
make the latter an expression of the total life of society,
so far as the values that stand for this life have actually
been translated into pecuniary terms.
Although this transla
tion is in fact only partial and, as I have tried to show,
institutional, still the wide scope of pecuniary value, along
with its precision, gives it certain title to its popular
acceptance as Value in a sense that no other kind of value
can claim.
(Cooley, 1918: 309)
Cooley understood value in a broad sense— a judgement of worth.
As such, Cooley believed that many forms of value can be translated,
to one degree or another, into pecuniary terms.
. . . it is impossible to mark off sharply the pecuniary sphere
from that of other kinds of value.
Pt is always possible that
the highest as well as the lowest things may be brought within
its scope.
(Cooley, 1918: 314)
. . . the progress of market valuation, as a rule, is a transla
tion into pecuniary terms of values which have already become
in some measure, a social institution.
(Cooley, 1918: 338)
Though Cooley's analysis lacks the prophetic character of
Marx's theory, Cooley also places great emphasis on the part played
by class.

The upper class, he says, have an interest in common by

virtue of their wealth.

To maintain and propogate this wealth it

is to their benefit to maintain the pecuniary market, the source
of much of their wealth.

It is not necessary that the persons of

the upper class be friends or constitute a social group as such.
Even individual efforts toward the same end will have an impact,
especially if the individual is wealthy and occupies a position of
power.
Power is concentrated about the functions of the dominant
institutions, and the powerful class advantage. . . .
It
seems, then, that pecuniary valuation is a social institution
no less than the state or the church, and that its development
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must be studied not only on the impersonal side but also in the
traditions and organization of the class that chiefly administers
it.
(Cooley, 1913: 555)
Cooley writes about the dominance of economic institutions
and its control by a "class" in rather matter-of-fact terms.

The

nature of this domination is discussed in a more or less cryptic
fashion.

The nature of pecuniary valuation as an institution we

must understand to be structural, according to Cooley.

He does

not put emphasis on the role that ideas play in forming and maintain
ing institutions.

Marx is more explicit in this respect.

His

reference to religion as the opiate of the masses is well known.
Marx w r i tes:

•

What else does the history of ideas prove than that intellectual
production changes its character in proportion as material
production is changed?
The ruling ideas of each age have ever
been the ideas of its ruling class.
(Feuer, 1959: 26)
It is not necessary that people deliberately use ideas to
deceive others for personal benefit.

The fact is that ideas are

always present to buttress an institutional structure.

This is

important because institutions do orient an individual’s perceptions
and conceptions.
Those in authority attempt to justify their rule over institu
tions by linking it, as if it were a necessary consequence,
with widely believed-in moral symbols, sacred emblems, legal
formulae.
These central conceptions may refer to a god or
gods, the "vote of the majority," "the will of the people,"
"the aristocracy of talent or wealth," to the "divine right of
kings," or to the allegedly extraordinary endowment of the
ruler himself.
Social scientists, following Weber, call such
conceptions "legitimations," or sometimes "symbols of justi
fication. "
Various thinkers have used different terms to refer to them:
M o s c a ’s "political formula," or "great superstitutions,"
L o c k e ’s "principle of sovereignty," Sorel's "ruling myth,"
Thurman Arnolds "folklore," W e b e r ’s "legitimations," Durkheim’s
"collective representations," M a r x ’s "dominant ideas,"
Rousseau’s "general will," Lasswell’s "symbols of authority,"
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Mannheim’s "ideology," Herbert Spencer's "public sentiments"—
all these and others like them testify to the central place
of master symbols in social analysis.
Similarly in psychological analysis, such master symbols,
relevant when they are taken over privately, become the reasons
and often the motives that lead persons into roles and sanction
their enactment of them.
If for example, economic institutions
are publicly justified in terms of them, then references to
self-interest may be acceptable justification for individual
conduct.
But, if it is felt publicly necessary to justify
such institutions in terms of "public service and trust," the
old self-interest motives and reasons may lead to guilt or at
least to uneasiness among capitalists.
Legitimations that are
publicly effective often become, in due course, effective as
personal motives.*
(Mills, 1959: 36)
Cooley acknowledges the power of economic institutions by
noting that other v a l u e s , which are already institutional, come
under its influence.

If Cooley is correct, then we should expect

to find that general ideas such as "success" and specific institu
tions such as the family have become adorned with the connotations
and values conducive to economic development.
Kimball described the disruption of "rural social organization"
under the impact of two factors:

technology and capital.

At one

time, Kimball wrote (1949: 38-49), rural status systems were highly
egalitarian.

Social life was characteristically cooperative.

These qualities were maintained out of necessity.
example,
it alone.

To use Kimball's

"A" helped "B" and "B" helped "A" because neither could go
This mutual dependence sparked an appreciation of the

system or, in other words, gave rise to sentiments favorable to
the systems maintenance.

The close interaction between members of

a rural community in their efforts to subsist was repeated in other

*These "master symbols" which Mills discussed seem quite
similar to Sumner's "watchwords" and "phrases."
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areas of community life— churches, schools, recreation, etc.
New machinery, improved farming techniques, and the realization
that farming can be big business eroded old style rural life.

Men

having capital at their disposal and who were not raised in the old
cooperative style formed large "commercial farms."

Smaller farms,

with the aid of new machinery, could be operated singly.

The

sentiments which arose out of necessity began to decline for the
lack of necessity.

The commercial farms introduced status dis

tinctions between owners and workers where previously, owners were
workers.

Community life was reorganized to suit status differences.

As the life experiences of eommunity members began losing their
similarity the homogeneous quality of other local institutions
deteriorated.
A study by Johnson and Kerckhoff (1964: 149-156) revealed
that adult men who favor nuclear family norms are most likely to
accept "the value of change" and least likely to perceive a conflict
4

between family values and economic success values.

The authors used

a Likert scale and statements like the following:
Family N o r m s :
Children should take care of their parents in whatever way
necessary, when they are sick.
The children should give their parents financial help.
If children should live nearby after they grow up, they
should visit their parents at least once, a week.
(Johnson
and Kerckhoff, 1964: 151)
Value of Change:
If I could have my way I would keep things the same rather
than having them change all the time.

134
When you come right down to it, the old ways are the best.
Sometimes I feel all the changes that go on are too much for me.
I have never felt too old to try something new.
Kerckhoff, 1964: 152)

(Johnson and

Respondents who give a high rating to the items favorable to the
nuclear family and accept the value of change are most likely to
have higher education, better jobs and income, greater experience
in geographic mobility, and less rural experience.

The opposites

are true for those who favor extended kinship and respond negatively
to the change items.

The authors state that this supports an

"intra-personality strain toward consistency reflecting the
interinstitutional relationships of our society."
One would expect that there be a positive correlation between
urbanization, industrialization, and technological growth.

Kimball's

rural community began to change under the influence of technological
development and concentrated methods of economic success, i.e.,
commercial farms.

The capital necessary to establish these

commercial farms is symbolic of, if not equivalent to, economic
success.

A positive view of the nuclear family and the value of

change is positively associated with urban or suburban life.

Success

defined in economic terms moves outward from the city areas.

If

this analysis is correct, Johnson and Kerckhoff's rather cumbersome
conclusion can be changed to read as follows:

Persons who define

success in pecuniary terms are likely to maintain values associated
with other institutions which are conducive to pecuniary success.
A study by Kahl (1965: 669). sought to determine some of the
characteristics of the success value.

"Our notion of the concept
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'value' implies a verbal system, an official ideology that is
deliberately taught to new members of given groups or strata."
According to his definition, the success value is ideological.
Kahl combined the results of several studies which were amenable
to the same statistical treatment (factor analysis).

Four variable

from the variety of studies could be used; "trust," "activism,"
"independence of family," and "occupational primacy."

The trust

items involved questions about human nature or the trustworthiness
of people in general.

"Activism" dealt with the methods used to

succeed and the goals which symbolize success.

"Independence of

family" involved opinions about moving away from home or at great
distances from relatives, and family triggered employment (pulling
strings).

"Occupational primacy" involved the importance of work

and its accruences to life.

In other words, how important is one's

work relative to other matters.

Occupational primacy, the factor

most indicative of success as defined in economic terms, proved to
be curvilinear.

The middle class scored highest on occupational

primacy while the upper and lower classes placed other things above
occupation.

Kahl concluded that the success goal is evident

throughout society.

Without defining the precise content of

"success," this value remains an ideal— everybody wants it.

Kahl

agreed with Mizruchi's contention that "the 'success' goal is
widespread throughout the class hierarchy, but that the particular
content of this goal and the means by which it can be obtained vary
significantly (Kahl, 1965: 678)."
It appears that "success" in particular, and ideals in general,
serve as "master symbols" as described by C. Wright Mills,

The

articles by Kimball, Kahl, and Johnson and Kerckhoff demonstrate
the power of economic institutions in affecting the characteristics
of an individual's physical life as well as the ideas an individual
has about that life.

Had Kimball's rural community consciously

resisted the changed in life style depicted by Kimball (in
consideration of the correlations in Johnson and Kerckhoff's
article, there is good reason to believe that they would have,
had they known what was going on) it is unlikely that the community
would have been able to resist an institution whose legal structure
is geared to capital investment.

If Cooley's "pecuniary valuation"

is indeed an institution of the dominant nature which he describes,
then responses to the question "What is success?" would more often
than not be associated with economic terms.

The same should be

expected from the question "What is value?".

Institutions and Ideologies:
Their Bond in
Sentiments and the Basis of Conflict
An argument b y Riemer was quoted in the last chapter,
(1)

Ideologies are set off against one another according to
disparate means for achievement of the "summon bonum."

(2)

Lower level values stand in a relationship as means to the
higher level values.

(3)

Ideological conflict involves lower level values.

(4)

Acceptability is reached by climbing out of the concrete
into the "lofty" heights of supreme values.
"Consensus
can never be reached if the true issue of concrete value
specifications is avoided."
(Riemer, 1949: 133)

An earlier article

by

Riemer serves to illustrate what he means.

In "Social Planning and Social Organization" (Riemer, 1947: 508-516)
he says that "social planning is concerned with the concrete detail
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of its subject matter"; "social planning co-ordinates diversified
technical skills and professional training" and; "social planning
calls for the proclamation and specification of values (Riemer, 1947:
508)."

There is a problem when concrete means are not provided

along with "ideal" plans.
This necessity is frequently obscured by the delegation of
power to the social planner in terms of truisms.
He is called
upon to plan for the "welfare of the community," but it is
left to him to specify such general statements in terms of
tangible objectives that can serve as a guide for concerted
community action.
(Riemer, 1947: 510)
It is impossible to create a plan which implements an ideal to the
fullest because many ideals are inconsistent, vague, and as Becker
pointed out, they can be irrational in the long run.
the "free market" as an example:

Riemer gave

If the ideal of the free market

is carried to its extreme, monopolies will be the result; hence,
there is no more free market.

Planning is also inhibited in the

United States because of the separation of powers.
cannot implement plans.
to implement plans.

The judiciary

The executive must go through the legislature

The legislature is too large and therefore too

divided for any consensus to be attained on specific action.

When

a specific action has been decided its activation requires the
money acquired through taxation.
Taxation itself is an example of a controversial government
necessity.

Bittner (1926: 442-449) contrasted the institutions

"American Pattern of Taxation" with the ideological "Democratic
Pattern of Taxation."

The American pattern involves keeping state

services at a minimum so as to keep taxes down; permit wide latitude
for private enterprise; permit tax free securities; and a progressive
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tax system.

The Democratic pattern contains the "belief elements"

of a lessening of extremes of wealth; increased public services to
the common man; taxes are necessary evils— make them light for the
many and heavy for the few; hereditary wealth and priviledges are
hindrances to democratic progress.

Bittner noted that both of these

systems have elements in common while those elements that conflict
are solved only temporarily.
by incurring public debt.

Expenses are pushed into the future

Public debt, usually incurred by means of

tax free securities, undermines elements in both systems.

Progressive

taxation is undermined in that the very rich invest in tax free
securities and severely reduce their taxable income.

Taxes do not,

in fact, turn out to be heavy for the few.
"Value conflict implies that two or more parties in society
hold different views about the goodness, logic or beauty of some
thing (Honigman, 1959: 35)."

Honigman says that legislation is often

unable to resolve value conflict between legislation often gives
rise to the conflict or else makes that conflict visible.

When

legislation is effective in resolving conflict, according to Honigman,
it is often because the constituents recognize the authority of the
law-making body or places obedience to the law above the particular
values in conflict.
Riemer appears to be correct.

When good intentions are reduced

to practical activity the substance of value conflict becomes evident.
Willard Waller was of a different opinion however.

In an

article primarily intended to reveal the sources of an individual's
understanding of a situation as a social problem, Waller sets
"organizational mores" against "humanitarian mores."

When
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organizational mores produce results which are incongruent with
humanitarian mores the student perceives "social problems."

"In

every social problem seek the moral problem; try to discover the
complex processes of conflict, supplementation, and interference
in our own moral imperatives (Waller, 1936: 926)."

In other words,

the problem of social problems cannot be understood apart from the
student's motives in seeing the situation as a problem.
While Waller's reasoning behind seeing social problems as
"problems" is sensible, his criticism of "solutions" is filled with
status quo ideology.
A simpleton would suggest that the remedy for poverty in the
midst of plenty is to redistribute income. We reject this
solution at once because it would interfere with the institution
of private property, would destroy the incentive for thrift
and hard work and disjoint the entire economic system.
What
is done to alleviate poverty must be done within the limits
set by organizational mores.
(Waller, 1936: 926)
Without arguing the merits of income redistribution there are three
assumptions made by Waller which are questionable.

First, Waller

makes the assumption that "thrift and hard work" are thoroughly
responsible for the success of those not hampered by poverty.

This

ignores the possibility that the institutions, or the "organizational
mores" as he calls them, are themselves responsible for the poverty.
Second, he assumes that institutions should not be interferred with.
To believe that efforts to alleviate poverty must be done within
the organizational mores is to believe in the immutability of such
mores or to assume that these mores are inherently beneficient.*

*It would appear that Sumner would also take issue with Waller
on this point.
He said that we should judge the mores of our time
and "put courage and labor into resistance to the current mores
when we judge them wrong (Sumner, 1906: 118)."
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Had Waller used his method for analyzing social problems to analyze
his critique of solutions he might have discovered the flaws in his
own argument.
An article by Bowman has similarities to those of Cooley,
Riemer, Waller, and Bittner.

Bowman (1943: 306-312) said that

scientists can examine "means" (as culturally defined) as to their
consistency with other social ideals or "ends."

In other words,

social scientists can examine plans for a course of action.

Though

he does not say that social scientists should do the planning, they
can determine the justifiability of plans that are presented.

In

keeping with this rolq, Bowman argues, the social scientist can
examine ideologies which espouse particular actions for the "general
social welfare."

Such an examination would reveal the sub-group

origins and the actual interest satisfactions; the same could be done
for institutions.
conclusion:

This suggestion is not unlike Bittner’s earlier

"When a decision on policy prevails we tend to accept it

as having a reasonable basis when in fact it has chiefly a pattern
foundation and a superstructure of rationalization (Bittner, 1926:
449)."
Though institutions may provide for the "general social
welfare" the content of that provision and the institutional supports
may limit the extent to which an institution has an effect.

Burton

Clark’s study of the effort to implement adult education into the
California Public School System illustrates these limitations.

The

success or failure of this implementation was considered in terms of
the values in proximity to the adult program and the larger institution,
namely, public education.
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Social values may be defined as conceptions of the desireable
that are distinctive of some human group.
These conceptions
are usually voiced in goals and standards of action— in
relatively specific notions of what should be attained and how.
(Clark, 1956: 328)
Clark considered adult education to be a precarious value.

His

assumptions about precariousness were:
(1)

Social values tend to

be precarious

when they are undefined.

(2)

Social values tend to be precarious when the position of
functionaries is not fully legitimized.

(3)

Social values tend to be precarious when they are
unacceptable to a "host" population. (Clark,
1956: 328)

The implementation of values is contingent upon the manifest ends of
action, organizational marginality, and operating pressures.

The

manifest ends of public education are generally considered to consist
of the transmission of knowledge for the betterment of society.

Like

other ideals such as "the public welfare," the specific content of
action is undefined.
Adult education holds a marginal position in that there are no
laws which can secure a predictable adult audience for these educa
tional programs.

Furthermore, the content of education itself is

left up to the specific locale in which the education is taking
place.
As concerns operating pressures, the content or existence of
a program depends upon some clientele to pay for them.

Unlike
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primary and secondary education which have a coerced audience, adult
education must rely on public interest in specific courses.
With these things in mind, adult education requires that its
functionaries sell the product in the same sense that companies have
to market their products.

The adoption of a function outside the
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existing institutional framework requires an adaptation of that
framework.
We may expect that this value adaptation, where purpose is
reduced to service, will be pronounced when (a) organizations
attached to a precarious value (b) continue to find themselves
without a predictable clientele, or more broadly, with no
specific outside forces to sustain them.
(Clark, 1956: 336)

The Confinement of Ideology to Politics
The term ideology is frequently thought of as a verbal facade
used to convince some group that the leaders have only the best of
intentions and that the course of action espoused by the ideologues
will have, or is having, desirable consequences.*
•

•

*

In the modern world, I think we must bear in mind, power is often
not so authoritative as it appeared to be in the medieval period;
justifications of rulers no longer seem so necessary to their
exercise of power.
At least for many of the great decisions
of our time— especially those of an international sort— mass
"persuasion" has not been "necessary"; the fact is simply
accomplished.
Furthermore, such ideologies as are available
to the powerful are often neither taken up nor used by them.
Ideologies usually arise as a response to an effective debunk
ing of power; in the United States such opposition has not been
recently affective enough to create a felt need for new ideolo
gies of rule.
Today, of course, many people who are disengaged from
prevailing allegiances have not acquired new ones, and so
are inattentive to political concerns of any kind.
They are
neither radical nor reactionary.
They are inactionary.
If
we accept the Greek’s definition of the idiot as an altogether
private man, then we must conclude that many citizens of many
societies are indeed idiots.
This— and I use the word with
care— this spiritual condition seems to me the key to much
modern malaise among political intellectuals, as well as the
key to much political bewilderment in modern society.
Intellectual "conviction" and moral "belief" are not necessary,
in either the rulers or the ruled, for a.structure of power to
persist and even to flourish.
So far as the role of ideologies

*According to Clyde Kkuckhohn, "ideology has today a somewhat
pejorative sense which does not attack to value."
(Kluckhohn, in
Parsons, 1951: 433)
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is concerned, the frequent absence of engaging legitimation and
the prevalence of mass apathy are surely two of the central
political facts about Western societies of today.
(Mills, 1959:
41)
There must have been a mood at the time this book appeared
which inspired sociologists to address this question.
a book appeared entitled The End of Ideology:
Political Ideas in the Fifties (Bell, 1960).

One year later

t)n The Exhaustion of
Mills, perhaps, hopes

for a revival or a resuscitation of ideological commitment.

Daniel

Bell was simply declaring the end of ideological commitment— he did
not mourn its passing.
disagreement.

B e l l ’s book created a stir and plenty of

Before presenting the counter arguments, this writer

must ask what Bell means by ideology.

In the broadest sense of the

term ’’political" all ideology is political.

In the narrowest sense

of "political" only those systems dealing specifically with govern
ment forms are ideological.

"Ideology" has also been subjected to

this problem of conceptual expension and contraction.

Bell said that:

. . . in popular usage the word ideology remains as a vague term
where it seems to denote a world-view or belief-system or creeds
held by a social group about the social arrangements in society,
which is morally justified as being right.
People then talk
of the "ideology of the small businessman," or of liberalism,
or fascism, as an "ideology." Or some writer will talk of "the
dream world of ideology (in which) Americans see their
country as a place where every child is born to ’equality of
opportunity,’ where every man is essentially as good as every
other man if not better.” In this sense, ideology connotes a
’'myth" rather than just a set of values.
Clearly, such usages, by mixing together many things, create
only confusion . . .
We can, perhaps, borrow a distinction from Mannheim, and
distinguish between what he called "the particular conception
of ideology," and "the total conception of ideology."
In the
first sense, we can say that individuals who profess certain
values have interests as well, and we can better understand
the meaning of these values or beliefs, or the reasons why
they come forth where they have, by linking them up with the
interests they have— though the interests may not always be
economic; they may be status interests (such as an ethnic group
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that wants higher standing or approval in a society), political
interests, such as representation, and the like. . . .
A total
ideology is an all inclusive system of comprehensive reality,
it is a set of beliefs, infused with passion, and seeks to
transform the whole way of life.
This commitment to ideology—
the yearning for a "cause," or the satisfaction of deep moral
feelings— is not necessarily the reflection of interests in the
shape of ideas.
Ideology, in this sense, and in the sense
that we use it here, is a secular religion.
(Bell, 1960:
399)
The moving force behind ideologies are intellectuals.

The

intellectual of yesterday is more likely to be the scholar of today.
The scholar qua scholar, is less involved with his "self." The
intellectual begins with his experience, his individual percep
tions of the world, his priviledges and deprivations, and judges
the world by these sensibilities.
Since his own status is of
high value, his judgements of the society reflect the treatment
accorded to him.
(Belj., 1960: 402)
To the extent that the intellectual was disenfranchised from the
desired places in society,
there was a built in compulsion for the free-floating intellec
tual to become political.
The ideologies, therefore, which
emerged from the nineteenth century had the force of the
.intellectuals behind them. . . , for the radical intelligentsia
(of today), the old ideologies have lost their "truth" and their
power to persuade.
(Bell, 1960: 402)
From these quotations we can see that Bell is referring to total
ideologies having their origin in the nineteenth century when he
refers to the "end of ideology."

He noted that "new ideologies"

are appearing in third world countries.
These are the ideologies of industrialization, modernization,
Pan-Arabism, color, and nationalism.
In the distinctive
difference between the two kinds of ideologies lies the great
political and social problems of the second half of the
twentieth century.
The ideologies of the nineteenth century
were universalistic, humanistic, and fashioned by intellectuals.
The mass ideologies of Asia and Africa are parochial, instru
mental, and created by political leaders.
The driving forces
of the old ideologies were social equality and, in the
largest sense, freedom.
The impulses of the new ideologies
are economic development and national power.
(Bell, 1960:
403)
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Bell noted that a "new left" is emerging but it is impotent
because of a lack of direction.

The need for ideology is present,

as is the energy, but there is no indication that solutions to great
problems, "the direction," are present.

As Bell put it, "any of

the great questions that require hard thought, are only answered
by bravura phrases (Bell, 1960: 405)."
Eight years later a collection of papers by various authors
was published in a volume entitled The End of Ideology Debate
(Waxman, 1968).

C. Wright Mills wrote:

Ultimately, the end-of-ideology is based upon a disillusionment
with any real commitment to socialism in any recognizable
form.
That is the only'"ideology" that has really ended for
these writers.
But with its ending, all ideology, they think,
has ended.
That ideology they talk about; their own
ideological assumptions, they do not.
(Mills in Waxman, 1968:
128)
It is a kindergarten fact that any political reflection that is
of possible significance is ideological:
in its terms policies,
institutions, men of power are criticized or approved.
In this
respect, the end-of-ideology stands negatively, for the attempt
to withdraw oneself and o n e ’s work from political relevance;
positively, it is an ideology of political complacency which
seems the only way now open for many writers to acquiesce in
or to justify the status quo.
(Mills in Waxman, 1968: 131)
Though B e l l ’s usage of ideology is "total" the phraseology*
that surfaces in change oriented ideologies is "political."

With

this in mind, Bell's arguments may be attacked from two positions:
(1) If by "ideology" Bell means all ideologies, then we may ask if
it is true that all ideologies are on the decline;

(2) if by

ideology Bell means socialism in particular, then we may ask if it

*The term "phraseology" is used here to avoid the tainted
connotations of the term "rhetoric."

146
is true that socialist ideologies are on the decline.

B e l l ’s

reference to "new ideologies" seems a sufficient indication that he
does not mean that all ideologies are on the decline.
interpretation, on the other hand, seems correct.
greatest certainty of decline to the west.
ments damaging to B e l l ’s thesis.

The second

Bell confined his

Even here there are argu

In his analysis of the political

scene in Italy, Lapalombara writes:
If by decline is meant the abandonment of some of the rhetoric,
the verbal symbols, the predictions and expectations voiced
until the late fifties, there seems little doubt about the
validity of such a judgement, although the more appropriate
word would be change.
What is important is the apparent P. C. I. conviction that it
can come up with a new strategy— a new formula for achieving
power— for Communist parties operating in Western European and
other countries of advanced capitalism.
It is important to
bear in mind that, in doing this, the party purports to be able
to provide an up-dated ideological rationale for action.
Some
of the "moldiness" of "Scientific Socialism" has certainly been
scraped away.
What remains, coupled with some of the newer
ideas currently in ferment, amounts to much more ideology
than one might detect from the simple notation that the
language of the late forties and early fifties is no longer
in vogue.
The new myths, which form the core of the ideological structure
of many intellectuals, are those of the welfare state and of
economic planning.
As Henri James rightly puts it, "The myth
of planning is only the socialist variant of the myth of
progress."
(Lapalombara in Waxman, 1968: 328, 329, 340)
It is not true that all ideologies are on the decline.

Neither does

it appear true that ideology in the form of socialism is on the
decline.

Though Bell has been successfully criticized on these

counts, his most important formulation remains unscathed.

Ideology

contains myth and, as such, tends to mislead as much as it tends
to inspire.
ideologue.

Bell has been charged with serving as a status quo
However, Bell wrote:
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Where the theme of the ’’end of ideology” is currently most
relevant is in Eastern Europe, among the intellectuals who
have experienced at first hand the deadening effects of an
official ideology, and among the young generation for whom
ideology is simply flatulent rhetoric.
(It is curious that
Mr. Aiken seems to assume that ideology is always nascent and
passionate, and neglects its more pervasive role as a
coercive, official force.)
. . . The intention, then, of the ’’revolt against ideology”
is not to make one insensitive to injustice or to the need
for a transcendant moral vision.
It is, rather, to make one
wary of the easy solution and to deny that any embodiment of
community is final.
(Bell in Waxman, 1968: 270)
Doesn't

"official ideology" sound like another phrasing for the

term "institution?"

Aren't institutions those value systems which

are the status quo?

It appears incorrect to call Bell a status

quo ideologue.
It appears that the end of ideology debate is a grand example
of people talking past each other.
still remain.

The

questions of greatest substance

What kinds of ideologies attract what kinds of people?

What kinds of "underlying strain or tension" are most likely to
evoke what kinds of ideology?

How can ideologies be analyzed so

as to distinguish the factual from the mythical elements?

Who is

behind what ideologies and what have they to gain?
"The Radical Right as a Minority Group" (Howard in Sagarin,
1971: 288-306) asks if the advocates of right-wing ideology constitute
i

a minority group.

Howard

argued that virtually everyone can be

thought of as a minority in some respect when minority is thought
of in the broadest sense of the term.

His reasons for viewing the

radical right in minority group terms are as follows:
(1)

In a structural sense the radical right is not a minority
group as the concept is conventionally understood.
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(2)

The perspective of many persons on the far right is
similar, however, to that of members of a minority group.
In terms of political attitudes and values many manifest
what Hofstadter has labeled "the paranoid style."

(3)

The perspective of the right derives from certain
persistent strains and tensions in the American system
and is important in that occasionally it breaks through
to broadly mark the course of political events.

(4)

The persistence of the strains and tensions which generate
theparanoid style can be better understood if one departs
from the broadly conventional conceptualization of minority
group and employs what might be termed a radical conception
of the minority group phenomenon.
(Howard in Sagarin,
1971: 289)
The Christian Crusade, the John Birch Society, and the Ku

Klux Klan are groups which exemplify the range of right-wing
ideology— Christian fundamentalism, anti-Communism, and racism.
In describing the members of these groups Howard noted that the
KKK seemed to be of lower socio-economic strata than the Birch
Society and less "staid and respectable" than Christian Crusade
followers.
.•

A fourth group might be added to the constituencies of the
right:
the urban, working poor, the white worker earning
$5,000 to $10,000 a year.
This individual finds himself in
a continual economic bind; he sees many of the values and
institutions which he was taught to revere attacked and
ridiculed.
He is against the putative agents of destruction:
niggers, peace creeps, weirdos, eggheads, commies, politicians,
students, dope fiends, sex perverts, and anyone else whom he
does not understand or whose difference makes him uncomfortable.
George Wallace probably drew the bulk of his support in the
North from among the white working poor.
(Howard in Sagarin,
1971: 292)
The higher income, higher social status conservatives have in
common with the above group the feeling that their advantages and
privileges are being eroded.

These people wish to gain or at

least not lose any ground in the hierarchy of advantages.

Insti

tutions embody some policy or ideology and as such they benefit
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some people more than they benefit others.

The concept of "insti

tutional discrimination" refers to the systematic application of
procedures to the exclusion of an aggregate of people having some
characteristic(s) in common.

Unlike religious and racial minorities,

the radical right has not been subjected to factual discrimination or
persecution.

"The persecutions visited upon the radical right are

less visible to the dispassionate observer.

It is not so much

that the right is persecuted but that it believes it is (Howard
in Sagarin, 1971: 294)."

Rokeach's Model of Political Ideology

,

•

s

The study of ideologies would be enhanced if the characteristics
of certain groups of people could be correlated with the elements or
themes in the ideologies which they profess or with which they
express agreement.

Rokeach’s The Nature of Human Values (1973)

contains a chapter entitled "A Two-Value Model of Political
Ideology."

Rokeach argues that politics is mainly about a concern

with "freedom" and "equality."

If each of these values exists on

a high-low dimension in terms of the degree to which each is
valued in ideologies, four extreme types will result.
ing figure illustrates the range of each dimension.

The follow

150
Communism

Freedom
low

Equality high

•■

_______________________________ ____

Fascism

Figure 1.

Socialism

Equality low

Freedom
high

Capitalism

A Freedom-Equality Model of Political Variations*

To test his two-value model, Rokeach selected 25,000-world
samples from writings which represent the four major ideological
orientations.

Communism was represented by Lenin.

represented by Adolph Hitler.
Goldwater.

Fascism was

Capitalism was represented by Barry

Socialism was represented by T. B. Bottomore, Erich

Fromm, P. Medow, N. Thomas, and M. Titmus.

Rokeach felt that no

single individual could represent the socialist point of view.

The

samples were subjected to content analysis and counts were made of
the absolute and relative frequency for which freedom and equality
received positive or negative reference.**

"Our results clearly

4

show that the traditional left-right dimension turns Out to be a
two-dimensional one (Rokeach, 1971: 294)."

Rokeach argues

To American conservatives, social equality is perhaps seen as ’
a threat to individual freedom; to socialists, there can be
no freedom for the citizenry without social equality.
Similarly,

*The above diagram is a duplication of Rokeach’s Figure 6.1
(Rokeach, 1973: 170).
**A11 of the instrumental and terminal values of Rokeach’s lists
were obtained from these samples but are not relevant to this
particular model.
The lists may be found in Chapter VII.
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both communism and fascism place a low value on freedom
advocate instead the supremacy and power of the state.
to fascists, the power of the state is seen as a weapon
coerce inequality, whereas to communists it is a weapon
coerce equality.
(Rokeach, 1973: 184)

and
But
to
to

Rokeach added that "equality” alone can be used to differentiate
the "major political groupings" in the United States but that it is
inadequate for distinguishing other ideologies as they are not
sufficiently represented in the United States.

Rokeach said that

this method could be used to analyze other political ideologies.
If this method can be used to analyze political ideologies
there does not appear to be any reason why the same method, using
the same or different values, could not be used to analyze more
specialized ideologies such as those of religion, art, or whatever*

Conclusion
Institutions and ideologies are systems of interrelated meanings.
These systems of meanings are comprised of specific values such as
norms, beliefs, and ideals as well as their various subtypes.

These

systems of meanings (or values) are highly focused and highly
visible.

In other words, a system is a collection of values con

centrated about some function or social concern.

The family, for

example, is an institution and concerns very many "specific" norms,
beliefs, and ideals.

The family is highly visible.

An institution, unlike an ideology, requires that its systems
of meanings be accompanied by highly patterned, interrelated behavior.
In other words, an institution has a structure.

An ideology, by

contrast, can exist more or less independently of any behavior
patterns or interrelationship of roles.

For an ideology to supplant an institution requires that the
people become disaffected with the institution(s) in question.
This means that norms associated with the institution are no longer
complied with; that the beliefs presented by the institution no
longer persuade; and that the ideals towards which the institution
was directed no longer hold high esteem.

Conversely, the ideology

must gain a believing constituency and a set of behaviors con
sistently practiced and endorsed as proper behavior.

There can

be no doubt that "myths" play an important role in persuading
people that an institution or ideology is necessary, beneficial,
or what have you.

The fact; that myths do play a role is evident

in the "fictions" we employ in our day-to-day dealings within
institutions.

For one reason or another we do not wish to confront

the possibility that our explanations are mythical explanations.
Daniel Bell and C. Wright Mills are both familiar with the role of
myths.

It is even possible that C. H. Cooley was addressing this

issue when he debunked the notion that "human nature" could serve
as an explanation of values.

The claim, "It’s human nature," could

serve as a powerful buttress for some institutional structure.
The literature discussed in the section on "Economy as the
Dominant Institution" suggests two ideas.
attributable to Marx:

A society's

The first idea is

economic structure (institution)

determines the other features of the social order.
this idea may be attributed to Cooley.

A variant of

Cooley suggested that

pecuniary valuation, or estimations of worth as defined in economic
terms, was an institutional phenomenon and one that was ascending.
Cooley’s idea was not so deterministic as M a r x ’s.

Other literature
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supported the idea that the economy was the dominant institution in
the United States:

Old style rural life was being drastically

altered with the onset of farming techniques and social relations
designed to maximize profits (Kimball); adult men who favored
nuclear family norms and accept the "value of change" are least
likely to perceive a conflict between family values and economic
success values (Johnson and Kerchkoff); there is a close relationship
between occupational primacy and success as defined in economic
terms (Kahl).

This particular body of information suggests that

in societies where a particular institution is dominant the values
associated with other -institutions will be arranged in such a way
that the subordinate institutions maximize the effects of the
dominant institution.
Recall from Chapter II that "value" corresponds to individual
expressions of positive or negative meaning while "social value"
corresponds to Sumner's "concept," Williams' "matters of collective
welfare" regarded as such by "an effective consensus," and Giddings'
"social appraisals of certain satisfactions, relations, modes of
activity, and forms of social organization."

Perhaps the measure

of social-value which an institution enjoys can be gauged by the
degree of conflict which surrounds it.

This conflict would take

place not on the level of ideals but on the level of effects.

Recall

Burton Clark's study of adult education as a.precarious value.
On the level of ideals we know that people think "education" is a
good thing.

When we address the subject with regard to what is

going to be taught, how the program is going to be supported, and
who is going to be involved in it we discover that education does
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not hold as high a position as we had imagined.

The conventional

educational institutions would have to be transformed in order to
actualize an adult program.
Ideology in the broadest sense refers to a total, universalistic,
all-inclusive system which seeks to transform a way of life.
in the narrow sense is "particular."

Ideology

This understanding sees an

ideology wherever a set of ideas is vocalized about some particular
social arrangement.

It is interesting that Daniel Bell announced

the decline of the "total" ideological system of socialism at the
time when Americans were becoming disenchanted with their institu
tional arrangements.

’The American contra-culture expressed a

number of socialistic ideas in a number of institutional areas.
question is:

The

Why did the American sociologist not see what was

coming?
In the opinion of this writer the "Systems" element of the
Vanfossen typology is the most inherently sociological.

Systems

encompass the specific norms, beliefs, and ideals, but puts them
into a perspective.

The Systems concept adds the element of value

to the structural component which is stressed in conventional
definitions of "institution."

Furthermore, the Systems concept

allows for an alternative to institutions by considering institutions
in terms of their ideas.

The Vanfossen typology invites one to

investigate the relationships of norms, beliefs, and ideals within
the concept of systems.
The final argument is that the term "ideology" should be
maintained and not discarded because it has, as Kluckhohn explains,
"a somewhat pejorative sense which does not attach to value."

If

ideology really is associated with a pejorative sense it is perhaps
because many ideologies are simply not believed.

People do not

regard negatively the sets of meanings which they do believe.

What

term shall we have for sets of meanings which lack a pejorative sense

CHAPTER VII
COMPLEXES

Complexes are diffuse sets of values., Complexes are of two
types:

ethos and ethics.

Complexes are diffuse in that they are

comprised of many values of differing types.

Complexes permeate the

less diffuse institutions and ideologies.
That complex which incorporates all
of the major values of a
society
into an overall "style" may
be referred to as that
societies11 Ethos; that complex which portrays the image or
range of alternative images of man himself may be termed an
Ethic and includes various Personality Cynosures and their
associated Emulation Models.
(Vanfossen, page 20)
While an ethos characterizes a particular society or culture, an
ethic is directed specifically at man.

While an ethos is temporally

bound, an ethic may be found in different cultures at different
times.

Robert Redfield makes a similar distinction between man and

society but adds other elements.
When we speak of "world view" we make one kind of attempt to
characterize a traditional way of life.
"World view" is one
of those terms which are useful in asserting something of
what is
most general and persistent
about a people. . ..
Then we
find ourselves talking about fundamental themes or
patterns.
Or we can place emphasis on the normative aspect
of this great whole, and then "ethos" appears, the system of
values. . . . And, finally in this short list, I mention
the interest recently directed toward the characterization
of a people, of a way of life, as if we were characterizing
a single human being.
The attempt to describe "national
character" is of this sort.
In that case a people is
represented in terms of a "personality type," and the
explanation of the formation of the type is found, perhaps,
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in the mode of rearing children.
The culture of a people is, then, its total equipment of
ideas and institutions and conventionalized activities.
The
ethos of a people is its organized conceptions of the Ought.
The national character of a people, or its personality type,
is the kind of human being which, generally speaking, occurs
in that society.
The "world view" of a people, yet another
of this group of conceptions, is the way a people characteristically
look outward upon the universe.
(Redfield, 1953: 84)
Redfieldfs usage is slightly different from the one used here.
Ethos is not restricted to the normative and includes what Redfield
called "world view."

An ethic, though it deals with "personality

type," also contains normative elements and is not restricted to the
"national character of

people."

Clyde Kluckhohn makes use of the concept of "value-orientation."
Kluckhohn writes:
A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of
an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desireable
which influences the selection from available modes, means and
ends of action.
. . . any given act is seen as a compromise between motivation,
situational conditioning, available means, and the means and
goals as interpreted in value terms.
Motivation arises in part
from biological and situational factors.
Motivation and value
are both influenced by the unique life history of the individual
and by culture.
It is convenient to use the term value-orientation for those
value notions which are (a) general, (b) organized, and (c)
include definite existential judgements.
A value-orientation
is a set of linked propositions embracing both value and
existential elements.
(Kluckhohn in Parsons, 1951: 395, 403,
409)
From these conceptions Kluckhohn proposed a scheme for
classifying value-orientations with the following dimensions:
modality (positive or negative), content (aesthetic, cognitive, and
moral), intent (instrumental and goal values), generality (specific
and thematic), intensity, explicitness (one which is stated verbally
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by actors or inferred by observers), extent (idiosyncratic, personal,
and group), and organization (referring to position in a hierarchy,
or isolation).
Kluckhohn-'s article was discursive and we can only infer the
manner in which he thought this scheme should be used.

Kluckhohn's

value-orientation joins ethos and ethic so as to cut out parts of
both.

The dimension of "extent" suggests that a value-orientation

may be discussed with reference to an individual or a group; we do
not speak of an individual's ethos.

The dimension of "generality"

implies concern with concrete values as well as the none too specific
"themes."

It may be that "value-orientation" includes systems as

well as complexes as implied by the dimension of "organization."
In any case, Kluckhohn's conception is difficult to classify and
discuss as one which corresponds to any particular type of value.
Considering the variety of value concepts it is not surprising to
find a wide array of conceptions that deal with diffuse value sets.*
There is another framework which, like Kluckhohn's, can be
thought of as a typology of diffuse values which entails more than
complexes.

Fallding's four types** (membership, partisanship,

ownership, and interest) are broad enough to include the elements
discussed by Kluckhohn but lack the specificity of Kluckhohn's
dimensions.

What would be considered "partisanship" by Fallding

might be an orientation of low "organization," moderate

*The methods used by Parsons and F. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck
are also different.
They will be discussed shortly.
**This is discussed at greater length in Chapter III.
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"explicitness," and of moral "content" for Kluckhohn; perhaps, for
Vanfossen, this would be an ideology.

Kluckhohn’s and Fallding’s

diffuse types overlap with the "systems" concept.

More often than

not, efforts to embrace values which are called complexes mix ethos
and ethics together with systems.

The following sections attempt to

discuss complexes in as unmixed a fashion as possible without
destroying the meanings intended by the various authors.

Ethos
It was stated earlier that ethos are culture bound.

Man

"constantly imposes on this environment his own constructions and
meanings; these constructions and meanings [are] characteristic of
one culture as over against another (Kluckhohn quoting Bateson in
Parsons, 1951: 409)."

Aside from any preference of definition, the

concept of ethos is one which encompasses the transmitable as well
as the non-transmitable features of a society or culture.

It follows

therefore, that some term be used which incorporates the elements
which cannot be borrowed or diffused to other societies.

Though

his discussion was not explicitly directed to ethos, Ralph Linton
outlined the culture bound character of some values.
. . . we have in all cultures those vital attitudes and values
which lie largely below the level of consciousness and which
the average member of a society rarely tries to verbalize even
to himself.
The practical impossibility of making such
elements available for borrowing by the members of some other
society is obvious.
This part of any culture is simply not
susceptible to diffusion.
It can never be presented in
sufficiently concrete and objective terms.
Such things as
religious or philosophical concepts can be communicated
after a fashion, although probably never in their entirety.
Patterns of social behavior can also be transmitted in the
same uncertain way, but the associations which give them genuine
potentialities for function cannot be transmitted.
A borrowing
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group may imitate their outward forms, but it will usually be
found that it has introduced new elements to replace those
which could not be genuinely communicated to it.
(Linton,
1936:
339)
In a sense it may be said of ethos that it describes those
common values which give the appearance of integration.

This is

not to say that a society is integrated because its members agree
on the ethos but rather, that ethos depicts a society’s wholeness.
John Sirjamaki’s conception of ethos is comprised of all of a
society's "culture configurations."

"Culture configurations are the

moral principles which comprise the social philosophy of a society
(Sirjamaki, 1948: 465)."
They are patterns of covert behavior; as such they are the
culturally approved rules or sentiments which motivate overt
behavior and which integrate it into consistent patterns; and
they can be deduced only from behavior. . . . When taken
together, the configurations delineate the ethos of a culture.
(Sirjamaki, 1948: 464)
The bulk of Sirjamaki's article is involved with descriptions
of the culture configurations of the American family.

This gives

the impression that Sirjamaki considered the study of institutions
as the best means of describing ethos.

Sirjamaki listed the

following eight points as the culture configurations of the
American family:
(1)

Marriage is a dominating life-goal, for men as well as
for women.

(2)

The giving and taking in marriage should be based on
personal affection and choice.

(3)

The criterion of success for marriage is the personal
happiness of husband and wife.

(4)

The best years of life are those of youth, and its qualities
are the most desirable.
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(5)

Children should be reared in a child’s world and shielded
from too early participation in adult woes and tribulations.

(6)

The exercise of sex should be contained within wedlock.

(7)

Family roles of husband and wife should be based on a
sexual division of labor, but with the male status being
superior.

(8)

Individual, not familial, values are to be sought in family
living.
(Sirjamaki, 1948: 465-470)

Most of these "moral principles" are stated as idealized norms.
Some of them would be severely contested today, particularly item
seven.

If indeed these are the moral principles upon which the

American family was based in 1948 they may serve to distinguish the
difference between depicting an ethos and investigating an institution,
v
As elements of an ethos they are taken to be "culturally approved
rules or sentiments" and can be deduced only from behavior.

As an

institution, or more broadly, as a system these principles would be
studied in greater detail than one finds in a depiction of the
dominant patterns.

As Cooley would suggest, we would ask whose

rules or sentiments these are; what is the source of these rules;
how are these rules reinforced structurally?

This is not the primary

concern when study is restricted to ethos.
The greater the degree of cultural approval of a particular
value the more* frequently will support be voiced for this value.
Albrecht

(1956: 722-729) expected that this support would be voiced

in literature.

Albrecht noted three general assumptions about the

relationship between literature and values:
(1)

Literature reflects society and culture with respect to
common cultural values.

(2)

Literature serves as a means of social control.
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(3)

It influences attitudes and behavior of people in ways
considered in some respects desireable, in others
undesireable. (Albrecht, 1956: 722)

Albrecht’s study was oriented toward the first of these
assumptions.

He hypothesized that "short stories read by large

audiences . . . will express essentially the same basic values and
ideals as the American family (Albrecht, 1956: 722)."

Albrecht

added two items to Sirjamaki's eight cpnfigurations to form the
framework against which the hypothesis would be tested.
were chosen to represent three levels of sophistication.

Six magazines
True Story

and True Confessions represented the "lower level"; American and The
Saturday Evening Post represented the middle level; The Atlantic and
The New Yorker represented the upper level.

Sampling was limited to

any "regular" short stories appearing in the year 1950.

An author

expressed a value if he made a positive statement about some theme
or a negative statement about one of the configurations alternatives.
The direction of the plot resolution was also used as evidence.
Assuming that Sirjamaki’s eight points and the two points added
by Albrecht were true values, Albrecht’s hypothesis would be
supported if the literature examined embraced these ten points.
The hypothesis was supported to this extent.

However, the literature

.for each level-did not support the themes with equal weight and the
intralevel weighting was also unequal *

Though the results supported

the idea that the stories "will express essentially the same basic
values and ideals as the American family" there was no indication as
to why certain levels of sophistication placed higher value on
some themes more than others.
Albrecht’s article concentrated on "American" values concerning
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a particular institution— the family.

GillinTs article, "National

and Regional Cultural Values in the United States" (Gillin, 1955:
107-113), also discussed "American" values.
did not focus on a particular institution.

Gillin’s discussion
Instead, he characterized

national values* and discussed geographic regions** with regard to
"special emphases"

and "special values."

The following excerpts

are examples of Gillin’s type of characterization.
NORTHEAST.
(a) Special emphases.
Hard work and thrift are still
given special emphasis in rural subcultures. Hereditary status
is more firmly established than in the country as a whole.
Power
over persons and groups, including those in other parts of the
nation is emphasized, and is more explicitly justified, especially
in cosmopolitan centers like Boston and New York. . . .
SOUTHEAST.
(a) Special emphases.
Protestant morality is
especially strong. . . . Family relations are strong and include
extended kin groups. . . . Pragmatic ingenuity, and the
corrolaries of the mechanistic world view, especially cleanli
ness and orderliness, are rated lower than in the country as a
whole. . . . (b) Special values.
Doctrine of white supremacy
and resulting race-castes.
Idealization of women in the image
of the "lady." Violence as a solution of interpersonal and
intergroup problems. . . .
MIDDLE STATES.
This region is often described as the "most
typical" of the United States.
(a) Special emphases.
Outward
symbols of prestige and power are devalued and emphasis is
placed on "democratic leveling." . . . Optimism is strong.
. . . Honesty and outspokenness are especially valued and the

*These national values are discussed in Chapter V.
**Gillin defined his regions as follows:
(1) Northeast:
Maine,
Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and West
Virginia.
(2) Southeast:
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas,
Tennessee, Kentucky.
(3) Southwest:
Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico,
Arizona, Utah, and Nevada.
(4) Middle States:
Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri.
(5) Northwest:
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas,
Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado.
(6) Far West:
Washington,
Oregon, and California.
(Gillin, 1955: 111)

164
notion is often expressed
"foreigners, frankly, are
"Isolationism," if it may
of the Middle States most

that "Easterners are crooks," and
inferior." . . . (b) Special values.
be called a value, is the feature
often cited. . . . (Gillin, 1955: 112)

Gillin added that each of these regions has sub-regions with
special emphases and special values of their own.

If particular

geographic regions are continually divided into smaller and smaller
sub-regions, when does the ethos concept become too general?

When

do we begin talking about specific values and specific situations?
Gillin noted that previous generalizations by "Mead, Gorer, and the
Kluckhohns have on their own admission been suggestive rather than
definitive (Gillin, 1955: 107)."
»

of his attempt.

*

Gillin added that this was also true
4

It seems that any attempt to generalize about

specific values for a large number of people would necessarily remain
tentative and suggestive.

Of course, this does not deny the

informative capacity of efforts to depict an ethos.

Like most

concepts, ethos is useful at its particular level of abstraction.
Robin Williams' American Society (1951) contains a lengthy
discussion of values in American society.

Preceding his discussion,

Williams wondered if such a complex society as the United States
actually had what could be called "dominant values."

Williams

wrote:
It is clear that in our society the range of interests, beliefs,
values, knowledge, and so on is so great that precise and
detailed characterizations can be done only for carefully
delimited segments of the society.
Any attempt to delineate
a national character or typical American values or a national
basic personality type is extremely hazardous, not only
because of serious gaps in the requisite data but also because
of the enormous value-diversity of the nation.
This diversity
we know to be so marked that a common core of values which
could be said to hold for the whole population would probably
be quite highly generalized.
Furthermore, values change
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through time, rendering any cross-section inventory subject
to periodic reappraisal.
(Williams, 1951: 450)
For a value to be considered dominant Williams explained that it
must compare well with other values with regard to the following
criteria:
1.

2.
3.

4.

Extensiveness of the value in the total activity of the
system. What proportion of a population and of its activities
manifest the value?
Duration of the value.
Has it been persistently important
over a considerable period of time?
Intensity with which the value is sought or maintained, as
shown by:
effort, crucial choices, verbal affirmation,
and by reactions to threats to the value— for example,
promptness, certainty, and severity of sanctions.
Prestige of value carriers— that is, or persons, objects,
or organizations considered to be bearers of the value.
Culture heroes, for example, are significant indexes of
values of high generality and esteem.
(Williams, 1951: 448)
Williams’ discussion of dominant values was directed at

describing value "systems."

"To speak of value systems is, then,

to imply that values are not simply distributed at random but are
instead interdependent, arranged in a pattern, and subject to
reciprocal or mutual variation (Williams, 1951: 451)."
of which Williams speaks are of high generality.

The values

Williams discussed

achievement and success, activity and work, moral orientation,
humanitarian mores, efficiency and practicality, progress, material
comfort, equality, freedom, external conformity, science and secular
rationality, nationalism-patriotism, democracy, and individual
personality.

It must be understood that Williams discussed each

of these at some length and paid considerable attention to their
interrelationships.

After his discussion of the above mentioned

"concrete themes (value-belief complexes)" Williams proposed the
following "suggestive" generalized formulations:
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1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

8.

American culture is organized around the attempt at active
mastery rather than passive acceptance. Into this dimension
falls the low tolerance of frustration; the refusal to
accept ascetic renunciation; the positive encouragement of
desire; the stress on power; the approval of ego-assertion,
and so on.
It tends to be interested in the external world of things
and events, of the palpable and immediate, rather than in
the inner experience of meaning and affect.
Its genius
is manipulative rather than contemplative.
Its world-view tends to be open rather than closed:
it
emphasizes change, flux, movement; its central personality
types are adaptive, accessible, outgoing and assimilative.
In wide historical and comparative perspective, the culture
places its primary faith in rationalism as opposed to
traditionalism; it de-emphasizes the past, orients strongly
to the future, does not accept things just because they
have been done before.
Closely related to the above, is the dimension of orderliness
rather than unsystematic ad hoc acceptance of transitory
experience.
(This.emphasis is most marked in the urban
middle classes.)
With conspicuous deviations, a main theme is a universalistic
rather than particularistic ethic.
In interpersonal relations, the weight of the value system
is on the side of the "horizontal" rather than "vertical"
emphases:
peer relations, not superordinate-subordinate
relations; equality rather than hierarchy.
Subject to increased strains and modifications, the received
culture emphasizes individual personality rather than group
identity,and responsibility.
(Williams, 1951: 501-502)
Williams often repeated the tentativeness of such an undertaking

as the description of the dominant values, value systems, or "ethos"
of American society.

In his concluding remarks Williams reiterated

the dangers attached to the delineation of values:
It must always be kept in mind that these themes, values, and
systems of belief do not operate as single and separate units
but are in continually shifting and recombining configurations
marked by very complex interpenetration, conflict, isolation
and labeling of themes must not be allowed to leave the
impression— to repeat an earlier caution— that values are
disembodied elements which somehow function apart from concrete
social relations and personalities.
Although values are
abstractions, everything described in this chapter must be
capable of observation, in some sense, in the behavior of real
personalities and in actual social structure, or else we have
mistaken fancy for fact.
(Williams, 1951: 500)
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According to Cuzzort, there are those who think Sorokin may
have mistaken fancy for fact.

This opinion is based on the great

time span considered, the variety of topics discussed, and the
disdain for Sensate culture which appears in Sorokin's mammoth Social
and Cultural Dynamics (1937).

Sorokin's Ideational and Sensate

i

cultures can be said to deal with ethos because they are the result
of Sorokin's attempt to typify the concerns or direction of cultures.
The following lists comprise a comparison of some of the significant
differences between Ideational and Sensate cultures.

Ideational Culture Mentality

Sensate Culture Mentality
4 .

1.

Reality is seen as eternal,
spiritual, and transcendental to
the senses.

Reality is seen as located in
material "things."
It is
immediately apparent to the
senses.

2.

The main needs of the individual
are spiritual.
Physical desires
are curbed.

The primary needs of man are
physical.
Sensory indulgence
and gratification should be
maximized.

3.

"Progress" is achieved through
self-control.

"Progress" is achieved through
control of the external milieu,

4.

There is belief in "Being," and
an indifference to transient
values.

There is belief in "Becoming,"
Values are transient.
There
is endless readjustment.

5.

The sensual man and self are
repressed.

People are dedicated to "selfexpression" and to sensual
fulfillment.

6.

People are introvertive and
subjective in character.

People are extrovertive and
objective in character.

7.

Truth is based on mystical
inner experience.
Intuition,
faith, and revelation are
used.

Truth is based on observation,
measurement, and experimen
tation.
Logic is used.

8.

The moral code is imperative,
everlasting, and unchangeable,

Morals are relativistic, change
able, and oriented toward the
provision of happiness.
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Ideational
9.

Culture Mentality (cont.)

Art is symbolic and directed
toward religious va l u e s .

Sensate Culture Mentality (cont)
Art is directed toward
entertainment.
(Cuzzort, 1969: 239)

Sorokin’s scheme is inclined toward categorizing or typifying
particular cultures.

An examination of Williams’ propositions

suggests with little doubt that we live in a Sensate culture.

Of

course, it would not be necessary to consider Williams’ conclusions
to be aware of that.

The characteristics listed above are far

removed from any particular case.

In other words, it would be

unwise to consider any of the above generalities as the typification of a particular culture.

For any particular culture there

would probably be numerous exceptions.
Folsom and Strelsky (1944: 296-307) have also written a
generalized, "exceedingly preliminary, tentative" article on
Russian values and character.

"He who thinks about values should

always keep clearly in mind these distinctions:
1.

The value-object, which is something outside the human
neuro-muscular-glandular apparatus, versus the type of
attitude with which the human being reacts to the object.'

2.

Cognitive ideology (the way we conceive and categorize
the world in order to understand or control it, including
theological and ficticious concepts and beliefs), versus
value-system or ethos (the way we.conceive and categorize
the world in terms of our feelings and attitudes toward i t ) .
(Folsom and Strelsky, 1944: 296)
Unlike Gillin, these writers discussed Russia as a whole and

used Germany, France, England, and the United States as contrasts.
Folsom and Strelsky discussed six categories of values and attitudes:
nature, artifacts, symbols and ideas, human beings and their
characteristics, society and institutions, and abstract value-objects.
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The following are a few examples of the authors’ characterizations.
1.

Nature.
The Russians lack the German's rapturous attitude
toward wild nature, the Frenchman’s high aesthetic valuation
of formal, cultivated gardens and parks, and the Irishman’s
nostalgic affection for particular places.
Their feeling
is rather for the soil of Prussia in a generalized sense,
and it has an almost religious character. . . .

2.>

Artifacts.
Russian valuation of the world of artifacts is
probably more limited and less richly varied than that of
West-Europeans and Americans, but the Soviet era has brought
a tremendous a w a l u a t i o n of machinery and large-scale
technology. . . .

3.

Symbols and Ideas.
The Russians hold an instrumental rather
than a moral, puristic attitude toward their language.
In
this they are quite unlike the French.
The Russian mothertongue is a flexible instrument which easily admits change.
•

•

•

Ideas as such have high value? in Russia; philosophy,
theology, evolution, political theory, enter into everyday
conversation to an extent which surprises the Anglo-Saxon,
although to the German it is less unfamiliar. . . .
5.

Society and institutions. . . . German obedience is an
exhibitionistic passon, well symbolized by the goose-step.
It is based typically upon the family authority of an
austere father, and readily passes into rebellion and
hatred against the father and a blind devotion to some leader
or even to contradictory and shifting ideals. It is not
surprising that psychoanalysis, emanating from German
culture, has made so much of the Oedipus complex, the
super-ego, and the whole psychological problem of
authority. . . .
. . . it seems a reasonable interpretation of avail
able evidence to say that the Russian has less of family
generated hostilities and greater real respect for age. . . .
For both Russians and Germans, more than for AngloSaxons, the end seems to justify the means, but for the
Russians the end is objectively clear, humane, and
universal. . . . (Folsom and Strelsky, 1944: 298-300)
One would expect that the authors section of "human beings

and their characteristics" would fit well in the context of "ethics."
However, the authors apply their "ethical-emotional types" to whole
cultures.

As a result, the "ethical-emotional types” are discussed

within the context of ethos as opposed to ethics.

The descriptions
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which appear below conform to what Redfield called ’’national
character.”

Once again the authors said these types were ’’exceedingly

tentative. ’’
A.

B.

Types promoting social solidarity:
1. Appolonian:
harmony, moderation, conservation of the
past, social participation, self-control, guidance by
reason, a variety of interests, both contemplative and
active; Aristotle, Vishnu, Confucius; Greek, English,
French, Chinese, Zuni cultures.
2.

Christian:
love of God and fellowmen, devotion, relin
quishment of force, asceticism only so far as necessary
to maintain the dominance of love and unselfishness;
humility, tolerance; Jesus, St. Augustine; Arapesh
culture.

3.

Mohammedan:
merging of self with a society of believers
for a holy war.against the unbelievers; warrior discipline
and passionate obedience to the leader; Nazi culture.

Types representing varieties of individualism:
4. Buddhist:
detachment from desire, sexual absistence,
relinquishment of property, solitude, practice in
control of feelings (through postural and respiratory
techniques et al.); Gandhi, Hindu asceticism.
5.

Dionysian;
exaltation of individual strength, abandon
ment of feelings, affirmation of life, with positive
acceptance of its conflicts and sufferings, the tendency
to extremes, explosive and ambivalent behavior:
Nietzche, Plains Indians.

6.

Promethean:
technological control of environment, rest
less activity, "unceasing making,” intelligent, rational
effort, individual independence, multiple goals;
Goethe’s Faust, John Dewey, modern industrialism and
science.

7.

Calvinist:
ceaseless competitive effort to become,
or to be convinced of being, one of the elite (or
"elect") within a given society, in either a worldly
or other-worldly sense.
Uses rational effort and
moderate asceticism: Northwest Indians, capitalistpuritanism.

According to these definitions, American character is mainly
Calvinist-Promethean-Appolonian; German character fundamentally
Promethean-Calvinist-Dionysian, but driven into Mohammedanism
by the sense of encirclement and the Nazi movement; Japanese
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character is Mohammedan-Appolonian; Russian character is funda
mentally Christian-Dionysian, with a recent development of
Prometheanism.
(Folsom and Strelsky, 1944: 303)
The "ethical-emotional types" are not specific in the sense
that the Protestant Ethic and the Scientific Ethic are specific.
Nevertheless, these types conform most closely with this writer's
understanding of ethics in that emulation models are named and the
emotional make-up or Personality Cynosures are discussed.
The articles by Gillin and Folsom and Strelsky, like any work
on the subject of ethos which this writer has seen* claims to be
tentative and suggestive.

It is possible that this is simply a
%

fashion such as the reliable call for "further research."*

On the

other hand, the tentative and suggestive standing of ethos
depictions indicates that such depictions may (1) serve the casual
student whose main concern is to learn a little about another culture
or (2) provide the serious student with a direction for research on
a level of abstraction which is more specific or concrete.

Ethos and Equilibrium
Ralph Pieris (1952: 339-346) contends that ethos may be
dichotomized into latent and operative sectors.

The latent sector

is comprised of those values which are considered desirable by a
large portion of the population but are thought to be too "idealistic
or utopian" to be consistently practiced.

The operative sector

consists of what is really happening or what men believe is really

*This is not to say that the call for "further research" is
unwarranted or illustrative of modesty.
Its frequency suggests
that the call is a norm of the scientist.
This writer has never
read an article which claimed final authority.
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happening in their society.

Stated otherwise, we may say that the

latent sector is comprised of ideals while the operative sector is
comprised of institutions.

Pieris argues that a society is in a

state of "perfect" equilibrium when there is no discrepancy between
the latent and operative sectors.

To the extent that such a discrepancy

exists a society is in "static" or "dynamic" equilibrium.

"Static"

refers to a stable discrepancy while "dynamic" refers to a changing
degree of discrepancy.

Pieris said that his use of ethos was

derived from W e b e r ’s understanding of culture— the result of man's
attempts to relate value-ideas to empirical reality.

According to

Pieris, as the value-ideas fit less and £ess well with empirical
reality a condition of "ideological entropy" exists wherein the
"ethos is self contradictory."

When such a discrepancy is unresolved

the result is anomie.
The standing of a value-idea is an "ideal" implies that such
a value-idea is beyond any specific situation.

In pieris’ own terms,

the latent sector is comprised of the desirable but believed to be
unattainable modes of action.

If this is the case, what populace

would be upset to discover that empirical facts did not correspond
to their "utopian" conceptions?

Neither does it appear surprising

that an ethos would or could be self contradictory since there is
nothing inherently consistent about a set of values.*

It may simply

be a quirk of Pieris' definition but the counter-posing of latent

*Recall Becker's discussion of the long-run irrationality
of values.
It would that the same applies to a whole set of
values.
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and operative sectors seems to imply an inherent self contradiction.

Ethos and the Parsonian Method
Parsons places considerable emphasis on the role played by
values in human activity.

Lipset paraphrased Parsons emphasis:

"Beliefs and values are actualized, partially and imperfectly, in
realistic situations of social interaction, and the outcomes are
always co-determined by the values and the realistic exigencies
(Lipset, 1963: 531)."
Value-orientation is essential for the definition of roleexpectations which are themselves essential to social interaction.
According to Parsons, there are five pairs which constitute the
"pattern alternatives" of value orientations.

They are:

A.

Affectivity vs. Affective neutrality
"The polarity of affectivity-neutrality formulates the
patterning out of action with respect to this basic
alternative."

B.

Self-Orientation vs. Collectivity-Orientation (The individual
faces a choice of pursuing interests private to himself or
shared with other.)

C.

Universalism vs. Particularism
"The primacy of cognitive values may be said to imply a
universalistic standard of role-expectation, while that
of appreciative values implies a particularistic standard."

D.

Achievement vs. Ascription

E.

Specificity vs. Diffuseness
The scope of e g o ’s interest in the object.
1960: 489)

(Martindale,

Lipset used these "pattern-variables" for a cross-cultural
comparison of the United States and the U.S.S.R.

According to Marsh,

Lipset concluded that "they are similar in the emphasis on
universalism, achievement, and specificity.

They differ in that
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the United States is more self-oriented, or less collectivity
oriented than the Soviet Union (Marsh, 1967: 28)."*
In a different context, Lipset tried to demonstrate the
fruitfulness of the value perspective in comparative analysis.
In this article Lipset used the dimensions of elitism-equalitarianism, ascription-achievement, particularism-universalism and
diffuseness-specificity.

Lipset did no predicting.

Instead, Lipset

used historical facts to explain why Canada, Australia, the United
States, and Great Britain varied with regard to the above dimensions.
The dimension of elitism-equalitarianism is a sort of overall
characteristic which Lipset-derived from«the other three.
A society may emphasize that a person in his orientation
toward others (1) treats them in terms of their abilities and
performances or in terms of inherited qualities (achievementascription); (2) applies a standard or responds to some personal
relationship (universalism-particularism); or (3) relates to a
selective aspect of another or to many aspects (specificitydiffuseness). (Lipset, 1963: 515)
Lipset noted that Australia was less elitist than Canada,
which was less elitist than Great Britain.

Many would consider this

a strange arrangement, Lipset contends, since all are parts of the
British Commonwealth.

The fact that they are members of the common

wealth is not so important as are the historical conditions under
which they originated.

Among the conditions cited by Lipset are

Great Britain's period of feudalism, Canada's loyalty during the
American revolution, and Australia's beginnings as a penal colony.
Another study using the Parsonian pattern variables (Zurcher,

*Folsom and Strelsky would have agreed.
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Zurcher, and Meadows, 1965: 539-548) forwarded two hypotheses.

The

authors hypothesized that (1) particularism is influenced by culture
and (2) that more particularistic individuals working in a universalistic setting would evidence higher alienation than less particularistic
individuals.

The groups chosen to represent different cultures

were Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, and Anglo-Americans.

The authors

claimed that the first hypothesis was supported in that Mexicans
scored higher than Mexican-Americans and Mexican-Americans scored
higher than Anglo Americans on a scale of particularism.

The results

for the second proposition were in the right direction but were not
statistically significant.

-

-

The articles by Lipset and Zurcher are attempts to use the
pattern alternatives developed by Parsons.

As a method of analysis

it has the advantage of being able to compare different cultures
and intracultural groups on the same dimensions.

The source of

advantages for this method— a limited number of dimensions, each of
which covers a total range— is also the source of disadvantages with
respect to ethos.

Though Parsons’ method allows societies to be

typed systematically, it does not provide a means for determining
a unique style or character of a society.

In this respect, Parsons'

pattern alternatives and ethos are complementary rather than
alternative concepts for social analysis.

For example, Lipset

found that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are similar in their emphasis
on "achievement."

On the other hand, Parsons' method would not be

able to discover that "Russian school children ranked bankers and
priests near the bottom of the-occupational prestige scale, while
American children ranked these near the top (Folsom and Strelsky,
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1944: 300)."

In other words, Parsons' method focuses in five

dimensions while the method used by Folsom and Strelsky permits
a degree of detail which is limited only by their curiosity.
The use of pattern alternatives in particular, and values in
general, as dependent and independent variables has received
criticism.

Lipset had written that "events structure institutionalized

arrangements (values) and predispositions and these in turn determine
later events (Lipset, 1963: 530)."

Of Lipset, Marsh writes:

Values are analyzed as both dependent and independent variables.
As dependent variables, current values are said to be determined
by factors in the history of nations in question.
But where
Lipset uses values as independent variables, he is not always
very precise about t h e ,relationship between values and behavior.
We find statements like "behavior 'reflects' values" or "values
are 'manifested' in behavior.” . . .
. . . Pattern-variables and other techniques for stating the
value orientations of societies are powerful tools for concise
description.
However, since comparativists want not only to
describe, but to explain and predict as well, it follows that
we cannot rely solely on "value" approaches like that of Lipset
at this time.
(Marsh, 1967: 28-29)

Three Cross-Cultural Approaches to Ethos
It is generally the case that a societies conception of ideal
man can be inferred from an examination of their expressed preference
with regard to values in general.

This idea is not unlike the one

which says that man's conception of the "good" is’ influenced by his
conception of the "true."

"There can be no doubt that an individual's

or a group's conception of what is and what ought to be are inti
mately connected (Kluckhohn, 1951: 391)."

Like the difference between
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the existential and the evaluative* "ethos and ethics" are connected;
this is frequently the case where studies do not concentrate on one
or another of these aspects but simply study complexes— the nature
of man and the style of society are mixed.

The three studies or

approaches to be discussed in this section have been cited with great
frequency** by other students of values.
a different approach to values.

Each of the three takes

The method used by Morris is the

oldest of the three and in all likelihood his method has passed its
apex of influence.

The method used by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck is

the single most influential approach in the study of values.

The

method used by Rokeach, appearing in 1973, has not as yet passed the
test of time.

In terms of the number of citations which this work

by Rokeach has received, it is not possible at this time to assess
its impact.

Charles Morris
In 1942 Charles Morris published a book entitled Paths of L i f e .
His method relies in the rank-ordering of "13 ways to live."
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Preserve the best that man has attained
Cultivate independence of persons and things.
Show sympathetic concern for others.
Act and enjoy life through group participation.
Experience festivity and solitude in alternation.
Constantly master changing situations.
Integrate action, enjoyment, and contemplation.
Live with wholesome, carefree enjoyment.

*This difference, which this writer recognizes as a convention,
is most obvious where two people agree on the "facts" but disagree
on the "good."
**Rokeach is the exception in terms of his most recent book.
He is recognized as an authority on values in psychology but
receives only scant reference in sociology.
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(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)

Wait in quiet receptivity.
Control the self stoically.
Meditate on the inner life.
Chance adventuresome d e e d s .
Obey the cosmic purposes.
(Morris in Marsh, 1967: 223)

Using a Likert scale of numerical values Morris claimed "the
attainment of a cross-cultural interval scale for measuring values
(Marsh, 1967: 224)."

The computed means for the 13 ways can be

compared in at least two ways.

First, the mean scores of countries

for any particular "way" can be compared.

Second, the ways can be

ranked to show relative popularity in any particular country.
Further analysis by Morris made use of the statistic "D."*
The statistic "D" shows which societies have the largest differences
and the greatest similarities.

For instance, the greatest differences

were between "(1) U.S. and China,
and China.

(2) U.S. and India, and (3) Japan

The greatest cultural similarities on the ways to live

values are between (1) the U.S. and Norway,

(2) India and Japan,

and (3) Japan and Norway (Marsh, 1967: 226)."**
The benefits and drawbacks of Morris' method are similar to
those of Parsons' pattern variables.

It is not as detailed or

comprehensive as the Folsom and Strelsky type but it is more
economical in terms of time and lends itself to statistical treat
ment.

Morris' method dictates that the 13 ways are presented as

they are to the respondents.

Parsons method on the other hand, can

*The statistic "D" is computed as follows:

D =

, where

"d" is equal to the difference between two countries mean scores on
each way to live.
(Marsh, 1967: 225)
**Morris compared Canada, the United States, India, China,
Norway, and Japan.
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make use of situations which are realistic to the respondents; their
position on the five pairs is inferred from their responses.

Morris'

items are stated in idealized form rather than in the more precise
form of customary norms.

Both forms could be used with Parsons'

m ethod.

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck
The approach used by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck is based upon a
three-part conception of psychology.

The authors noted three

integrated elements which enable and confine valuation.

These

three elements are the cognitive, the affective, and selective.*
The combination of these three elements results in a "directive
tendency" for valuing.

The distinction between "selectiveness" and

"directiveness" is unclear except that a "directive tendency .
aids in the selection among possible value systems and also serves
to give continuity to the total system (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck,
1961: 8)."
Directiveness appears to be causally important in at least two
senses.
First, although the several authors cited above have
argued strongly and convincingly that the cognitive and
affective elements are inextricably interrelated, they do not
go far in indicating the "why" of the interrelationship other
than stating that it appears an irrefutable fact that what a
people believe to be true (existential premises) is strongly
influenced’ by their normative judgements and that contrariwise
the normative assumptions as to what is right and proper are
never truly separable from the existential premises.
Selectivity is discussed as an element of the total process,
but it is not clearly defined as an element which is
distinctive in having relating (integrating) and directive
(processual guiding) influences upon the other elements.
It
is our view that to the extent that the cognitive and affective

*Parsons' three-part conception is the same except that he
uses "evaluative" where Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck use "selective";
they seem equivalent.
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aspects of the process are a unity it is because of the
directive element, which is as much, or perhaps even more,
biologically given than are the capacities for either
intellection or affectivity.
It is on this basis that we state that in the concept of
a value orientation as a guiding principle, it is the directive
element which is of primary interest.
This is the second way
in which the element may be considered as a critically causal
one.
Any given value system of human beings has both a content
and a direction which derive from biologically given capacities
and predispositions but are not instinct bound, but it is the
directive aspect which is most crucial for the understanding of
both the integration of the total value system and its continuity
through time.
(Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961: 9)
A value orientation has five dimensions.
these dimensions on three assumptions:

The authors formulated

(1) "There is a limited number

of common human problems for which all people at all times must find
some solution";

(2) there is variability in solutions to all the

problems, but "it is neither limitless nor random but is definitely
variable within a range of possible solutions";

(3) "all alternatives

of all solutions are present in all societies at all times but are
differentially preferred."

Each society has "variant" or "substitute"

profiles in addition to its dominant profile of value orientations.
There is almost always a rank-ordering of the preferences or
alternatives.
The five dimensions (areas of "common human problems") are
human nature (good, good-and-evil, evil), man-nature (mastery over,
harmony with, subjugation to), time (past, present, future),
activity (being, being-in-becoming, doing), and relational
(individualistic, collaterality, lineality).

In their research

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck did not use the "good" alternative for the
human nature dimension because of the lack of societies with such
a positive view.

Each of the five dimensions is ranked within
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itself.

For example, a person may rank time as "present" is more

important than "future" which is more important than "past."
Societies or cultures are compared on each dimension as compared
with the rankings in another society.
The authors used a twenty-two item interview schedule to
determine an individual's position with regard to the five dimensions.
The items were distributed among the five dimensions almost equally.
For each item the individual was given three choices each of which
implied a different orientation.

The following is an example of one

item from the "relational" dimension.
When a community has to'make arrangenfents for water, such as
drill a well, there are three different ways they can decide
to arrange things like location, and who is going to do the
work.
A.
There are some communities where it is mainly the older
or recognized leaders of the important families who decide the
plans.
Everyone usually accepts what they say without much
discussion since they are the ones who are used to deciding
such things and are the ones who have the most experience.
B. There are some communities where everyone holds to his
own opinion, and they decide the matter by vote.
They do what
the largest number want even though there are still a very great
many people who disagree and object to the action.
C. There are some communities where most people in the
group have a part in making the plans.
Lots of different people
talk, but nothing is done until almost everyone comes to agree
as to what is best to be done.
Which way do you think is usually best in such cases?
Which of the other two ways do you think is better?
Which way of all three ways do you think most other persons
in
would usually think is best?
(Marsh, 1967:

244)
The particular task which is given as an example may be changed for
different cultures and environmental conditions so as to be more
realistic to the respondents.
The authors theorized that it was inadequate to speak simply
of the "dominant values" because this fails to recognize the importance
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of acceptable alternatives.

It must be recognized that social groups

also have variant rank-orders within the dimensions which are also
acceptable.

The elements of each dimension are referred to as

"basic values."

The authors hypothesized that it is through

persons holding "variant" orientations that change is most likely
to occur.

The stimulus for this change must be external.

The

greater the variance in the orientations of a societies members
the more susceptible to external forces will that society be.
The implications which Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s conception
of value orientation has for understanding change is based on "two
major theoretical formulations."
First, and most important, is conceptualization of the
variation in value orientations of a culture as an interlocking
network of dominant (most preferred) value orientations and
variant value orientations which are both required and
permitted. . . .
The second major deductive proposition is: The difference
between the value-orient at ion systems of seemingly quite
distinctive cultures, as well as those between the varying
segments within a given culture, are not absolute.
Instead
they are the representatives of varying rank orderings of the
same value-orientation components which are common to all
cultures at all times.
The theory also postulates, as do other of the theories
which treat of basic values, that most of the observable
patterns of action and thought give simultaneous expression to
all of the value elements.
The degree of influence of one or
another of the value orientations upon a particular concrete
behavior pattern may be appreciably greater than that of
others, but it is not often that any one of them has no effect
at all.
Therefore it follows that systems of value orienta
tions must be examined for the degree of congruence each of
the value components has with the others.
This is obviously
a task of great complexity when it is rank orders of value
orientations and not just single dominant values which must
be consideredBut however complex the analysis may be, it
is essential to the evaluation of the type and degree of
cultural integration a social system has and its distinctive
resistances and susceptibilities to change.
(Kluckhohn and
Strodtbeck, 1961: 341-342)
The ordering of each dimension would yield thirteen possible
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logical types.

The thirteen possible orderings for the relational

dimension are as follows:
Pure Rank-Order Types
1.

Individualism over Collaterality over lineality.
expressed as Ind>Coll>Lin
Ind>Lin>Coll
Coll>Ind>Lin
Coll>Lin>Ind
Lin>Coll>Ind
Lin>Ind>Coll

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

This is

Linked First-Order Types
7.

Individualism equals Collaterality over lineality.
expressed as Ind>Coll>Lin
Ind>Lin>Coll
Coll_>Lin>Ind

8.
9.

This is

Linked Second-Order Types
10.

Individualism over Collaterality equals Lineality.
expressed as Ind>Coll>Lin
Lin>Coll>Tnd
Coll>Ind>Lin

11.
12.

This is

Nonordered Types
13.

Individualism equals Lineality equals Collaterality (that
is, there is virtually equal stress on all value orientation
alternatives in the society) . This is expressed as Ind_>Lin>_
Coll.
If the frequencies of preference for two pairs of
alternatives are exactly equal, the notation would be, for
example, Ind>Lin = Coll.
(Marsh, 1967: 242)
For all dimensions, Type 13 was predicted to be uncommon.

Types seven through thirteen were understood as indications of
change.

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck argued that two alternatives

which receive equal stress suggests that one of the two had been
the dominant member of the pair.

According to Marsh:

An equal preference for Individualism and Collaterality, for
example, would suggest that the society had previously preferred
either Individualism or Collaterality but was not moving toward
a preference for the other alternative: at the time of the
study the society was caught in transition between the two
alternatives.
(Marsh, 1967: 243)

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck used a one-way analysis of variance
to determine if the intercultural differences were significant
relative to the intracultural differences.

They found that "inter-

cultural differences are significant at the .001 level relative to
intra-cultural differences in means (Marsh, 1967: 249)."

Table 1

is a graphic interpretation which Marsh used to illustrate the
confidence which a researcher may have in his statistics on cultural
differences.

The treatment given by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck revealed

three categories for the Doing-Being dimension on the basis of mean
values:
(2)

"(1) the Doing-oriented Navaho, Mormons, and Texans;

the Doing-Being-oriented Zuni:

Americans (Marsh, 1967: 250)."

(3) tiie Being-oriented Spanish-

This means that the three groups in

the first category are not significantly different.

TABLE 1
MEAN VALUES OF THE FIVE RIMROCK COMMUNITIES
ON THE DOING-BEING DIMENSION

Morm<3ns
T<sxas

Spanish--Americans

Zuni
Navaho — j

\l
6

5
Doing Being

\!

\/
4

M

3

\/
2

Doing = Being

1

0

Being Doing

(Marsh adaptation of Kluckhohn and- Strodtbeck, 1967: 250)*

The utility of a construction such as Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck1s

*This table corresponds to M a r s h ’s Table 20.

185
Value Orientation would be enhanced considerably if it could be
related to other types of social analysis.*

Kluckhohn and

Strodtbeck hypothesized relationships between the "dominant value
orientation patterns" and institutional "spheres."

These spheres

were designated as the economic-technological, the religious, the
recreational, and the intellectual-aesthetic.

Marsh reiterated

three o f »these hypotheses:
1.

Dominant value orientations of Individualism, the Future,
Mastery-over-Nature, Doing, and an Evil-but-Perfectible
human nature are associated with giving priority to the
economic-technological sphere.

*The work by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck was the result of the
Values Project conducted through Harvard University.
There was a
great deal of work done in this Project and many people were
involved.
Evon Vogt and Thomas O'dea worked in this project and
published a study in 1953 which was concerned with the Mormon and
Texan communities.
Rimrock was the Mormon settlement and Homestead
was the Texan settlement.
The communities had highly similar
environmental-ecological features.
Rimrock was characterized by "community cooperation." The town
developed an irrigation system with funds provided by the Church;
operation is paid for by equal dues from the townspeople.
A school
was built by a contribution of either funds or labor.
The streets
were graveled by the same method.
Homestead, on the other hand, developed no irrigation system
(partly because they lacked an appropriate source of wa t e r ) , a half
built gymnasium, and partially graveled streets.
Vogt and O'dea argued that such diverse paths of development
are attributable to different value orientations.
The major differ
ence is Homestead's preference for individual action.
Wells were
dug to supply water.
Contributions to the gymnasium were voluntary.
The streets were graveled according to the individual's willingness
to pay for the section in front of his property.
The settlers of Rimrock arrived with a pre-established bond—
religion.
Homestead settlers had no such bond.
They were mostly
protestant and lacked the "clanish" propensity which they saw in their
neighboring community.
In this particular case, the different patterns of community
development is attributed to the orientation of Individualism to
a far greater degree than any other element.
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2.

Dominant value orientations of Lineality, the Present,
Subjugation-to-Nature, Being, and Good-and Evil mutable
human nature are associated with giving priority to a
fusion of the religious and recreational spheres.

3.

Dominant value orientations of Being-in-Becoming, Harmonywith-Nature, Lineality or Collaterality, and the Past or
(less probably) the Present are associated with giving
priority to the intellectual-aesthetic sphere.
(Marsh,
1967: 252)

Unfortunately, no effort was made to test these hypotheses
statistically.
In the sense of ethos, the value orientation method of Kluckhohn
and Strodtbeck has the advantages of being systematic, amenable to
cross-cultural study, and lends itself to statistical treatment.

Of

course, the value orientation method does not provide the detailed
description of an ethos which is found in the Folsom and Strelsky
approach.

Rather, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck*s method seems particu

larly effective as a means of classifying or categorizing "types"
of ethos.
In the sense of ethics, the value orientation method as applied
by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck reveals little.

Since the authors were

able to generate hypotheses relating value orientations to dominant
institutional spheres it is plausible that the same could be done
for dominant ethics.

The orientations listed in Hypothesis #1 are

strikingly similar to the Calvinist perspective in particular, and
the more general "protestant ethic."

The dominant institutional

sphere in Hypothesis #1— economic-technological— is the sphere one
might expect to be dominant where the "protestant ethic" is the major
ethic.

The dominant value orientation in Hypothesis #2 corresponds

to the Confucian Ethic.

As delineated by Weber, China was dominated
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by its recreational sphere.
correct.

The intellectual sphere would be more

The intellectual sphere in China was dominated by the

"literati."

Their intellectual pursuits, however, were directed at

a thorough understanding of the "classics."

The "classics” are of
*

a religious nature.

Rokeach
The approach used by Rokeach is different from that used by
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck.

While the later used items referring to

necessary existential judgments, Rokeach used "named" values which
may or may not be translated with equivalent meaning to another
6

language.

*

*

For Rokeach:

A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct
or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable
to an opposite or converse mode of existence.
A value system
is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable
modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum
of importance.
(Rokeach, 1973: 5)
This definition of value and the manner in which it is applied is
based on five assumptions:
(1) The total number of values that a person possessed is
relatively small; (2) all men everywhere possess the same
values to different degrees; (3) values are organized into
value systems; (4) the antecedents of human values can be
traced to culture, society and its institutions, and per
sonality; (5) the consequences of human values will be
manifested in virtually all phenomena that social scientists
might consider worth investigating.
(Rokeach, 1973: 3)
Rokeach divided his values into "instrumental" and "terminal"
groups.

This is Rokeach's rephrasing of the means-ends distinction.

Instrumental refers to behavioral modes while terminal refers to
end-states of existence— as such they are ideals.
To say that a person has a value is to say that he has an
enduring prescriptive or proscriptive belief that a specific
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mode of behavior or end-state of existence is preferred to an
oppositive mode of behavior or end-state.
This belief
transcends attitudes toward objects and towards situations; it
is a standard that guides and determines action, attitudes
towards objects and situations, ideology, presentations of
self to others, and attempts to influence others.
Values
serve adjustive, ego-defensive, knowledge and self-actualizing
functions.
Instrumental and terminal values are related
yet are separately organized into relatively enduring
hierarchical organizations along a continuum of importance.
(Rokeach, 1973: 25)
RokeachTs lists of instrumental and terminal values contain
eighteen items each.
have been revised.

The lists which comprise his "Value Survey"
According to Rokeach, form "D" is the most

reliable and is in widest use.
Rokeach1s list of terminal values cfame from several sources.
Besides the values named in "the literature" Rokeach used his own
terminal values, those obtained from about thirty graduate students
in psychology, and from a "representative sample" of 100 adults in
metropolitan Lansing (Rokeach, 1973: 29).
The list of instrumental values was obtained through Anderson's
(1968) list of 555 "personality trait words" for which he has
reported positive or negative evaluative ratings.

Rokeach had a

list of 200 after eliminating words with negative meaning.
The 18 instrumental values were selected from this list according
to several criteria:
by retaining only one from a group of
synonyms or near-synonyms . . . ; by retaining those judged to
be maximally different from or mimimally intercorrelated with
one another; by retaining those judged to represent the most
important values in American society; by retaining those deemed
to be maximally discriminating across social status, sex, race,
age, religion, politics, etc.; by retaining those judged to be
meaningful values in all cultures; and by retaining those one
could readily admit to having without appearing to be immodest,
vain or boastful (thus eliminating such values as being
brilliant, clever, ingenious, and charming).
(Rokeach, 1973:
30)
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TABLE 2*
TEST-RETEST RELIABILITIES OF 18 TERMINAL AND
18 INSTRUMENTAL VALUES, FORM D (N=250)

Terminal Value

r

.70
A comfortable life
(a prosperous life)
An exciting life
.73
(a stimulating, active life)
.51
A sense of accomplishment
(lasting contribution)
A world at peace
.67
(free of war and conflict)
A world of beauty
.66
(beauty of nature and the arts)
Equality (brotherhood, equal
.71
opportunity for all)
Family security
.64
(taking care of loved ones)
Freedom
.61
(indepenpence, free choice)
.62
Happiness
(contentedness)
Inner harmony
.65
(freedom from inner conflict)
.68
Mature love
(sexual
and spiritual intimacy)
National security
.67
(protection from attack)
Pleasure
.57
(an enjoyable, leisurely life)
Salvation
.88
(saved, eternal life)
.58
Self-respect
(self-esteem)
.65
Social recognition
(respect, ad.miration)
True friendship
.59
(close companionship)
Wisdom (a mature under
.60
standing of life)

Instrumental Value

r

Ambitious
.70
(hard working, aspiring)
Broadminded
.57
(open-minded)
Capable
.51
(competent, effective)
Cheerful
.65
(lighthearted, joyful)
Clean
.66
(neat, tidy)
.52
Courageous
(standing up for your beliefs
.62
Forgiving
(willing to pardon others)
Helpful (working for the
.66
welfare of others)
.62
Honest
(sincere, truthful)
Imaginative
.69
(daring, creative)
.60
Independent (selfreliant, self-sufficient)
Intellectual
.67
(intelligent, reflective)
.57
Logical
(consistent, rational)
.65
Loving
(affectionate, tender)
.53
Obedient
(dutiful, respectful)
.53
Polite
(courteous, well-mannered)
.45
Responsible
(dependable, reliable)
.52
Self-controlled
(restrained, selfdisciplined)
(Rokeach, 1973: 28)

*This table corresponds to Rokeachfs Table 2.1.
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Each list is numbered from 1 through 18 with a blank space
after each number.

The respondent places gummed labels, on which is

indicated a particular value, in order of importance to him, in the
eighteen blanks.

The resulting hierarchies may be compared with

respect to individuals or the mean scores for each value may be
used to compare groups.
The Nature of Human Values is a large book with a considerable
number of topics.*

A few of RokeachTs findings may be of interest.

When Rokeach controlled for occupation and compared those who
planned to enter a specific occupation with those already practicing
in the field he failed to find significant differences between them
relative to other occupational groups.
For men and women in the "National” sample Rokeach found
that the sexes varied in the importance placed on several values.
One might anticipate the differences:

men place a significantly

higher value on "an exciting life, a sense of accomplishment, freedom,
pleasure, social recognition, ambition, capable, imaginative, and
logical"; women place higher value on "a world at peace, happiness,
inner harmony, salvation, self respect, wisdom, cheerful, clean,
forgiving, and loving (Rokeach, 1973: 58)."
"Clean" is the value which is most distinguishing of the rich
and the poor.

The poor rank "clean" second as opposed to seventeenth

for the rich.

The next most distinctive value for these groups is

"comfortable life."

The poor rank it sixth as opposed to fifteenth

*The use of values in distinguishing ideologies is discussed
in Chapter VI.
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for the rich.

Rokeach warns, however, that it is not safe to assume

that people will value most what they don’t have.

As an example of

what people neither have nor want Rokeach gives us "imaginative’'
and "intellectual."

These two values were ranked low by most

Americans.
Rokeach also called into question the "culture of poverty"
thesis.

If there is a culture of poverty, he explains, then we

should find the values of the poor Black even among Blacks who are
not poor or uneducated.

First, he notes, we do not find the usual

stigmata of hedonism more among Blacks than among Whites.

"Exciting

life" and "pleasure" are ranked the same by both groups, seventeenth
and eighteenth respectively.

"Self controlled," on the other hand,

is ranked in the middle by both groups.

When SES differences are

controlled, the differences in value ranking disappears with the
exception of "equality" which is still more highly valued by Blacks
(second as opposed to twelfth).

According to Rokeach, these findings

are in direct opposition to Moynihan's conclusion of a distinct
cultural difference between Blacks and Whites.

Rokeach argues,

aspirational (terminal) values are very similar among Blacks and
Whites while it is the values most closely associated with adaptation
(instrumental)- which show the greatest differences.

Ethics
The use of the term "ethic" in sociological literature is most
frequently attributed to Max Weber.

The "protestant ethic" is the

most famous of the ethics which Weber discussed.

Weber was not

satisfied with the Marxian conception of economic institutions,
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or structural forms in general, as the determinant of future structures
and ideas.
. . . W e b e r could affirm:
Specific economic conditions do not
guarantee the rise of capitalism; at least one other condition
is necessary, one that belongs to man's inner world.
There
must be, in other words, a specific motive power, the psychologi
cal acceptance of values and ideas favorable to the change.
(Timasheff, 1955: 172)
Weber conceived of these "values and ideas" as an "economic ethic."
"The term 'economic ethic' points to the practical impulses for
action which are founded in the psychological and pragmatic context
of religions (Gerth and Mills, 1946: 267)."
Weber's thesis on the relation of the protestant ethic to the
development of modern capitalism may be criticized on other
counts, but four points seem incontestable:
(1) The religious
ideas and values of ascetic protestantism tally point for point
with the ideas and motives "required" for. disciplined, ration
alized, persistent capitalistic effort; (2) protestantism did
precede the rise of capitalism in many areas (although not in
others, such as northern Italy); (3) religious attitudes were
only one of several primary causes for the development of
capitalism, but were equally indespensable for the specific
structure of the latter; (4) the specifically religious ideas
evolved in a complex mutual interrelation between an environing
social structure, a complex of religious interests (for instance,
a sense of sin and a need for salvation), and other specifiable
social elements.
(Williams, 1951: 368)
Weber not only demonstrated that protestantism, for the most
part, preceded capitalism, but showed that capitalism did not
arise in places where the structural conditions were favorable.
. . . Tfeber tried to prove his thesis on the Chinese case by
three steps:
(1) Chinese social structure on the "material"
conditions contained a mixture of elements both favorable
and unfavorable to capitalistic economy and the spirit of
capitalism.
Thus, the structural characteristics could not
be a decisive factor in China's failure to develop capitalism.
(2) Confucianism, the dominant system of ultimate values, was
consistently traditionalistic, enjoining adaptation to the
given world and not transformation of it.
(3) Taoism, the
leading heterodoxy, was unable to alter the Confucian tradi
tionalist trend because of its otherworldly mysticism and its
/
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own magical tradition.
The consequence was that Confucian
traditionalism was left in its dominant position which,
together with the literati's lack of interest in economic
production enterprises, inhibited socioeconomic innovation in
the direction of western capitalism.
(Yang in Weber, 1964:
XXXVI)
W e b e r ’s use of ethic does not depart from the present under
standing of an ethic as a diffuse set of values.

As such, thorough

descriptions of ethics tend to forgo simple point for point state
ments.

W e b e r ’s description of the Confucian ethic is no different.

W e b e r ’s most general description of Confucisnism is also the shortest.
. . . Confucianism exclusively represented an innerworldly
morality of laymen.
Confucianism meant adjustment to the
world, to its orders and conventions.
Ultimately it represented
just a tremendous c o d e o f political maxims and rules of social
propriety for cultured men of the world.
(Weber, Yang ed.,
1964: 152)
Among the most important elements of the Confucian ethic
discussed by Weber are piety, propriety, pacifism, and knowledge.
"For Confucianism the last word was

’knowledge,’ and that meant

knowledge of tradition and of the classical norms as acquired
through literary studies (Weber, Yang ed., 1964: 169).”

For

Confucious, the embodiment of all these qualities to the highest
degree was called "manhood-at-its-best."*

*This is" curiously similar to Sumner’s concept of "man-as-heshould-be." His formulations in this regard are as follows:
Group ideals may be types of character.
In the Old Testament
the ideal type is the "just man," who conformed to ritual standards
at all points.
In modern English-speaking society the "gentleman" is the
name for man-as-he-should-be.
The type is not fixed and the defini
tion is not established.
It is a collective and social ideal.
Gentlemen are a group in society who have selected a code and
standard of conduct as most conducive to properous and pleasant
social relations.
Therefore manners are an essential element of
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Ralph Linton also discussed constellations of values which
centered about conceptions of man though he did not call them
"ethics" nor consider them under a specific concept.
. . . they think of a particular system of interests as
a unit.
All societies recognize such systems, although their
members may have great difficulty in verbalizing them, and
express them in concepts such as our own concept of what
constitutes "a lady" or "a gentleman" or "the good life." . . .
Everyone in our society feels that he knows what constitutes
a gentleman, but anyone will find that he has considerable
difficulty in putting the concept into words.
A moments intro
spection will convince any reader that his picture of what a
gentleman does with respect to a whole series of situations
is very much clearer than his picture of the interests and
ratings which motivate this conduct.
Nevertheless, the concept
of the gentlemen is an effective element in our culture.
It
cannot be dismissed as a mere abstraction which the observer
derives from his dbservation of behavior patterns.
Vague
and poorly verbalized as it is, it provides a code which has
a profound influence on the lives of many individuals.
It
gives added emotional significance to certain of our cultures
patterns of behavior, thus ensuring their expression, and
guides the individual in situations for which no patterns
exist.
(Linton, 1936: 436)
Linton’s inclusion of "the good life" extends his meaning
beyond ethics.

In a sense, Linton seems to be describing ideals

in general and ideal man specifically.
ideals.

Of course, ethics contain

Parsons’ "Status-Roles" is similar except that the concept

of "ethic" and the examples given by Linton imply that high esteem
is given to the role or position in question.

Parsons’ status-

roles— "positions plus the activities appropriate to them"— lacks
any notion of Personality Cynosure.

It is plausible that particular

status roles have a concentration of esteem to the extent that a

this type. . . . Novels develop and transmit the ideal; . . .
A gentleman of today in the society of a century ago would be
thought to have rowdy manners.
Artificial manners are not in the
taste of our time; athletics are.
The "gentleman" always tends to
an arbitrary definition.
(Sumner, 1906: 203, 206-207)
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particular personality type and emulation are associated with it.
Generally speaking, an ethic is a large-order conception.
The "protestant ethic" may be manifested in businessmen, doctors,
students, or whoever.

The "scientific ethic" may be endorsed by

many people having only the vaguest notion of what science, or the
practice of it, is really about.

Advertising frequently makes its

appeals by noting that some product has been "scientifically proven,"
"tested under rigid laboratory controls," etc.

The foundation or

rationale for this type of appeal is that people believe in science.
To the extent that many people share a belief or appreciation of
them, we may say that the protestant ethic and the scientific ethic
are major ethics.
On a smaller scale we might think of particular status-roles
as minor ethics.

Doctors, lawyers, and professors evoke an image

in peoples minds of the typical

doctor,

lawyer, or professor.

Generally, these occupations are considered "professions."
occupations have high status or prestige.

These

These occupations are

formally or informally governed by a code of ethics.
entitled "Social Cohesion Through Variant Values:

In a study

Evidence From

Medical Role Relations" (Turk, 1963: 28-37) the author expected that
a student physician-student nurse team would be more cohesive if the
values which each held with regard t o ’the patient were different.
In operational terms, Turk expected that a "bureaucratically
oriented" student physician (as defined by responses to a rules and
regulations type questionnaire) teamed with a non-bureaucratically
oriented student nurse would work together better and have fewer
conflicts than if the members of the team were oriented the same.
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In his bureaucratic way, the student physician would be concerned
with the patient as an "organic system" which may or may not
malfunction.

The student nurse would be concerned with the patient

as a person.

As a result there would be no conflict of function.

The hypothesis was supported.
Turk explained these results as an indication that differing
values may be a source of cohesiveness.
partially correct.

This interpretation is

However, only some values are different.

The

particular role or image of the role played by the other is the
framework within which the doctor and nurse function.

If the doctor

behaved as the nurse then the nurse might* be puzzled or annoyed.

Turk

ignored the larger concept under which the doctor and nurse are working.
Specifically, both hope that the patient will improve^as a result of
their treatment.

Both, if you will, are working under the same ethic

or principle or code with only minor variations in their practice of
that ethic.
The "ethic approach" to value research is a convenient label
for those studies which focus on particular persons, fictional or
otherwise, as cultural examples of good or praiseworthy qualities.
"Culture heroes, for example, are significant indexes of values of high
generality and esteem (Williams, 1951: 448)."

It was noted earlier

that Americans placed a higher value on achievement than upon
ascription (Lipset in Marsh, 1967: 28).

In "New Light on Changing

American Values" (Greenstein, 1965: 441-450) the author rejected
the "widely accepted" views of Riesman and Whyte that personal
achievement is less valued than in the past.

According to Greenstein,

Riesman arrived at his conclusion by noting a change from an "age of
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production" to an "age of consumption"; a shift from inner to otherdirected modes of conformity.

By considering the results of old

survey data (1896-1910) on "hero-worship" Greenstein was able to
conclude that values have not shifted so radically as others have
suggested.

The basic shift has gone from national heroes to enter

tainment figures.

Though business and political leaders are not

common "exemplars" now, they were not common at the time of the
survey.

"However, there is no evidence to interpret these changes

as evidence of declining aspiration levels (Greenstein, 1964: 450)."
One writer was willing to argue that the study of ethics (the
emulations of those ethics particularly) 'would be the remedy for
the deficiencies between sociology and social anthropology.
Goldschmidt (1953: 287-293) said that social anthropology should be
directed towards establishing "(1) general social imperatives, and
(2) requisite functional relationships between certain cultural forms
in different departments of social life (Goldschmidt, 1953: 293)."
According to Goldschmidt, sociology has tended toward broad general
theorizing while social anthropology and ethnography have been very
concerned with enumerating cultural particulars.
needed.

A middle ground is

As an example of this middle ground Goldschmidt suggested

the concept of "arete."
The Greek word "arete" carries the meaning of those qualities
of person, circumstance, and position that distinguish an
individual of honor from the run of the mill, and hence those
qualities which are the desiderata, the goals, the hopes and
expectations of every proper person within a culture.
(Goldschmidt, 1953: 287)
Goldschmidt did a fair job of demonstrating that arete symbols
can be viewed in functional terms.

First, land as a value symbol
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has a "requisite functional relationship" with the character of the
economy.

Second, the relationship is not always functionally

positive or negative.

Third, the direction of the relationship may

be discovered by looking at the relationship between land and the
esteemed members of the society.

A Note on Ethical Theories
In a previous quotation, Linton indicates that ethics may help
to guide men "in situations for which no patterns exist."

The study

of complexes of this type provides some indication as to how people
might behave given some proximate ethic.
•

*

On the other side of the
4

coin, we find the intentionally constructed ethics which a writer
may suggest as a solution to contemporary problems or as a prediction
of future values.

Constructed ethics usually lack an example or

emulation of the man representative of the ethic.
constructed ethics appear more as ethical theories.

As such,
Usually these

theories are criticized on the grounds that "moral values cannot be
derived from natural data nor from science . . . (Allport in Maslow,
1959: 137)."*

Allport provided the following types as examples of

ethical theory which "fare badly" under social scientific analysis.
Asceticism— according to this view morality is largely a matter
of repression or negation— a denial of much or most
of m a n ’s endowment for growth.
Authoritarian Morality— . . . defines goodness merely in terms
of obedience. . •. . the result, we know,
is stultification, tyranny, and war and
therefore the destruction of virtually
all v a lues.

*Though Allport is a psychologist and, as such, is outside the
concern of this paper, his criticisms are not bound to any discipline.
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Legalistic Theories— . . . the letter of the law, being inflexible,
does not guide men in the novel and changing
encounters of daily life.
Utopian— theories are inept . . . because they plot no pathway from
today's quandaries to the ultimate beatitude they depict.
Utilitarian Ethics— . . . fixed men's minds on a will o' the wisp.
. Happiness can never be a tangible goal; it
can only be a by-product of otherwise moti
vated activity.
(Allport in Maslow, 1959:
138)

Conclusion
An ethos is a diffuse constellation of values which, when taken
together, represents a society's unique style.
approaches for such cultural characterizations.

There are numerous
John Sirjamaki

thought that an ethos was comprised of the moral principles which
make-up the social philosophy of a society.

Milton Albrecht argued

that common cultural values are "reflected" in literature.

Robin

Williams noted that cultural heroes are significant indexes of
values.

The ethics— the guides for living and the type of person

representative of it-— are intermixed with depictions of ethos.

As

is often the case, a cultural style or national character is
described as though it were a person.
What can we do with the variety of approaches to depicting
ethos?

There is no indication as yet that Rokeach's method will

work cross-culturally.

Though Rokeach says that his lists contain

items "judged to be meaningful in all cultures," this writer is not
aware of any effort to test this judgment.

If Rokeach's method were

applied to ethos its meaning would fall between Kluckhohn and
Strodtbeck and Folsom and Strelsky.

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck

specify five existential judgments which may be, and usually are
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implicit.

Folsom and Strelsky are wide ranging.

They discuss

relationships between men and objects, language, other countries,
time, space, topology, etc.
stated in idealized form.

Rokeach specifies particular values
A different meaning is derived from a

description which says that a culture values a sense of accomplish
ment, social recognition, and "ambitious," than when a description
says a culture emphasizes the "Doing" alternative of the "Activity"
dimension.
Rokeach said that the five dimensions of Kluckhohn and
Strodtbeck can more aptly be thought of as "basic philosophical
orientations than as value orientations."

In a sense he is right.

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck call their alternatives "basic values."
This implies a framework within which other values are organized.
Such a framework is literally an orientation.

On the other hand,

Rokeach’s use of idealized values is only slightly less "philosophi
cal."

This is only because each of his values implies a content— a

content which is specifically behavioral.

Since Kluckhohn and

Strodtbeck confront their respondents with concrete situations to
which they must react, their method seems a more reliable basis for
predicting behavior than Rokeach’s instruction:

"Study the list

carefully and pick out the one value which is most important for
you.

. . .

Then pick out the value which is second most important

for you (Rokeach, 1973: 27)."
When we examine the "values" used in the investigations carried
out by Albrecht, Sirjamaki, Gillin, Golsom and Strelsky, Sorokin,
Williams, Morris, and even Parsons, we see that they have in common
an interest in themes, or ideals, or broad patterns.

This is the
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nature of Complexes.

These types of values cannot tell us what a

particular person is going to do. or for what reason he is going to
do it.

If Rokeach’s limited comment can be expanded, then Complexes

are very much like philosophical orientations.

With this idea in

mind, it can be understood why Williams warned of the dangers of
inferring or deducing particulars from generalized propositions.
A good depiction of ethos or ethics must be arrived at inductively.
And the more complex the society which is being examined, the more
important it becomes to remember that "ethos" is an abstraction
which does not apply to any single individual, but which is not
completely removed from any'individual. *
Since Complexes are abstractions which permeate a society they
are not entirely removed from specific values.

The relationship

between the specific values and the diffuse is explicit in the
Vanfossen typology.

Their relationship is also implicit in any of

the methods used by the above named researchers.

Sirjamaki utilized

ideal norms in describing part of the American ethos.

Sorokin

observed the literature, art, music, law, religion, and many other
cultural elements to derive his Sensate and Ideational concepts.
Williams discussed norms, "humanitarian mores," beliefs, and what
have you in order to illustrate the American value systems.

Why

are Complexes an important addition to norms, beliefs, ideals, and
systems?

Complexes are important because they represent the

Gestalt of a culture which will not be found by studying only the
norms of a delinquent gang or some other comparatively small entity.
Complexes remove specific values from isolation and treats them
within the context of a larger social entity.

Is there a best method

for doing this?

The best method is one which considers an array

of value types from a variety of sources.

In other words, a

thorough depiction of ethos would follow in the style of Williams
or, on a smaller scale, the method of Sorokin.

The methods of

Parsons and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck would have the advantages of
economy— several cultures could be compared on the same dimensions
in quantifiable terms.

The methods used by Williams and Sorokin,

though more detailed and well rounded, could not be done nearly
as quickly as those of Parsons and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck.

The

method used by Rokeach is too narrow to employ only his idealized
values.

Rokeach’s technique would betteif serve as an augmentive

tool to other methods.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

A Theory of Value
In 1959 an article was published in the American Sociological
Review entitled "A Theory of Value" (Catton, 1959: 310-317).

Catton

defined value as "a conception of the desireable which is implied
by a set of preferential responses to symbolic desiderata (Catton,
1959: 312)."

The theory is composed of the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1:

Socially acquired conceptions of the desireable
(values) influence human choices among nonsymbolic desiderata.

Corrolary la:

Significant correlations may be found, at any
given time, between values and personal desires.

Corrolary lb:

Within an isolated social system, such
correlations tend to increase through time.
That is, there is a strain toward alignment of
desiring with socially acquired values.

Corrolary lc:

The influence of values (as defined above) upon
human choices among non-symbolic desiderata is
conditioned by socially acquired knowledge of the
characteristics of the desiderata..

Hypothesis 2:

When values are held constant, desiring (or
"motivation") varies inversely with t h e '"distance"
(in an n-dimensional psychological space or value
space) between the valuer- and the desideratum.

Hypothesis 3:

When values and desideratum-to-value distances
are held constant, desiring varies with the'
activation of levels in some prepotency hierarchy.
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Hypothesis 4:

A valuer’s responses to sets of subsidiated
desiderata are more predictable than his
responses to sets of independent desiderata.

Hypothesis 5:

A valuer's responses to sets of congruent
desiderata are more predictable than his
responses to sets of independent desiderata.

Hypothesis 6:

When values are held constant, the order of
preferences among a set of desiderata may
nevertheless vary from person to person or from
group to group as a result of the failure of
each person or group to be fully cognizant at
all times of all the dimensions of the value
space.
(Catton, 1959: 312-317)

This is the only formal "theory of value" which this writer
discovered in the sociological literature.
theory is inadequate.
hypothesis.

Unfortunately, this

Two criticisms can be made of the first

First, if "conceptions of the desireable" influence

choices then it is also true that conceptions of the undesirable will
be influential.*

Second, it doesn't seem possible to test the first

hypothesis since "non-symbolic desiderata” cannot be symbolized
without destroying the desideratum's condition of being non-symbolic.
Even though people do not always desire those things which
they think desirable, more often than not there will be a consistent
relationship.

As a result, Corrolary la is virtually tautological.

Corrolary lb is as tautological as la.

Furthermore, why does Catton

*For example, in parts of Africa there was a high incidence
of blindness due to glaucoma.
This disease was transferred to the
human eye by flies.
Medical technicians from the World Health
Organization drastically reduced the incidence of glaucoma by simply
teaching the local people to brush the flies from their faces.
Without being aware of the relationship between flies and blindness,
the presence of flies on the face was a neutral conception.
Wien
they became aware of the relationship between flies and blindness,
flies on the face became a "conception of the undesireable" and the
people thus preferred to brush away the flies.
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use the phrase "socially acquired values" in one place and simply
"values" in others?

Also, what is the tension implied by Catton's

use of the term "strain"?
term "conditioned"?

As for 1c, what does Catton mean by the

How does one gain "socially acquired knowledge"

of desiderata which are non-symbolic?

"Socially acquired knowledge"

implies the transmission of information.

This transmission in turn

implies the interplay of symbols (words, mannerisms, etc.).
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the farther away the valuer is from
acquiring some desiderata the less the valuer will desire it.

Rokeach

found that Americans neither had nor wanted the values of "intellectual"
and "imaginative."*

This would support Catton's hypothesis.

Rokeach

also found that persons who did not live in clean environments were
more likely to value cleanliness ("clean").

This is in contradiction

to Catton's hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 is most curious.
"activation"?

What does Catton mean by

A prepotency hierarchy implies that some values are

of greater power or influence than other values.
be restated:

Hypothesis 3 might

A person has a greater desire for desiderata which are

more desirable.
Hypotheses 4 and 5 are subject to the same qualification.

Both

require that the individual be aware of the subsidiary and congruent
characteristics of the sets of desiderata to which they are responding,
The provability of hypothesis 6 requires that the researcher is

*Catton's second hypothesis is consistent with dissonance
theory.
In these terms, the valuer would have less desire for the
desideratum which is farther away so as to reduce the dissonance
produced by the situation of high desire coupled with a low
probability of satisfaction.
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also aware of "all the dimensions of the value space."
Franz Adler criticized Catton's theory by saying that "the
valuations of individuals, singly or in the aggregate, can be known
only from their actions (Adler, 1960: 85)."

Using this interpretation,

Adler translated Catton's theory with results that are similar to
this writers criticisms.

Catton defended himself by saying^ that

"peoples values are not the objects they desire, nor even their
desires for those objects, nor their strivings (actions) for those
objects . . . (Catton, 1960: 87)."

Uses of Value and Criticisms of Value
Belshaw
According to Belshaw in "The Identification of Values in
Anthropology" (1959: 555-562), the use of values may be categorized
into three major groups.

S.* F. Nadel characterized the first group

with his definition that "values are ideas about worthwhileness
(Belshaw, 1959: 555)."
group.

Clyde Kluckhohn characterizes the second

He "holds that a value is a conception relating to a code

or standard.

It implies the desirable— but just any kind of desire

will not do:

it must be justified morally, by reasoning, by

aesthetic judgment or by some combination of these (Belshaw, 1959:
556)."

The third usage, which is more general than the other two,

derives values from action, i.e., peoples values are reflected in
their actions.
Belshaw added that each use of "value" implies a method for
investigation.

Nadel's kind of value is tapped through questions

about what a subject desires.

This kind of investigation may cover
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a very wide range.

Morris' 13 ways to live may be included within

the range of a subject's desires.

The same is true of Rokeach's

instrumental and terminal values.

Since "desires" is such a broad

qualifier, studies concerned with norms, beliefs, or ideals may all
fall within this category.
Like Nadel, Kluckhohn's use of value requires that the subject
conceive of his values.

That is, a value is a conceptualization.

Kluckhohn's usage is more specific.

The subject must be able to

verbalize the value and justify it.

As a result, Kluckhohn's type

of value is suited to institutional or ideological research where
values are frequently‘buttressed by rationalizations.
requires more than an idea about worthwhileness.

Kluckhohn

His stress on a

value's influence on the "selection from available modes, means, and
ends of action" adds the specific behavioral component lacking in
Nadel's formulation.

Kluckhohn's concept can be used in questionnaires

but the items would have to be more specific than Rokeach's "named"
values.
The third use of value which Belshaw discussed covers the
widest range of possible meaning.

If peoples values are reflected

in their actions then the method for investigating values is simply
to observe behavior.

This understanding is the one which has

received the most severe criticism.

Fallding's criticism of concepts

which place values in a causal position demonstrates the basis of
this conceptualization's weakness.

The practice of inferring values

from behavior has been used as a criticism of questionnaire techniques.
As the critics would say, what a subject says about his values has
the same weakness as an observer's interpretation of action since
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"verbal" and "non-verbal" are merely distinctions in behavior.
Rokeach explained his reasons for choosing the method he used
rather than other techniques.

Two other methods were considered and

rejected.
One concerns the drawing of inferences about a person’s values
from his behavior in structured situations.
This approach was
rejected because it had too many drawbacks:
It is timeconsuming a n d ,expensive; it cannot be employed with large numbers
of people; it is difficult to interpret and quantify; and it may
be biased by the observer’s own values.
A second approach is
to ask a person to tell us in his own words about his values— a
simple phenomenological approach.
This was also rejected because
it has drawbacks: A person might not be willing or able to tell
us about them, or he might be highly selective in what he
chooses to tell us.
To get around such limitations, we presented the respondent
at the outset with previously constructed lists of terminal and
instrumental values, wherein the only burden placed upon him
is to rank them for importance.
The two lists were designed to
be reasonably comprehensive and were at the same time worded in
a manner that would, it was hoped, yield phenomenologically
valid data.
That is, the measuring instrument was designed to
elicit information about values that the respondent would be
willing or even eager to admit he had, which meant that it
could neither be couched in negative terms (e.g., cowardly,
irresponsible) nor in terms so positive as to give the impression
of immodesty or boastfulness (e.g., brilliant, clever).
(Rokeach,
1973: 26)

Fallding
Fallding (1965: 223-233)* also directed himself to criticisms
of value concepts.

He argued that hierarchical constructs are

inadequate because they fail to account for shifts in value and imply
that time and place are static.

This criticism is unimportant when

the student is interested in a particular temporality.

The adequacy

of a value concept9, like any concept, depends upon the purpose

*Fallding’s formulations are discussed at greater length in
Chapter III.
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intended for the concept.

Rokeach's rank-orderings of "instrumental"

and "terminal" values may not explain change over time but it does
indicate something about the "values" that different people with
different characteristics endorse' at a particular time.
Fallding also argued that a value holds a "self-sufficient"
status.

Pleasures and interests "are capable of becoming values if

they attain self-sufficient status."

This criticism is also

problematic because it necessitates that one determine self-sufficiency.
Fallding's best criticism is that it is incorrect to assume that all
behavior is value-oriented.
tion into values:

Compulsions "are not capable of exalta

they compete with them rather, and so far as a

person is in the grip of compulsions his capacity to pursue values
is drained away (Fallding, 1965: 226)."
Perhaps the most difficult problem involved in relating values
to behavior is the problem of establishing a causal relationship
between the two.

This is subject to the fallacy of circularity.

With regard to values, an argument is circular when (1) one infers
the existence of a value from an observed behavior and (2) then
explains the behavior as though it were caused by the value.

Means-Ends
A different though closely related problem surrounds meansends constructs.

Parker (1967: 463-466) said:

If they can be distinguished, (intrinsic values from
means), the social scientist, at least by implication, is
assigned a new role:
the scientist displaces the political
actor as the validating agency of desired ends.
The scientist,
by estimating their relative "yield" in terms of the degree of
satisfaction afforded (which involves considering their
relative "cost" in terms of the extent of other values
sacrificed), determines the desireability of desired ends.
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Informed by his normative concepts and theory, the scientist
makes characterizing and especially predicting value judgements
which form the basis, an objective one, for the selection of
desired ends.
His sphere of competence being so extended,
the scientist is qualified to assume the responsibility
previously regarded as an attribute of the political ac t o r .
(Parker, 1967: 466)
Without becoming involved in Parker's new role for the scientist
we can examine the basis for his distinguishing means from ends
(intrinsic values).

The difference between means and ends appears

clear until one examines the substance of the two categories.

Some

have argued that norms are the "means" for the attainment of^yalues.
Unfortunately, norms may be valued for themselves irrespective of
the effect of the norm or the "end" result of the norm.

As Riemer

pointed out, the basis for disputing policies or plans of action is
not on the level of results.
form.

The results are anticipated in ideal

The disputes occur on the level of specific courses of action.

An example from current events will illustrate the problem.

Given (

several population problems, i.e., too many people, the inability
of some persons to care for offspring, the lack of desire for some
persons to have children, the necessity of public assistance (ADC,
Welfare) for those who lack the physical means of child care, there
are several proposed solutions.

Among those allowed by the Supreme

Court is the right to abortion.

Abortion is viewed by some as one

means of avoiding or alleviating

the problems cited above.

Right to

Life groups consider abortion to be an immoral "means" of approaching
the problems.

For these groups, the having of children is an "end."

To these groups, giving birth is

considered and end no matter what

basis or rationale is used as a substantiation.

Rationales may be

religious, philosophical, legal, or simply based on a conception
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of the "woman's role.”

Is giving birth a means or an end?

It is

both.*
As a value concept the means-ends distinction is inadequate.
It is a workable approach only in highly restricted areas.

It is a

principle behind cost-benefit analyses undertaken by business and
government, but this implies the economic conception of value which
is virtually dead as a sociological approach.

Means and ends lack

conceptual clarity when discussion involves social conceptions of
right and wrong.

Franz Adler
In the broadest sense, all value research relies on behavior.
It is because of this that "value" has received such sharp criticism.
Franz A d l e r ’s "The Value Concept in Sociology" (1956: 272-279)
is directed at four basic categories of value concepts.

Adler's

intention was to show that values were either inaccessible to research
or that the reliance on behavior for manifestations of values makes
the concept altogether inadequate.

*John Dewey recognized the impermanence of means-ends
distinctions:
In all the physical sciences (using "physical" here as a
synonym for non-human) it is now taken for granted that all
"effects" are also "causes" or, stated more accurately, that
nothing happens which is final in the sense that it is not part
of an ongoing stream of events.
If this principle, with the
accompanying discrediting of belief in objects that are ends but
not means, is employed in dealing with distinctive human phenomena,
it necessarily follows that the distinction between ends and
means is temporal and relational.
Every condition that has to
be brought into existence in order to serve as means is, in
that connection, an object of desire and an end-in-view, while
the end actually reached is a means to future ends as well as a
test of valuations previously made.
(Dewey, 1939: 43)
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In the first category (1) "values are considered as absolutes,
existing in the mind of God as eternal ideas, independent validities,
etc."

In the second,

(2) "values are considered as being in the

object, material or non-material."

In the third,

(3) "values are

seen as located in man, originating in his biological needs or in
his mind.

Man by himself or man in the aggregate, variously

referred to as group, society, culture, state, class, is seen as
'holding' values."
action.
272)."

In the fourth,

(4) "values are equated with

There are in addition, some mixed types (Adler, 1956:
A d l e r ’s critique is as follows:

Values according t o '(3) are as irfaccessible to the methods
of the natural sciences (at the present state of our knowledge
concerning internal mental and emotional phenomena) as values
according to (1) and (2).
Current scientific psychology has
nothing to say on the subject.
In such a quandry the theorist
who wishes to base his sociology (or his economics, political
science, or whatnot) on values either must use a philosophical,
non-empirical psychology already in existence or must make up
one of his own.
It is very improbable that pure speculations
different from, and competing with Newtonian and Einsteinian
physics would gain any respectability in our day and age. Why,
on the other hand, speculative psychology should be given
preference by serious thinkers to experimentally gained and
scientifically organized ones is a riddle that has not yet
been seriously investigated.
The psychology used by present-day American value
sociologists is generally derived from German phenomenological
philosophy through the mediation of Max Weber and fortified
with Mead's and Cooley's social interactionism,
The result
is "interpretive" or "verstehen” sociology.
(Adler, 1956:
275)
Adler says that the link between phenomenological philosophy
and social interactionism gives rise to the fourth type of values.
These are criticized on the basis of the fallacy of circularity.
Adler suggests that the value concept should be dropped:
In the past emphasis on values has slowed down the advance
ment of the social sciences rather than furthered it.
Znaniecki,
in one of his most recent works, embodying some of the fruits
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of a lifetime of sociological endeavor, states:
"Even a
superficial survey of the evolution of some sciences of culture
indicates that their methodological progress is correlated with
the growing emphasis on the study of human actions rather than
on the study of cultural values abstracted from the actions
in which they occurred." There is no reason to believe that
this relationship would be reversed in the future.
(Adler,
1956: 279)
It would seem that Znaniecki’s comment could be more meaningful
if the term "quantitative" is substituted for the term "methodologi
cal."

This would be a reasonable substitution because the progress

of methodology is generally gauged by the sophistication of
quantitative technique.

Quantitative analysis is considered the

benefit derived from an emphasis on empiricism.

And as C. Wright

Mills put it, "any style of empiricism involves a metaphysical
choice— a choice as to what is most real . . . (Mills, 1959: 67)."
Adler apparently believes that "values abstracted from" actions
are not as real as the actions themselves.
Reconsider A d l e r ’s first sentence in the paragraph quoted
above.

There is no basis for believing that "emphasis on values

has slowed down the advancement of the social sciences.".

It may be

true that as emphasis on values decreased the sophistication of
quantitative technique increased; but it is another thing to suggest
causality where there may simply be a spurious relationship.

Adler's

unqualified use of "advancement" and "slowed down" impute cause where
none has been demonstrated.

It is arguable that computer technology

and "the research institute" have more to do with a lowered emphasis
on values and the "advancement" of the social sciences than does
the concentration of research upon human actions.
When Adler insists that the study of human actions is the

214
means by which social science is advanced he forgets that Durkheim
had emphasized actions in his early years only to stress subjective
factors in his later work.

Adler forgets that Weber did not consider

"verstehen" an end product but as a correlative or complementary
method for the development of causal explanation.
The relationship between an emphasis on values and an emphasis
on actions is similar to the relationship between theory and research—
if one or the other is neglected the results lack either meaning or
substance.

George Lundberg is as behavioristic as Adler yet

subjective factors manage to play a part in his formulations:
* . . Lundberg considers quant it activism as almost inseparable
from behaviorism.
His opposition to introspection is outspoken:
such terms as will, feelings, ends, motives, and values, he
claims, are "the phlogiston of the social sciences."
It is noteworthy that Lundberg!s uncompromising position
supporting behaviorism does not prevent him from considering
the study of values and ideals to be an important task of
sociology.
He defines value operationally as that toward which
people respond so as to decrease or avoid the "value" in question.
On the other hand, institutions are defined at one point as
mechanisms which men have established in order to secure or
achieve their primary ends— and here we see the intrusion of
the presumably unscientific concept of "end." Lundberg proposes
various empirical procedures to study values and institutions,
favoring especially attitude questionnaires which incorporate
quantitative techniques.
(Timasheff, 1955: 194)

Recommendations for the Value Concept
Taken as a group the various writings on the subject of values
that have been discussed in this paper support Clyde Kluckhohnfs
characterization of the literature as being "often vague and diffuse."
What must be done for the value concept to have greater impact on
and utility for sociology?

Barron (1951: 208-214) addressed the

study of juvenile delinquency and listed three major requirements
for value to have an impact on that area.

(1)

Social values will have to be refined conceptually in at
least three dimensions;
A. A distinction between "official" and "unofficial" values,
B. A typology of negative as well as positive values,
C. A distinction between "social processes or norms," and
"social objectives or goals."

(2)

We will need hypotheses to explain the relation of incon
sistent values held by the delinquents to inconsistency
in the delinquents behavior.

(3)

A more versatile utilization of methodological techniques.

To what extent are these recommendations valid and what does
the information in this paper say with regard to the utility of
these recommendations?

With regard to "1A" the distinction between

"official" and "unofficial" must be addressed by asking:
a

'*

we referring when we say that a value is "official"?
answered at two levels:

To whom are

*

This may be

There is the legal structure in which case

"official" values are identified with institutions which are either
legitimate (that is, there is consensus in the population that the
institution is justified) or powerful enough to enforce its rule.
The second level is the group which considers itself outside of, or
in opposition to the institution.

In this case, the "official"

values are the ones which are recognized and practiced by the members
of the group.

As a whole it is easier to speak of the legal structure

as "official," and the values of any social entity are seen as being
consistent or inconsistent with that structure.
"IB" is an important recommendation.

In the literature dis

cussed in this paper, there is no typology of negative values.

There

are, however, occasional comments to the effect that such a typology
is needed.

For example, Ralph Linton’s concept of "interest" is

supposed to encompass "value" (which implies "good") as well as those
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matters or themes towards which people have an aversion, e.g.,
murder.

It would seem possible that the methods of Rokeach could

be used to rank those qualities (negative values, aversions,
objections, or whatever name) which men do not wish to experience
or have as a characteristic of themselves or others.

Just as every

culture has its heroes, so they have their villains.

If it is

useful to know those things x^hich a culture holds in high esteem,
then by implication it must be useful to know those things which a
culture maintains as the subject of ridicule.
"1CM has already been discussed in effect.

"Social processes

or norms" may be ends in themselves and "social objectives or goals"
may be so abstract that we do not know what in fact we are striving
for.

A social objective or goal may be concrete:

abstract about an idea such as full employment.

There is nothing
The only objection

to be made for recommendation "1C" is that "social processes or
norms" and "social objectives or goals" are not necessarily distinct
in fact.
The second recommendation is applicable to values in general—
not just to delinquents.

People generally profess inconsistent

values and act inconsistently as well.

This fact is pleasantly

illustrated by LaPiere:
For example, thousands of Americans devote tens of thousands
of hours and dollars each year to casting artificial flies out
onto the waters of lakes and rivers.
Casting is itself a
complex skill requiring, in addition to considerable and
costly equipment, a good deal of practice.
The flies, or
lures, are made in great variety; and although devotees to
the activity may differ in their beliefs, all operate on the
assumption that there is one specific kind of fly that will
prove irresistible to a specific kind of fish on a given day
in a given place and with the light and wind as specified.
The practitioners of what is usually termed "fly-fishing"
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have, furthermore, relatively fixed ideas concerning how heavy
a line is permissible to use, etc.
Equipped in accordance with
the standards to which he subscribes, a fly-fisherman will wade
for hours through icy water casting here and there to locate
the fish for which that fly was designed.
Taken from their general context— vacationing, the fishing
lodge, etc.— and without regard for the actual values they
serve, the activities of a fly-fisherman appear to be completely
irrational, a system of elaborate and fruitless rituals.
Clearly, fishing in this complicated manner is not conducive
to the catching of fish. . . .
In terms of its context and the
values of the fly-fisherman, however, fly-fishing is actually
an effective procedure— as effective in its way, no doubt,
as the fishing procedures of the primitive are in theirs.
For
one thing, fly-fishing makes the catching of fish so very
difficult that few fish are caught, with the result that a
number of values held by the fisherman are served:
(1) streams
and lakes will not be fished out, and there will be fish to
not-catch in subsequent years; (2) there will not be so many
fish to eat that the very idea of fish becomes repugnant; and
(3) the man who does catch a fish in this difficult manner
will be acclaimed by his fellows for his exceptional skill.
(LaPiere, 1954: 131)
There are no hypotheses to explain the inconsistencies in the values
and behavior of people in general.

The closest thing to an explana

tion for this phenomenon is that people do not live in consistent
environments, socially or otherwise.

For everyone to act in a

consistent fashion would require a greater degree of intellect and
insight than most people, or perhaps anyone, has available.
second recommendation might be restated:

Barron's

Why do delinquents appear

to be more inconsistent in their values and behavior than other
people?
With regard to the third requirement, there is quite an array
of methods for getting at human values.
a particular concept of value.

Most of these methods imply

As Kluckhohn put it, "one finds

values considered as attitudes, motivations, objects, measurable
quantities, substantive areas of behavior, affect-laden customs or
traditions, and relationships such as those between individuals,
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groups, objects, and events (Kluckhohn in Parsons, 1951: 390)."

As

the reader is quite aware, there are more definitions than these.
Marsh came to a conclusion with regard to the study of "comparative
values" that is generally applicable to the study of values:

"the

richness of methodological innovation and continuities in research
is somewhat offset by the dearth of easily codifiable findings (Marsh,
1967: 254)."

This condition, this writer proposes, is due to two

factors.
The first factor is directly related to the fact that there
are so many value concepts.

There are many people applying many

approaches with the result that a great cfeal of information is
collected that can not be interrelated with great certainty.

The

recommendation to be derived from this is that value researchers
consistently apply the same concept in the same way— the result,
hopefully, would be a great deal of information that can be
systematized.
The second factor involves the conceptualization of value
itself.

When a person decides to study the values of some group

or social entity that person adopts or develops a concept of value
to suit his purpose.

Of course, there are many sociological

concepts that have varied definitions, but there are few if any
that have the great variability of the value concept.

Some might

argue that this demonstrates that the value concept has little to
offer.

On the other hand, the variation in value concepts suggests

that the concept has a great deal to offer.

Everyone experiences

values as truths or facts; as a sociological concept, value is a
heuristic principle the form of which changes depending upon the
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level of abstraction at which the thinker is working.

Parenthetically,

what is meant by "the values of a fly-fisherman" does not have the
same meaning as "the values of America."

The second factor then,

suggests that "the dearth of easily codifiable findings" has
resulted from the attempt to relate many different kinds of value.
With these two factors in mind, this writer must argue that the
potential of the value concept lies in the consistent application
of single concepts, but no single concept can effectively encompass
the total range of meaning.

This idea can be explained by referring

to some general characteristics of the value concepts employed by
the researchers discussed in this thesis.

Two points stand out:

(1) Value concepts which are defined in terms of "desires," "the
desirable," or "worthwhileness" are broad in that they include almost
the whole range of possible definitions of "value."

The all-

inclusiveness of this kind of definition is marred by the lack of
internal discrimination.
diversity.

It includes considerable undifferentiated

(2) Definitions which are highly discriminative or are

very precise about what constitutes a value and what does not
constitute a value usually exclude a great area of meaning.

For

example, any economic conception would be guilty of this exclusion.
What is necessary then, is a format under which we have the
inclusiveness of the first point and the differentiation mentioned
in the second point.

The fact that the Vanfossen typology was used

as the framework for organizing the varied value concepts discussed
in this thesis exposes this writer's belief that the Vanfossen
typology constitutes this format.
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Comments on the Vanfossen Typology
Has the typology effectively met the requirements and avoided
the problems involved in-the two points discussed above?

As the

reader is able to see, "value” has been considered in terms of each
of the three specific kinds of value in the typology.

For the most

part, the diffuse kinds of values (Systems and Complexes) are
considered "values" by various researchers only in the sense that
institutions, ideologies, ethos, and ethics endorse or contain
"specific" values.

The exception to this generality is that some

researchers will deal with "value" as a cultural phenomenon.

Sumner’s

"concept," Williams’ "social value," and Sorokin’s mentalities are
examples of these.

The Vanfossen typology has overcome the differences

by permitting the values of "specific" content, endorsed by specific
people to coexist in the same conceptual realm with values which
contain a multiplicity of content, and lack a specific valuer(s).
This writer does not find a great deal in the Vanfossen typology
which is new.

The body of literature discussed in this thesis is

ample evidence that each of the particular ideas in the Vanfossen
typology has been proposed before.

The novelty of the Vanfossen

typology is that it serves as a principle of organizing various
levels of positive and negative meaning.

In no way has Vanfossen

dissolved the particular senses which attach to "ethos" or "belief"
or any other type of value.

Certainly, a "norm" is not an "ideology"

and a "belief" is not an "ideal," but each of these implies
"meaning" and is, to this extent, classifiable under a common
rubric— "value." -At the present there are not very many established
relationships between the different typological elements.

We are
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aware that myths play a necessary role in the formation and maintenance
of ideologies.
some belief.

We know that norms can be legitimized in terms of
It appears that a culture’s image of man (Ethic) is

related to its style (Ethos).

The "how" of these relationships is

yet to be determined.
The harshest criticisms which value concepts have received
involve the concept’s causal status, or its status as an independent
variable.

When a theory is formulated which maintains that "values

cause actions," or that "values determine attitudes and action,"
value is considered as an independent variable.

Values cannot be

seen or touched; there is no physiological location for values.
In this regard, the idea that "values cause . . . ," has no more
theoretical validity than the idea that "God causes . . . ."

The

idea is complicated even further when causation is attributed to
one kind of "meaning" which then causes another kind of "meaning."
The idea that "values cause attitudes" is guilty of this fallacy.
In general, values are inferred from behavior of some kind.

It is

erroneous then, to explain the behavior on the basis of the inferred
values.

Logically, this is known as the fallacy of circularity.

However, most everyone believes that what he values is
related to or influences what he does.
false as it is unoperational.

This idea is not so much

At the moment, we d o n ’t know how to

measure what "it" is that influences our behavior.

Fortunately,

the Vanfossen typology does not attribute causal status to values.
However, the typology implies that values may function as contingents
for behavior.

For example, we w o u l d n ’t expect that an overtly

atheistic person could be elected president in an overtly Judeo-
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Christian country.

Obviously, values would have something to do

with the probability of this individual’s winning the election.

We

have not, however, said anything about ’’cause."
The Vanfossen typology also' allows for the existence of
negative values.

Unfortunately, this aspect is as yet undeveloped.

The typology explicitly recognizes the role of cultural heroes but
says little about the villains; what is a bad guy like and what
does such a conception say about the society.
is there a corresponding negative meaning.

With regard to ideals,

"Evil" is an example.

Like positive ideals, we feel some affective reaction to the idea
but we are not certain as to its content.

What is "evil?"

Perhaps an addition could be made to the typology.

It appears

to this writer that there is no real place for what Sumner called
"watchwords" and "phrases" (Chapter V).

Along with "watchwords"

and "phrases" we might include "icons" and other symbols such as
flags, idols, and emblems such as the swastika, the hammer and sickle,
or the skull and crossed bones.

This addition is suggested because

these symbols convey meanings to those who are familiar with them.

A Final Note on the Role of Values
This writer thinks of sociology as the history of efforts to
elevate an interest in human activity to the level of a science.

In

the effort to become scientific, empirical, and quantitative, the
sociologist has become more and more concerned with "operationaliz
ing," determining "reliability" and "validity."
"value" has been carried along in this trend.

Like other concepts,
The very term "value"

connotes something important and significant to people.

It is only
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reasonable to expect that sociologists would try to give value a
"scientific” status.

It seemed self-evident that values were

causes— the trick was to measure them.

However, the idea of values

as causes would not hold up logically.

As the material presented

in this thesis indicates, all kinds of definitions, operationaliza
tions, and methods have been tried.
This writer thinks that it is unimportant to give value a
causal status.

It is an effective and sufficient role for value

to serve the function of interpreting the different levels of meaning
of which man is capable.
,

cognitive.

"Value" adds an affective element to the
••

4

The Vanfossen typology, of course, serves the purpose of

systematizing the various usages which have been attributed to
"value."

For Max Weber, sociology was "that science which aims at

the interpretive understanding (Verstehen) of social behavior in
order to gain an explanation of its causes, its course, and its
effects (Coser, 1971: 220)."

The value concept can aid in "inter

pretive understanding" without purporting to explain causes.

Like

Verstehen, the value concept can be used as a "correlative" exercise
or complementary principle in the development of causal explanations.
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